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The ageing of the population is an inevitable demographic change that is occurring in 
Australia and many other countries. Consequently, retirement policy will be increasingly 
important. The published articles and accompanying commentary forming this PhD all 
address various important aspects of retirement policies. 
 
The first article and accompanying commentary examine Australia’s retirement policy at a 
‘big picture’ level, and discusses what mix of retirement systems Australia should be 
utilising in the best interests of the relevant stakeholders. 
 
The second and third articles, as well as their accompanying commentary, critically 
examine specific parts of an important aspect of Australia’s retirement system, the 
superannuation system. They examine ways that it could be improved. Both tax and non-
tax issues are discussed. 
 
The final article and its commentary discuss life annuities, which provide retirees with a 
secure income free of longevity and investment risk. The article examines why such 
annuities are unpopular in most jurisdictions, and what can be done to increase their 
uptake in a non-coercive manner. 
 
The article concludes by discussing how relevant research accompanied by greater public 
awareness and discussion can lead to superior policy outcomes.

his PhD contains the law and research up to the 25th of January 2016. 
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This dissertation comprises a series of articles that address different aspects of Australia’s 
retirement system. Some of the research examines retirement policy holistically, from the 
broad perspective of an overview. In doing so it discuses the goals of retirement policy, 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms for providing 
retirement incomes. Other parts of the research examine ways of improving the way 
specific mechanisms function within the Australian retirement system. 
A consistent theme running through the articles is that each seeks to pinpoint the goals 
towards which particular aspects of retirement policy are directed, and the best way to 
achieve those goals. 
Three of the four articles were published in Australian journals and directly address the 
laws and policies of Australia. Although the fourth article is published in a US journal, its 
reasoning and policy recommendations can be applied to Australia’s retirement system. 
Chapter 5, which places the US article in context, sets out details pertaining to its local 
application. 
Given that retirement policy is a broad area, the articles forming the substance of this 
dissertation discuss both tax and non-tax issues. For instance, critical evaluation of the 
concessional taxation of superannuation is a taxation issue, whereas considering whether 
annuitisation should be the default option for relevant savings for retirement is a non-
taxation issue. At times, the tax and non-tax issues are interrelated, as in the use of 
concessional tax treatment to encourage the uptake of life annuities. 
#"!
Australia, like most other countries, has an ageing population. Consequently, its 
retirement policies will inevitably have an increasingly strong impact on the well-being of 
its residents. Those in retirement will feel its impact, given that most are at a time in their 
lives when they have a compromised ability to earn income from their own labour. 
Retirement policy also impacts others not in retirement. This is not only because most 
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people eventually become retirees, but also because workers are affected by the 
retirement system in a number of ways. Specifically, the retirement regime determines the 
after-tax incomes of workers, since retirement incomes are generally funded by tax 
revenue and contributions to retirement accounts. It also affects how people view their 
future in retirement and to what degree they can view it with optimism and certainty. On 
a related point, retirement policy affects the way people view their own role, and the role 
of government, in providing them with retirement incomes. Specifically, it affects the 
extent to which people feel they are personally responsible for their own financial security 
in retirement. 
The substantial impact of retirement policy on the populace means that relevant research 
is potentially very useful. The deeper knowledge base to which it contributes can help the 
community and those in power make decisions that fulfil the aims of retirement policy. 
Further, such research can help broaden the understanding of the trade-offs implied by 
various alternative retirement policy decisions, increasing the likelihood of policy 
formulation that fairly balances the interests of people across the Australian community 
and in different financial situations. 
Specifically, all of the papers that constitute this research are designed to expand the 
knowledge base of the Australian retirement system by examining fields which, to varying 
degrees, are under-researched. Each chapter contextualises one of the published papers 
and includes an explanation of the significance of that particular article. The law and 
research in this PhD is up to date as of the 25th of January 2016. 
 
!#"!"#""!##
The four articles comprising this body of research are as follows.  
• First, Rami Hanegbi, ‘Australia’s Superannuation System: A Critical Analysis’ 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 303–26 (‘Article 1’). 
This paper undertook a critical, holistic analysis of Australia’s retirement system. It 
did this by first evaluating the commonly claimed justifications for superannuation 
and discussing the relative merits of those justifications. It then applied its analysis 
 1
of those goals to our superannuation system, and to other potential, hypothetical, 
formulations of retirement policies (for example a non-means tested pension, with 
no superannuation) and discussed the various advantages and trade-offs that 
emerged from those policy settings. 
By explicitly discussing what a system such as superannuation aims to achieve, and 
by canvassing the advantages and disadvantages of other retirement systems, this 
article set the background for the other articles, which focused their discussion on 
the way specific attributes of the Australian retirement system could be improved. 
• Second, Rami Hanegbi, ‘Improving our Superannuation Regime: A Post-Henry 
Review Look at Superannuation Taxation, Raising Superannuation Balances and 
Longevity Insurance’ (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 425–57 (‘Article 2’). 
Following the first article’s holistic view of retirement systems, this article 
considered some of the specific features of Australia’s current retirement system, 
and provided relevant policy recommendations. Specifically, it examined the 
taxation of superannuation, policies to increase superannuation balances, and 
whether laws should be implemented to encourage or mandate longevity 
insurance. The paper compared and contrasted its findings with those of the then-
recent Australia’s Future Tax System Review, commonly referred to as the Henry 
Review. 
• Third, Rami Hanegbi, ‘The Transition to Retirement Provisions: a Critical 
Analysis and a Consideration of Policy Alternatives’ (2013) 23 Revenue Law Journal 
1–22 (‘Article 3’). 
Just as the second article made suggestions to improving specific features of our 
retirement system, this article also made policy recommendations for particular 
provisions within the retirement system. Specifically, it critically analysed the 
‘transition to retirement’ (TTR) provisions, which allow taxpayers who have 
reached the preservation age to access their superannuation in a limited manner 
despite still being in the workforce. Although these provisions were originally 
intended to allow those transitioning to retirement (going from full-time to part-
time work) to top up their lower income, they are in reality most often used by 
full-time mature-age workers to reduce their tax burden. This article critically 
examined the TTR provisions against their claimed justifications, and found the 
evidence high equivocal as to whether or not they furthered those goals. The 
article also discussed other policies that could fulfil the proclaimed goals in a more 
direct, fair and cheaper manner. 
• Fourth, Rami Hanegbi, ‘Security in uncertain times: policies for increasing the 
Popularity of Life Annuities Among Retirees’ (2013) 20 Virginia Journal of Social 
Policy and the Law 467–509 (‘Article 4’). 
Whereas our superannuation system is highly prescriptive for the pre-retirement 
period, comparatively little has been done to assure retirees of a reliable income 
 2
stream post-retirement. This means that in many cases the system might fall short 
of providing retirees with the financial security they desire. This article discussed 
policies aimed at increasing the popularity of life annuities, which are unpopular in 
most jurisdictions, including Australia. This is despite the fact they life annuities 
provide a lifelong income stream, and so can give retirees a substantial measure of 
financial security. This article discussed the reasons for their unpopularity and the 
polices that could be enacted so as to make them more popular. Although the 
article was written for a US journal, its suggestions are relevant to Australia.
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Article 1 sets out a critical analysis of Australia’s superannuation system. It examines the 
aims of the superannuation system and compares the merits of superannuation with 
those of other retirement systems. The significance of this publication lies in the lack of 
Australian research that at the most fundamental level examines the aims and 
justifications for superannuation, whether superannuation fulfils such aims, and how 
superannuation compares to other retirement systems. Such research is highly relevant to 
any discussion of policy proposals regarding superannuation or other retirement policies. 
Specifically, such research is vital in deciding whether there should be more or lesser 
reliance on superannuation, and in making similar decisions for other retirement vehicles. 
By discussing the aims of the Australian retirement system, including the superannuation 
system, this paper gives a solid foundation for the other articles forming this thesis. It is 
of central importance to keep in mind the broad goals of a retirement system when 
evaluating its particular aspects. 
Specifically, the article finds that the main meritorious justification for superannuation is 
income smoothing, in that it forces people to act in what is arguably their own-self 
interest by saving for their retirement. It then goes on to discuss the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of retirement regimes that involve income-smoothing.  The article also 
critically evaluates a regime involving a government investment fund that pays retirement 
benefits based on lifetime contributions, which is another income-smoothing regime. The 
article utilises this information by discussion the trade-offs that different combinations of 
retirement regimes entail.  
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!)
After an introductory Part 1, Part 2 of the article discusses the superannuation system 
and places it in context of World Bank classifications.  
!+!)
Part 3 then critically evaluates the most frequently professed justifications for 
superannuation. Specifically, it finds that claims of a future ageing crisis are 
unsubstantiated, given that dramatic increases in future real incomes are likely to trump 
the fact that taxes will be higher due to population ageing. This point is reinforced by the 
evidence strongly indicating that superannuation has a net fiscal cost due to the cost of its 
tax concessions outweighing the savings it generates on future age pension expenditure. 
Regarding another professed goal of superannuation, intergenerational equity, the article 
finds the merits of this justification highly contentious, because, while superannuation 
does shift some of the future burden of ageing onto the current generation of workers, 
this is arguably unnecessary given that the higher income of future generations could 
mean they are better placed to shoulder such burdens. Further, there are other ways to 
shift the intergenerational burden, such as improving the government’s fiscal position. 
The strongest justification for superannuation is found to be income smoothing, in that it 
results in effectively shifting people’s lifetime income into their retirement years. The 
article discusses the relative merits of retirement vehicles such as superannuation, which 
result in income shifting, and those such as the age pension, which do not have the same 
non-income shifting effects. The former afford greater work reward and incentive, but at 
the cost of retirement income inequality, in a world where the long-term trend is towards 
further widening of income inequalities. 
!,!)
Part 4 then examines the merits of some alternative combinations of retirement regimes. 
It first discusses scenarios in which reliance on income smoothing policies is maintained. 
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Specifically, it examines the merits of a government retirement fund that pays retirement 
income stream benefits based on people’s lifetime contributions. This is in effect similar 
to a defined benefit fund that pays benefits in the form of an income stream. It finds that 
this has advantages and disadvantages for the superannuation system, and suggests that 
positive policy outcomes could be gained by complementing the superannuation regime 
with such a system. It also briefly examines the unfunded equivalent, and concludes that 
such a policy is not fiscally prudent. 
Part 4 also then examines retirement policy possibilities that do not involve income 
smoothing. Specifically, it considers the consequences of discarding superannuation while 
maintaining the age pension in its current form – or, in the alternative, combining the 
abolition of superannuation with a non-means tested pension. It finds that they are both 
affordable, and that each has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
The article concludes that there is an important need for informed public debate about 
the extent to which we should be reliant on, respectively, income-smoothing policies and 
policies that guarantee a minimum income for all retirees. Furthermore, to the extent that 
there is reliance on income-smoothing policies, there are compelling reasons to diversify 
superannuation with a government retirement fund. 
$!!($" $#%#"
Although this article was published in 2010, it remains current for its discussion of the 
aims of retirement systems and the possible alternatives. However, there have been some 
changes in the law since its publication. 
! 
In paragraph 2.2 of the article there is mention of the government’s intention to raise the 
age limit of entitlement to compulsory superannuation contributions from 70 to 75. 
When this was eventually legislated, rather than increase the eligibility age to 75, the age 
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limit was completely removed,/ meaning that an employee of any age who earns over the 
legislative threshold is entitled to receive compulsory superannuation contributions.0 
!  
Paragraph 2.3 of the article discusses the government’s proposal to legislate a staggered 
increase in the compulsory superannuation contribution rate. The government did 
subsequently legislate this, and as a result, the superannuation contributions rate now sits 
at 9.5 per cent.3 However, since the enactment of such legislation, there has been a 
change of government. The current government originally intended the process of slowly 
increasing the compulsory contributions rate to be deferred by two years.4 However, 
when the legislation was eventually passed, negotiations meant that scheduled increases 
were to be deferred by six years, meaning that the next rise will be on 1 July 2021.5 
  !"!
Part 2.4 of the article mentions that the government, at the time of publication, intended 
to keep the $50,000 concessional contribution cap past 30 June 2012, but that this would 
only be applicable to those holding superannuation balances of under $500,000. 
However, subsequently, the government did not extend the eligibility for the $50,000 
concessional contributions cap, but rather introduced a new cap of $35,000 from 1 July 
2013 for those at least 60 years of age, which from 1 July 2014 also applied to those at 
least 50 years of age.6 Further, from 1 July 2014, due to legislated indexation, the 
concessional contribution cap for those under 50 increased to $30,000.7 Also worth 
 
1 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) s 4. 
2 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth). 
3 Ibid s 19(2). 
4 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2014-5, 17. 
5 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Repeal and Other Measures Act 2014 (Cth) sch 6. 
6 Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20. 
7 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20(1)(a), 291-20(1)(b). 
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noting is that the non-concessional contributions cap is now $180,000, and when 
averaged over three years is $540,000.8 
  !"!!'!"!
Another update also relevant to Part 2.4 of this article is that the former Labor 
government introduced a higher concessional contribution rate of 30 per cent for those 
earning an annual income of at least $300,000.9 
Part 2.4 also mentions the co-contribution scheme whereby the government previously 
matched dollar for dollar non-concessional contributions made by low-income earners, at 
a limit of up to $1000 a year. While this scheme continues to exist, the government now 
only matches 50 cents for every dollar contributed by the taxpayer, with an annual limit 
of $500.10  
%!$!$ 
There have also been changes in the way superannuation withdrawals are taxed, as 
compared with the figures originally mentioned in paragraph 2.4. For those aged under 
60 withdrawing a lump sum from a regular taxed superannuation fund, the first $195,000 
is tax-free, while anything above that is taxable at 17 per cent.11 For those withdrawing 
money from an untaxed fund, the $150,000 threshold is now $195,000, and the 
$1,100,000 threshold is now $1,395,000.12 
 
8 Ibid s 292-85(2)(c), s 291-20. 
9 Ibid div 293. 
10 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) ss 9, 10, 
10A. 
11 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 301-20, 307-345. 
12 Ibid ss 301-95, 307-100. 
 /.
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Part 3.1 of Article 1 refers to the cost of superannuation in terms of tax expenditure, using the 
figures available at the time the article was written. The latest figures now show the 
superannuation tax concession to be worth approximately $35.5 billion for the 2013–14 tax 
year,13 as opposed to $24.5 billion at the time the article was written.14 As mentioned in 
paragraph 3.1, tax expenditure calculations, which seek to calculate the revenue foregone by 
policies that offer concessional tax treatment,  have been justifiably criticised as overestimating 
revenue loss because they do not take into account the behavioural change that would occur if 
these concessions did not exist. However, recent Treasury modelling has estimated the cost of 
superannuation concessions when taking into account such behavioural changes. These 
calculations use two measures to estimate the loss of revenue from superannuation concessions. 
The first is the ‘revenue forgone’ method, which assumes that if the superannuation system did 
not exist, the money currently placed into superannuation would instead be paid as a salary and 
not otherwise invested.15 In other words, the difference between this method and the Treasury 
Tax Expenditure figures is that the Treasury figures assume that money paid as superannuation, 
if paid as a salary, would instead be fully invested outside of superannuation and the returns fully 
taxed, and so increases the calculated amount of the tax expenditure. On the other hand, this 
estimate assumes that none of the extra moneys paid as a salary would be invested. Using this 
method, for the 2013–14 financial year, the superannuation tax concessions are estimated to cost 
$19.1b.16 The second of these calculations is the ‘revenue gain’ method, which assumes that if the 
superannuation system did not exist, some of the money that would have gone into 
superannuation is invested in a tax-preferred manner, such as negatively geared investments.17 
Using this method, for the 2013–14 financial year, the superannuation concessions are estimated 
 
13 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2014) 98–107. 
14 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 4. 
15 Charter Group, A Super Charter: Fewer Changes, Better Outcomes - a Report to the Treasurer and 
Minister Assisting for Financial Services and Superannuation (5 July 2013) Commonwealth 
Treasury, 10 <http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-
Topics/SuperannuationAndRetirement/supercharter/~/media/Treasury/Policy%20Topi
cs/Superannuation/supercharter/Downloads/PDF/super_charter_report.ashx>. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 10. 
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to cost approximately $14.1b.18 Arguably, this latter method is more realistic, given that in the 
absence of superannuation some people would seek alternative tax-preferred investment 
vehicles. This strengthens the argument for complementing modification to the superannuation 
tax concession regime with concurrent minimisation of other legal tax planning vehicles. 
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!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!
Part 3.1 of Article 1 also discusses the ageing of the population and concludes that this 
will not result in a financial crisis; it also concludes that in the future, despite the 
population being older, the country will be substantially better off financially than is 
currently the case. Some of these predictions were based on the third Intergenerational 
Report released in 2010. Recently, the fourth Intergenerational Report has been released. 
This latest Intergenerational Report has been described as a political document,19 and it 
has been noted that some of the changing predictions contained in the various 
Intergenerational Reports are indicative of the general unreliability of such long-term 
predictions.20 Notwithstanding these legitimate reservations, it is still worthwhile to 
discuss the implications of the updated projections made in the most recent 
Intergenerational Report and their effect on the analysis presented in this article, which 
forms part of the thesis advanced in this dissertation, taken as a whole.  
Paragraph 3.1 of Article 1 states that the third Intergenerational Report predicts that the 
‘dependency ratio’ (the ratio of those aged over 64 to those aged 16–64) will double in 
the next 40 years. Similarly, the new Intergenerational Report also predicts an 
approximate doubling of the ratio of those aged over 64 to those aged between 15 and 
64.21 The updated Intergenerational Report also states that this ratio has already nearly 
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18 Ibid 9. 
19 See, eg, Ross Gittins, ‘Joe Hockey Turns Intergenerational Report into a Propaganda 
Weapon’ The Age (online), 6 March 2015 <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/joe-
hockey-turns-intergenerational-report-into-a-propaganda-weapon-20150305-
13wce9.html>; Peter Martin, ‘Fear – the Abbott Government’s Weapon of Choice’ The 
Age (online) 3 March 2015 <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/fear--the-abbott-
governments-weapon-of-choice-20150302-13rsb2.html>. 
20 Martin, above n 19. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia, 2015 Intergenerational Report: Australia in 2055 (March, 2015) 
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doubled since the 1970s, while income per person in real terms has more than doubled.22 
Although there is never any guarantee that history will be repeated, this does reinforce 
the conclusion that future drastically lower dependency ratios can co-exist with markedly 
higher incomes. 
As reported in Part 3.1 of the article, the third Intergenerational Report predicts Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth of 1.5 per cent for the next 40 years. 
Similarly, the latest report predicts the same GDP per capita growth for the next 40 
years,23 though Gross National Income is projected to increase by only 1.4 per cent per 
annum in real terms.24 (The difference between the two is attributable to the decline in 
the terms of trade.)25 Whereas the third Intergenerational Report was silent as to the 
dollar effect of predicted growth on future incomes, the fourth states that average income 
per person in 40 years’ time will increase from the current $66,400 to $117,300 in today’s 
dollars.26 As the third Intergenerational Report did not discuss the cumulative effect of 
future economic growth, Part 3.1 of this published article undertook its own calculations, 
and came to similar conclusions about the cumulative effect of growth on future incomes 
as the current Intergenerational Report.27 
Regarding the issue of income growth, it is noteworthy that Real Net National 
Disposable Income has not been rising in recent years.28 This statistic is considered to be 
a good measure of living standards29, and the reason for its stagnation has been due to 
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<http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Public
ations/2015/2015%20Intergenerational%20Report/Downloads/PDF/2015_IGR.ashx>.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid 27. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 32. 
26 Ibid 27. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Number 5206.0. 
29  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Measures of Australia's Progress: Summary Indicators (9 
December 2012) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1370.0.55.001~201
2~Main%20Features~National%20income~16>. 
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the substantial decline in resource prices.30 However, given that the phenomenon of 
falling resource prices logically has an end point, and that productivity increases will likely 
continue, realistically, such stagnation is unlikely to be a permanent trend.  
However, one area where projections of the current Intergenerational Report differ 
substantially from the third report is that of future budget deficits. Specifically, the fourth 
report predicts that on currently legislated policy, the budget deficit will be approximately 
6 per cent of GDP in 40 years.31 In contrast, Article 1 (in Part 3.1) uses the third 
Intergenerational Report’s prediction of a budget deficit of 2.75 per cent of GDP. 
However, the two figures are not as divergent as first appears, since the current 
Intergenerational Report predicts that for the 2049–50 financial year (the end year for the 
third Intergenerational Report), the deficit will be somewhere between 3 and 4 per cent 
of GDP.32 Part 3.1 of Article 1 argues that because future incomes will be so much higher 
than is currently the case, the budget deficit will not represent a problem, as even if taxes 
had to be increased to eliminate the deficit, after-tax incomes would continue to be 
drastically higher. Does the fact that the budget deficit is now predicted to be higher 
change this? Logically speaking, the answer is no, since – given the magnitude in 
increases in incomes – even the taxes levied to alleviate the recently predicted budget 
deficit will leave net incomes substantially higher. In other words, because there is a 
reasonable likelihood that incomes will be around 77 per cent larger in real terms, 
whether extra taxes cover a deficit of a 2.75 or 6 per cent, disposable incomes will still be 
dramatically greater in real terms, as compared to today. Furthermore, the trajectory of 
budget deficits in the recent Intergenerational Report indicates that net debt as a 
percentage of GDP will only begin to increase in any meaningful way between 2035 and 
2040, and even then is predicted to be only 61.8 per cent of GDP.33 Interestingly, the 
former Liberal (conservative) Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, has been quoted as saying 
 
30  Malcolm Maiden, ‘There's a Flaw in Australia's Economic Growth Report’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 3 March 2016 < http://www.smh.com.au/business/comment-and-
analysis/theres-a-flaw-in-australias-economic-growth-report-20160302-gn8q8w.html>. 
31 Ibid 46. 
32 Ibid 47. 
33 Ibid 84. 
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that net debt of 50–60 per cent of GDP is a ‘pretty good result’.34 In summary, while the 
new projections indicate a higher fiscal deficit far off in the future, the original argument 
in the article, that the country can afford the ageing of the population, continues to stand.  
This is due to substantially higher future real incomes, the unreliability of long-term fiscal 
forecasts and the availability of other means of fiscal repair.  
This part of Article 1 also explains why even ‘but for’ the superannuation system’s 
existence, the ageing of the population would still be more than affordable for society. It 
does this by comparing how much superannuation is predicted to cost, and how much it 
would be approximately likely to cost, if the superannuation system did not exist. The 
more up-to-date figures in the recent Intergenerational Report do not change this 
conclusion. According to this report, current spending on age pensions is 2.9 per cent of 
GDP and is forecast to increase to 3.6 per cent in 40 years.35 Using a similar ‘back of the 
envelope’ analysis as is used in Part 3.1 of Article 1, given that the proportion of the aged 
population will be approximately double what it is now, without superannuation 
continuing  it could be predicted that age pension expenditure would be roughly double 
the current rate, making it about 5.8 per cent of GDP. This compares to the 
Intergenerational Report’s prediction (with the current superannuation system) of 3.6 per 
cent of GDP, meaning that a hypothetical lack of a superannuation system would cost an 
extra 2.2 percentage points of GDP in extra pension expenditure. While this figure of 2.2 
percentage points is greater than the 1.5 percentage points in Article 1 (calculated on the 
assumptions in the third Intergenerational Report), given how much higher future 
incomes will be, this will be easily affordable for the country. Further, one of the reasons 
for the more recent larger savings figure is the higher mandatory superannuation 
contribution being legislated, as higher superannuation balances will lead to greater 
pension savings. However, as stated in this part of Article 1, superannuation has a net 
cost in fiscal terms, due to the tax concessions costing more than anticipated government 
pension savings. Consequently, this further increase in future pension savings due to 
higher superannuation contributions will be at a cost of an even greater loss of 
 
34 Jacqueline Maley, ‘Will the Real Tony Abbott Please Stand Up?’ The Age (online), 17 
March 2015 <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/will-the-real-tony-abbott-please-
stand-up-20150327-1m8d8o.html>. 
35 Commonwealth of Australia, 2015 Intergenerational Report, above n 21, 69. 
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government revenue, due to there being more money in the concessionally taxed 
superannuation system. In other words, the higher saving in future pension payments will 
be eclipsed by lower government revenue, reinforcing the argument that even ‘but for’ 
superannuation, society could still afford the ageing of the population. 
 "!" 
Part 4.1.1 of Article 1 mentions that superannuation fees can make a substantial impact 
on superannuation account balances. Recently, the interim Financial System Inquiry 
Report stated that excessive fees continue to be a problem, and that it is too soon to 
judge whether the now-legislated MySuper reforms (aimed at lowering fees), will help to 
alleviate this problem in any meaningful way.36 The report goes on to suggest that 
Australia might adopt the Chilean approach, where funds bid to be the default retirement 
funds in an auction.37 The experience in Chile indicates that this has caused a substantial 
fall in fees.38 The final Financial System Inquiry Report subsequently made a firm 
recommendation that the default fund process should be put to tender.39 Further, it 
recommended that unless employees choose to do otherwise, when they change 
employers they keep their established superannuation fund as the destination for the new 
employer’s contributions.40 The report concluded that this would lower costs and fees, 
and help ensure higher superannuation balances.41 However, the final report also 
emphasised that the process should be different from that conducted in Chile.42 
Specifically, instead of permitting only one or a small number of funds to succeed in the 
bidding process, as in the case of Chile, that a significant number of funds should be 
chosen, so as to encourage competition and innovation.43 If such an arrangement is 
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36 David Murray et al, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report (2014) [2-112] 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/07/FSI_Report_Final_Reduced20140715.pdf>. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 David Murray et al, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (2014) 101 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf>. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 115. 
43 Ibid. 
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implemented, it will be intriguing to observe the effect it has on superannuation fees. The 
government has recently responded to the Financial System Inquiry and has requested 
the Productivity Commission to both review the efficiency of the superannuation system 
and to develop methods for a formal competitive process of allocating default funds.44 
Although the government is under no obligation to follow the Productivity 
Commission’s recommendations, it is plausible that Australia will in the future legislate 
some form of competitive tender system for default funds. 
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Part 4.1.2 of Article 1 discusses the viability of allowing most people to rely on the age 
pension during retirement, concluding that this is neither unaffordable nor inhumane. As 
part of its reasoning, it points out that the age pension is tied to average weekly earnings. 
Specifically, under the current law, pension rises are tied to the highest rise of Male Total 
Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE), Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Pensioner 
and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI).45 However, in most cases the rise in average 
weekly earnings is applicable, since this is usually higher than the other two.46 In the May 
2014 budget, the government announced that this would no longer be the case, and that 
from September 2017, future pension increases would be linked to CPI.47 Subsequently, 
the relevant bill, the Social Services and Other Legislation Amendment (2014 Budget 
Measures No. 5) Bill 2014, did not pass the House of Representatives,48 and there was 
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44 Commonwealth of Australia, Improving Australia’s Financial System. Government Response to the 
Financial System Inquiry (2015) 13 
<http://treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications
/2015/Government%20response%20to%20the%20Financial%20System%20Inquiry/Do
wnloads/PDF/Government_response_to_FSI_2015.ashx>.  
45 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) 1991 pt 3.16. 
46 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Numbers 6302.0 (MTAWE), 6401.0 (CPI) 
and6467.0 (PBLCI). 
47 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2014-5, 203. 
48 Parliament of Australia, Social Services and Other Legislation Amendment (2014 Budget Measures 
No. 5) Bill 2014 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results
/Result?bId=r5354>. 
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evidence that the Senate would oppose it.49 If the relevant legislation had been enacted, 
then it could be argued that a pension that represents a falling percentage of average 
working incomes over time would leave retirees in a state of relative poverty. This is, first, 
because CPI increases do not necessarily reflect the increased cost of living for 
pensioners, given that their spending patterns do not necessarily match that of the 
average person still in the workforce. The abovementioned PBLCI, developed by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), is an index that seeks to measure increases in cost 
of living for age pensioner and others whose main source of income is government 
benefits.50 ABS data indicate that there can be substantial disparities between the CPI and 
the PBLCI.51 Interestingly, the Commission of Audit, which is the report on which the 
government based its plans for pension indexation, recommended that pensions be 
indexed to the higher of the CPI and the PBLCI,52 yet the government, without 
explanation, decided that the age pension should be indexed only to the CPI.53 Second, 
although there is no precise definition of poverty, it is generally accepted that poverty is a 
relative concept.54 Consequently, even if such a policy did not lead to the erosion of the 
purchasing power of pension incomes, under such a policy pensioners would suffer a 
greater degree of relative poverty, given that the gap between their incomes and that of 
workers would widen. Such an attempt to abate age pensions is in marked contrast to the 
logic underpinning one of the points made in Article 1 (in Part 4.2) that there is a strong 
case for greater reliance on the pension and less reliance on superannuation. The reasons 
for this are partly equitable, given that superannuation by its nature is more beneficial to 
higher incomes earners, as opposed to the means-tested age pension, which helps 
redistribute income towards those less economically advantaged. Also, as discussed in 
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49 Judith Ireland, ‘Scott Morrison’s Pension Changes Look Set to Fail as Crossbenchers Dig 
in’ The Age (online), 19 March 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/scott-morrisons-pension-changes-look-set-to-fail-as-crossbenchers-dig-in-
20150319-1m24n6.html>. 
50 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Explanatory Notes 6467.0. 
51 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Numbers 6401.0 (CPI) and 6467.0 (PBLCI). 
52 Tony Shepherd et al, Towards Responsible Government. The Report of the National Commission of 
Audit – Phase One 80-83 <http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/phase_one_report.pdf>. 
53 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2014-5, 203. 
54 Australian Council of Social Service, Poverty in Australia (2012) 6 
<http://acoss.org.au/uploads/ACOSS%20Poverty%20Report%202012_Final.pdf>. 
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Article 1, superannuation continues to carry deadweight losses in the form of fees. In the 
face of negative public reaction to the proposal, in the most recent 2015 budget, the 
government announced that it would not proceed with its plans for lower pension 
indexation rates.55 However, in the 2015 budget it also announced its intention to impose 
a stricter assets test on the age pension.56 The relevant legislation has now become law,57 
despite Australian Labor Party (ALP) opposition.58 Specifically, while the dollar value of 
assets a retiree can hold before their pension is reduced has been slightly increased, once 
this threshold has been crossed, the amount of pension reduction per dollar of excess 
assets has been markedly increased.59 Consequently, some middle class retirees will have 
their pension entitlement eliminated or reduced. 
#&
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As noted in Part 3.4 of Article 1, one of the more meritorious justifications for 
superannuation is that it promotes ‘income smoothing’. In other words, superannuation 
forces people to act in their own long-term self-interest by effectively forcing them to 
save for their retirement. In this sense, a broad analogy can be made between mandatory 
retirement savings and other laws that force people to act in their own self-interest, such 
as tobacco restrictions and mandatory use of seatbelts. 
Specifically, it has been argued that there are two interconnected reasons why 
government has a role in coercing people to make retirement savings. The first is that 
people hold mistaken beliefs about the action they should take to save for retirement.60 
The other is that even if their beliefs are correct, willpower has its limits, and people do 
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55 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2015, 170. 
56 Ibid 169-70. 
57 Social Services Legislation Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Pensions) Act 2015 (Cth) sch 3 pt 1. 
58 James Massola, ‘Pension Assets test: Deal with Greens Secures Coalition’s Changes’ The 
Age (online), 16 June 2015 < http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/pension-assets-test-deal-with-greens-secures-coalitions-changes-20150616-
ghplxg.html>. 
59 Social Services Legislation Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Pensions) Act 2015 (Cth) sch 3 pt 1. 
60 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, ‘How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why’ 
(2014) 127 Harvard Law Review 1593, 1603. 
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not necessarily carry through with actions that are congruent with their beliefs.61 On the 
other hand, to the extent these assertions are correct, they need to be balanced against 
the important, though not absolute, right to self-determination referred to in Part V.E of 
Article 4. Further, it has been argued that government coercion in such a context is at 
times suboptimal as a result of the overconfidence of policy makers, who are firstly, 
overly optimistic about their ability to enact legislation that has net positive outcomes, 
and secondly, also have a tendency to act in the interests of lobby groups.62 Given the 
human propensity to rationalise self-interested, dishonest behaviour, these two reasons 
are likely to be interlinked.63 In accordance with arguments for policies to be ‘evidence 
based’,64 if government is to legislate in the name of making people act in their own self-
interest, it should preferably do so only do so when there is evidence that that they are 
effective in getting people to act in a manner likely to increase their well-being. 
Ultimately, as far as the existence and levels of mandatory superannuation is concerned, 
what is important is its final impact on the well-being of people. Whereas some areas of 
policy making primarily aimed at making people act in their own interests – for example 
the presence of tobacco excise – are supported by empirical studies indicating that they 
increase well-being,65 there appear to have been no such studies on forced retirement 
savings laws. Consequently, as discussed in Part 3.4 of Article 1, while regimes such as 
superannuation promote income smoothing across lifetimes, the prior question of 
whether this necessarily increases well-being remains unanswered. As little research 
directly addresses this important question, it is relevant to examine studies that correlate 
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62 John Beshears et al, ‘How Are Preferences Revealed?’ (2008) 92 Journal of Public Economics 
1787, 1793. 
63 Shahar Ayal and Francesca Gino, ‘Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behavior’ in Mario 
Mikulincer and Phillip R Shaver (eds), The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of 
Good and Evil (American Psychological Association, 2011) 149. 
64 Ian Sanderson, ‘Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making’ (2002) 80 
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financial position and well-being. Clearly, this type of information is inferior to 
(hypothetical) direct research that looks at the correlation between forced saving and 
well-being. And while it is hoped that in the future there will be such direct research, for 
now a more indirect analysis must be relied upon. 
While there has been a large amount of research mapping the correlation between 
people’s well-being and financial status, it is noteworthy that there is more than one way 
to measure well-being. Specifically, it has been found that asking people about their 
general life satisfaction often yields different responses from those obtained by asking 
people about their moods and emotions (both positive and negative) in recent days.66 It 
has been argued that the latter provides a more accurate measure of the emotional impact 
of people’s circumstances, notwithstanding that measurements of ‘life satisfaction’ are in 
some respects useful.67 
Research that has examined the link between well-being and financial position has 
specifically examined the impact of both relative and absolute financial position on well-
being. Regarding relative financial position, the research clearly indicates that those that 
have a lack of adequate income suffer at both the ‘life satisfaction’ and the affect 
measurement levels.68 The negative impact is much more pronounced than the converse 
positive impact for those who earn comparatively high amounts.69 As far as absolute 
financial position is concerned, inter-country studies indicate that higher incomes do 
correlate with well-being, though its importance is less than relative incomes.70 However, 
some research indicates that as far as absolute incomes are concerned, the correlation 
with well-being is with income per hour of work (rather than total income), meaning that 
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67 Ibid 7, 22. 
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higher incomes at the cost of excessive hours can result in decreased well-being.71 
Although earlier research indicated that higher absolute income past a certain point did 
not affect well-being,72 subsequent studies have shown that this is not necessarily the 
case, though the impact is one of diminishing returns.73 It has been speculated that such 
diminishing returns are due to the fact that a greater dollar value is necessary to make a 
similar impact, in percentage terms, on one’s financial position as income rise.74 
Interestingly, while someone’s financial position exceeding a certain moderate level just 
above the mean makes a difference to ‘life satisfaction’, it has almost no impact on that 
person’s everyday degree of positive and negative emotional states.75 
While the evidence does clearly illustrate a correlation between financial position and 
well-being, the correlation is substantially weaker than what most people believe to be the 
case.76 This discrepancy between perception and reality has its strongest impact at lower 
levels of income.77 
Of substantial relevance to this issue, the evidence suggests that the effect on well-being 
of both relative and absolute financial positions is significantly diminished for retirees as 
compared with working people.78 As far as the markedly lessened impact of relative 
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74 Kahneman and Deaton, above n 68, 16489. 
75 Ibid 16491. 
76 Lara Aknin et al, ‘From Wealth to Well-being? Money Matters, but Less than People 
Think’ (2009) 4 The Journal of Positive Psychology 523. 
77 Ibid 524. 
78 Umar Boodoo, Rafael Gomez and Morley Gunderson, ‘Relative Income, Absolute 
Income and the Life Satisfaction of Older Adults: Do Retirees Differ from the Non-
Retired?’ (2014) 45 Industrial Relations Journal 281; Felix Cheung and Richard E Lucas, 
‘When Does Money Matter Most? Examining the Association Between Income and Life 
Satisfaction Over the Life Course’ (2015) 30 Psychology and Aging 120, 130-1; George E 
Vaillant, Ana C DiRago and Ken Mukamal, ‘Natural History of Male Psychological 
Health, XV: Retirement Satisfaction’ (2006) 163 American Journal of Psychiatry 682, 686; 
Raquel Fonseca et al, ‘Does Retirement Make you Happy? A Simultaneous Equations 
Approach’ (Working Paper 2015s-07, Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of 
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financial state is concerned, this is likely to be at least in part due to the fact that retirees 
do not have colleagues in the workplace with whom to compare their financial status.79 
The diminished impact of financial position is present for both genders.80 
The fact that poverty causes far more misery relative to the converse (positive) degree to 
which higher incomes increase well-being, together with the fact that retirees are, dollar 
for dollar, less concerned about income, has important implications for retirement policy. 
These findings appear to substantially weaken the argument for coercing superannuation 
savings beyond the level of poverty alleviation, or at least beyond accomplishing a 
standard of living where well-being is not markedly compromised. Specifically, it is 
important to note that, given that there is no precise definition of poverty, any policies 
aimed at alleviating the distress potentially caused by lack of adequate income need to 
take into account research that correlates income and well-being. Further, to the degree 
that the age pension does not alleviate compromised well-being due to financial distress, 
there is a strong argument for utilising higher government pension payments, rather than 
superannuation, to the extent possible, to fill the gap. This is because a pension payment, 
unlike a reasonable superannuation balance, is not dependent on a reasonable lifelong 
income. This dependence on lifelong income means, amongst other things, that certain 
classes of workers get less benefit from it. For example, women get markedly less benefit 
from the superannuation system than men.81 As pointed out in Part 4.2.1 of Article 1, a 
greater dependence on the age pension could be funded by abolishing the superannuation 
system, though in reality this is highly unlikely to happen. More realistically, reducing the 
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Organizations, February 2015) 25. See also Christopher Anderson and Jason Hecht 
‘Happiness and the Welfare State: Decommodification and the Political Economy of 
Subjective Well-Being’, in Pablo Beramendi et al (eds), The Politics of Advanced Capitalism 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 357, 377 which indicates that older people are 
dramatically less likely to have their well-being affected by income inequality. 
79 Boodoo, Gomez and Gunderson, above n 78, 296. See also Andrew Clark, Niels 
Westergård-Nielsen and Nicolai Kristensen, ‘Economic Satisfaction and Income Rank in 
Small Neighbourhoods’ (2009) 7 Journal of the European Economic Association 519; Erzo 
Luttmer, ‘Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being’ (2005) 120 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 963 for a discussion of how individuals’ financial position relative to 
those in their proximity impacts on well-being. 
80 Boodoo, Gomez and Gunderson, above n 78, 295. 
81  Helen Hodgson and Lisa Marriott, ‘Retirement Savings and Gender: An Australasian 
Comparison’ (2013) 28 Australian Tax Forum 725, 733-39. 
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tax concessions available to superannuation would also to some degree fund higher 
pension payments. 
Of course, none of this is to deny that retirees are potentially financially vulnerable, and 
retirement policy should be aimed at allowing retirees, both future and present, to feel 
financially confident. While it could be argued, as described in Part 4.1.1 of Article 1, that 
relatively higher reliance on public benefits might make people feel less secure due to 
political risk, the reality is that this needs to be balanced against private sector investment 
risks. Further, such insecurity could be minimised if governments gave people faith in the 
government’s ability to be fiscally disciplined. The importance of fiscal discipline is 
illustrated by the fact that Greece and Hungary have due to having a debt crisis led to 
both of them making legislative changes that have resulted in decreased pension 
benefits.82 Also, to the extent that people feel such insecurity, less emphasis on 
mandatory retirement savings in no way prevents people from increasing their voluntary 
savings to the extent they are discouraged by the political risk of government benefits. 
However, such risk-averse people are likely to have low returns in their savings (both 
voluntary and compulsory) given that in general, anxious people are likely to invest in 
low-yield investments, meaning that such people will require comparatively higher 
balances to obtain what they perceive as sufficient non-government retirement income.83 
" & #  !(
If however, it is assumed that government should be utilising some kind of coercion 
regarding individual retirement savings accounts, a related issue is whether it should be 
mandating savings (as is the case with compulsory superannuation contributions) or using 
a softer form of coercion. 
It has been argued that in the general, when government interference is required to make 
people act in their own self-interest, the preferable policy tool should be use of soft 
 
82  Matthias Stepan and Karen M Anderson, ‘Pension Reform in the European Periphery: the 
Role of EU Reform Advocacy’ 34 Public Administration and Development 320, 324-26, 330. 
83 Elisa Gambetti and Fiorella Giusberti, ‘The Role of Anxiety and Anger Traits in Financial 
Field’ (2014) 13 Mind and Society 271. 
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coercion, such as a default option, rather than mandates.84 Undoubtedly, while mandation 
is clearly justified at times, there are also situations where ‘soft coercion’ might be a more 
appropriate policy. For instance, if there was material but equivocal evidence that 
coercion (of some type) of retirement savings increased overall well-being, then a default 
retirement savings option might be the preferable policy choice, whereas if the evidence 
was more clear-cut, government strict coercion might be more appropriate. Also, if there 
was evidence that in general people who would opt out of the default are the ones who 
would not in the aggregate benefit from coercion, then this would also strengthen the 
argument for a default option as the preferable policy choice. 
Specifically, it has been argued that for retirement savings, if government is to encourage 
retirement savings, mandates are superior to the soft compulsion of default options. First, 
it has been asserted that policymakers might, if using a default option, choose the level of 
compulsion with less caution than they would when deciding the level of a direct 
mandate, as has arguably occurred in the USA.85 If this is correct, then if Australia’s 
superannuation system was based on a default option, the level at which it would be set 
would be less likely to be ideal than is now the case under the superannuation 
contributions system at its currently mandated level. In response, it can be argued that if 
in fact there is a tendency to use suboptimal settings when ‘soft coercion’ is involved, 
then the solution is to be aware of such a tendency and to take more care to choose the 
correct level of default contributions. Abandoning defaults for mandates on this basis 
insufficiently takes into account the importance of self-agency.  
Second, it has been argued (albeit without sound evidence) that those who do opt out of 
retirement savings default options do so for irrational reasons, and so they too should be 
safeguarded from acting against their own best interests.86 Such an argument presumably 
applies to a spendthrift who would choose not to participate in a hypothetical ‘opt out’ 
superannuation system. However, people might opt out of such a system for any number 
of legitimate reasons. For instance, they might require access to extra funds at the cost of 
 
84 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 
University of Chicago Law Review 1159. 
85 Bubb and Pildes, above n 60, 1605, 1609. 
86 Ibid. 
 03
lower retirement savings, or they might realistically believe that they will have a shorter 
life span than the general population, or they might have other investments or an 
expected inheritance that will provide for their retirement. Further, this argument does 
not acknowledge that ultimately coercing people to act in their own interests and allowing 
them freedom is a balancing act. Even if people are in some instances acting against their 
own self-interest, this might, depending both on the degree to which it is happening and 
on the harm being caused, be an acceptable cost for preserving some liberty by utilising 
soft coercion rather than resorting to mandates.87 
Ultimately, assuming some government coercion is required in building individual 
retirement savings accounts, in choosing between mandates and soft compulsion, the 
policy response would depend on the outcome of future research. Specifically, such 
research would examine to what extent those presented with a default option would opt 
out, and what proportion of those do so for a legitimate reason.88 
  
 
87 Daniel B Klein, ‘Statist Quo Bias’ (2004) 1 Econ Journal Watch 260, 263–4. 
88 For instance, in New Zealand, Kiwisaver is a retirement savings regime that allows users 
to opt out. See KiwiSaver Act 2006 (NZ) ss 16, 17. 
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Article 1 is reproduced in the following pages. The citation for this article is as follows: 
Rami Hanegbi, ‘Australia’s Superannuation System: A Critical Analysis’ (2010) 25 
Australian Tax Forum 303–26. 
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 )NTRODUCTION
Superannuation in Australia is now accepted as a part of daily life. Yet there appears 
to be very little public debate on the precise goals of superannuation or whether 
superannuation is the best vehicle to fulfil those goals.
This article aims to critically evaluate superannuation and some of its alternatives. 
Part two of the article will briefly look at the major aspects of current superannuation 
law, as well as how the superannuation regime fits into the World Bank’s categorization 
of retirement policies. Part three will then discuss the claimed justifications for 
superannuation, and whether those justifications have merit. Finally, the fourth part 
of the article will examine some of the alternatives to the current superannuation 
regime and will look at their comparative advantages and disadvantages. 
The future companion article will critically examine the taxation of superannuation, 
and will discuss the desirability of certain modifications to the superannuation 
system, including the lifting of the compulsory superannuation contributions rate. 
The discussion of these issues will include an evaluation of the superannuation related 
recommendations made by the recent Australia’s Future Tax System Review. 
 !USTRALIANSUPERANNUATIONHISTORYLAWANDRELEVANCE
TOTHEWORLDBANKSVIEWSONRETIREMENTPOLICIES
 #SJFG)JTUPSZPG4VQFSBOOVBUJPOJO"VTUSBMJB
Superannuation started becoming institutionalised in Australia in the mid 1980’s 
when some of the industrial awards that affected many Australian workers specified 
that relevant employees were to receive an amount of 3% of their salary in the form 
of superannuation.1 This move was supported by the government because it led to the 
affected workers receiving a smaller wage rise than would otherwise have been the case.2 
Small wage rises were seen as desirable as high inflation was a concern at that time.3 
By about 1990 the decision had spread to other industrial agreements; this resulted in 
about 80% of workers being entitled to have employer-sponsored payments paid into 
their superannuation accounts.4 However, some 20% of workers were still not entitled 
to receive superannuation contributions. So that nearly all workers would be covered, 
in 1992 the government introduced legislation that effectively mandated employers to 
pay 3% of their employees’ salaries into their superannuation accounts.5 The legislation 
stated that the 3% contributions were to incrementally rise to 9% by July 2002.6
1 APRA, A Recent History of Superannuation in Australia (2007) [3] APRA Insight <http://www.
apra.gov.au/Insight/upload/Insight_2_2007_web.pdf> at 18 March 2010.
2 Ibid 3.
3 Ibid 3.
4 Ibid 3.
5 Ibid 3.
6 Ibid 4.
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Under the current Australian law, employers must contribute to each employee’s 
individual superannuation account if the employee is under 70 and earns at least $450 
in a calendar month.7 The government has announced that from 1 July 2013, the 
upper age limit for employee entitlement to compulsory contributions will be raised 
from under 70 to under 75.8 
The minimum contribution an employer is required to make into an eligible 
employee’s superannuation account is 9% of the employee’s salary.9 These payments 
are referred to as Superannuation Guarantee payments.10 Some employers voluntarily 
or through industrial awards contribute more than 9%.
Employees are also entitled to make voluntary contributions to their own 
superannuation accounts. They can either make them out of their net income or 
capital. Alternatively, they can do so through ‘salary sacrifice’, which is where their 
employer agrees to lower the employee’s salary in exchange for an off-setting higher 
superannuation contribution. 
There is no law mandating that self-employed persons contribute to their own 
superannuation accounts, but they can voluntarily choose to do so. 
Most taxpayers are unable to access their superannuation until they reach their 
preservation age, which is between 55 and 60 depending on their date of birth.11 
There are no laws preventing taxpayers from collecting their superannuation benefits 
in the form of a lump sum.
 1SPQPTBMUPJODSFBTFMFWFMPGDPNQVMTPSZTVQFSBOOVBUJPO
DPOUSJCVUJPOT
On 2 May 2010 the government announced a proposal to increase the rate of 
Superannuation Guarantee payments that employers must make, from the current 
rate of 9%, to 12% of the employee’s salary.12 Under this proposal, the contributions 
rate will be increased incrementally, starting with an increase to 9.25% in the 2012-13 
financial year; the proposal is for the 12% rate to be reached in the 2019-20 financial 
7 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
8 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Raising the Superannuation Guarantee 
Age Limit from 70 to 75 (May 2010) Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/7_Fact_Sheet_SG_age_increase.pdf> at 
23 May 2010.
9 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
10 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
11 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.01 and sch 1.
12 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent (May 2010) Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/6_Fact_Sheet_SG%20_rate_increase.
pdf> at 16 May 2010.
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year.13 The government announced this proposed increase when it released the long-
awaited final report of the Australia’s Future Tax System Review.14 This review is 
colloquially referred to as the Henry Review due to the chair of the review panel being 
Treasury Secretary, Ken Henry.
Oddly enough, one of the preliminary Henry Review papers stated that the 
Superannuation Guarantee rate should be maintained at 9%.15 This finding was 
confirmed by the final Henry Review report.16 However, the final report did suggest 
various amendments to the superannuation system; one of the recommendations, 
not adopted by the government, was that superannuation contribution tax be 
paid by the individual rather than by the fund.17 The effect of implementing such 
a recommendation would be that taxpayers would receive a net contribution of 
9%, rather than the current gross contribution of 9%. This would be equivalent to 
employees receiving 10.6% of their income in gross superannuation contributions; 
9% of the contribution being from their employer, and the other 1.6% from them, the 
employee. 18 
 5BYUSFBUNFOUPGTVQFSBOOVBUJPO
A later companion article will include a detailed explanation and critical analysis of 
the tax concessions that benefit superannuation savings. This article will only give a 
brief overview of these concessions; this is done in the context of illustrating the extent 
to which superannuation savings are concessionally taxed, and so result in a loss of 
government revenue. Specifically, superannuation savings are concessionally taxed at 
the contributions and earnings stage, and are usually tax-free upon withdrawal.
Most contributions made into a taxpayer’s superannuation fund are taxed at 
the rate of 15%.19 This rate applies to the compulsory employer contributions, any 
income ‘salary sacrificed’ by an employee into their superannuation account, and 
13 Ibid.
14 Wayne Swan, Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future <http://ministers.treasury.gov.
au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/028.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=> at 16 May 2010.
15 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: the Retirement Income System: Report 
on Strategic Issues (May 2009) Australia’s Future Tax System [11-12] <http://www.taxreview.
treasury.gov.au/content/StrategicPaper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Retirement_
Income_Strategic_Issues_Paper/index.htm> at 18 May 2010.
16 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report: Part 2 Volume 1 
(2009) Australia’s Future Tax System [109-110] <http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/
FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_2/index.htm> at 18 May 
2010.
17 Ibid 100.
18 This is because 9%/(1-0.15) = 10.6%. This calculation is based on the current contributions 
tax rate of 15%. Although the Henry Review did recommend changing the structure of the 
contributions tax on superannuation, it did state that the rate should not be more than 15% for 
most taxpayers.
19 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 295-160.
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most contributions made by the self-employed. However, the 15% contributions rate 
will only apply without penalty for the first $25,000 of superannuation contributions 
that each taxpayer receives per year,20 though this limit is raised to $50,000 for those 
aged between 50 and 74.21 Although the $50,000 limit was initially intended to be an 
interim measure till 30 June 2012, the government announced that it will continue 
to operate after that date to taxpayers in the relevant age group, as long as they have 
superannuation balances of under $500,000. 22 
Most returns on investments made by superannuation funds are also taxed 
at 15%;23 however, capital gains on assets held for at least 12 months are taxed at 
10%.24 Furthermore, like most resident taxpayers, superannuation funds can benefit 
from the imputation system; under this system shareholders who receive dividends 
from resident companies are entitled to a tax credit for the income tax paid by the 
company.25
These above descriptions of the taxation treatment of superannuation funds at the 
contributions and earnings stages are valid for the vast majority of superannuation 
funds. However, a few public sector superannuation funds do not pay tax on their 
contributions or earnings.26 The tax legislation has provisions that distinguish 
between benefits from funds that have to pay tax and benefits from funds that do 
not.27 The superannuation funds that pay tax can be referred to as taxed funds and 
those that do not can be referred to as untaxed funds. 
Money withdrawn from a taxed superannuation fund is generally not taxable if the 
taxpayer is at least 60 years old.28 This is the case whether the benefits are withdrawn 
as a lump sum or converted into an income stream.29 However, if the taxpayer is of 
preservation age but under 60, and takes a superannuation benefit from a taxed fund 
as a lump sum, only the first $150,000 withdrawn is tax-free, and the rest is taxed at 
the rate of 16.5%.30 If such a taxpayer takes this type of superannuation benefit as an 
income stream it will be assessable at normal marginal tax rates less a 15% rebate.31
There is a harsher tax treatment for withdrawals made from untaxed superannuation 
funds. For taxpayers aged at least 60, money withdrawn from untaxed funds in the form 
of a lump sum will be taxed at a maximum rate of 16.5% for the first $1,100,000, and at the 
20 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Subdiv 292-B and Superannuation (Excess Concessional 
Contributions Tax) Act 2007 (Cth).
21 Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 292-20.
22 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent, above n 12. 
23 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ss 26(1), 27(1), 27A.
24 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 115-100.
25 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 207.
26 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 50-25.
27 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 307-E.
28 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-10.
29 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-10.
30 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-20 and s 307-345.
31 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-25.
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rate of 46.5% for any amounts over this.32 Taxpayers who are at least 60 and collect their 
benefits from an untaxed fund in the form of an income stream will be taxed at normal 
marginal rate subject to a 10% offset.33 Those who have reached their preservation age 
but are under 60, and withdraw money from an untaxed fund in the form of a lump 
sum will be taxed at a maximum rate of 16.5% for the first $150,000, at the rate of 31.5% 
for amounts between $150,000 to $1,100,000, and at 46.5% for amounts in excess of 
$1,100,000.34 Taxpayers of that age who take their benefit from an untaxed fund in the 
form of an income stream will pay tax at normal marginal tax rates.35
Low income earners are entitled to have their post-tax superannuation 
contributions matched dollar for dollar by the government for an amount of up to 
$1000 a year.36 The government has also announced that from the 2012-13 financial 
year low income earners will be entitled to a rebate of up to $500 to be deposited into 
their individual superannuation accounts; the aim of this rebate is to refund the tax 
paid on the mandatory superannuation contributions of these low income earners.37 
 "VTUSBMJBmTSFUJSFNFOUQPMJDJFTJODPOUFYUPGXPSMECBOLDBUFHPSJFT
PGSFUJSFNFOUQPMJDJFT
The World Bank categorises retirement policies into five pillars, but does not advocate 
reliance on any one particular pillar.38 Instead, the World Bank encourages countries 
to diversify their use of pillars as a means of addressing needs and minimising risks 
faced by the pension system.39 Interestingly, rather than label these pillars one to five, 
it labels them zero to four.40 The previous World Bank categorisation of retirement 
policies into three pillars41 is now obsolete.
Pillar Zero is a government paid benefit (whether means-tested or universal) that 
is not contingent on previous earnings.42 Australia’s means-tested Age Pension is 
Australia’s version of this pillar.
32 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-95.
33 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-100.
34 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-105.
35 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-110.
36 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) s 9.
37 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Low Income Earners Government 
Contribution <http://futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/8_Fact_sheet_Low_income_
earner_government_contribution.pdf> at 16 May 2010.
38 Holzmann, Richard Paul Hinz and Mark Dorfman, Pension Systems and Reform Conceptual 
Framework (2008) [5] World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0824 <http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/0824.pdf> at 20 
March 2010. 
39 Ibid 5.
40 Ibid 5.
41 World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis (1st ed, 1994).
42 Holzmann, Hinz and Dorfman, above n 38, 5.
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The First Pillar is a government-paid pension that is based on previous earnings, 
typically funded by pay-as-you-go tax receipts.43 Australia does not utilise the First 
Pillar, though many European countries do.44
The Second Pillar is a mandatory defined contributions scheme.45 To the extent 
that Australia’s superannuation system is funded by the compulsory superannuation 
guarantee, it is a Second Pillar system.
The Third Pillar is voluntary savings. Non-compulsory contributions to 
superannuation accounts and other forms of savings would fall into the Third Pillar 
category.46
The Fourth Pillar is comprised of other benefits people receive in retirement, such 
as family support and being able to live in one’s own residence rent free.47
 *USTIÚCATIONSFORSUPERANNUATIONk!CRITICALANALYSIS
Advocates of superannuation claim that it fulfils several goals. It is worth evaluating 
the purported goals and whether their fulfilment is desirable or necessary. It is also 
useful to evaluate whether superannuation fulfils the particular goals that are worth 
fulfilling. 
 5PQSFWFOUUIFGVUVSFBHFJOHDSJTJT
A justification not uncommonly used by politicians for the existence of superannuation 
is that it is necessary to avert the looming ageing crisis. For instance, the previous 
Treasurer stated that the adequate retirement policies are necessary ‘… so we can 
maintain a prosperous economy and a cohesive society that does not leave an enormous 
burden on future generations’48, though he did concede that we, as a country, ‘do 
not face an insurmountable crisis’.49 Such warnings are based on projections that our 
population profile will be substantially older in the future. Specifically, it is projected 
that in 2050, 22.6% of the population will be 65 or over, in contrast to the 2010 figure 
of 13.5%.50 This will lead to an approximate doubling in the old-age dependency ratio 
43 Ibid 6.
44 World Bank, Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World 
Bank Assistance (2006) Independent Evaluation Group World Bank <http://www.worldbank.
org/ieg/pensions/documents/pensions_evaluation.pdf> at 20 March 2010.
45 Holzmann, Hinz and Dorfman, above n 38, 6.
46 Ibid 6.
47 Ibid 6.
48 Peter Costello, Australia’s Demographic Challenges <http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.
aspx?pageID=&doc=speeches/2004/003.htm&min=phc> at 20 March 2010.
49 Ibid.
50 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergenerational Report 2010 (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010) 9.
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–the ratio of over 64 year olds to 16-64 year olds.51 Logically speaking, the ageing 
of the population will make future government spending higher than it currently is.
However, an examination of the facts shows that the situation is not as alarming as 
it might superficially appear to be.
Economic forecasts that assume the current superannuation regime will remain 
intact indicate that, economically, Australians will be markedly better off in the 
future. The latest Intergenerational Report predicts that GDP per capita will increase 
by 1.5% per annum for the next 40 or so years.52 However, it assumes that due to the 
ageing of the population, government spending in 40 years’ time will lead to a fiscal 
deficit of 2.75% of GDP.53 
If it is assumed that GDP per capita growth for the next 40 years will be 1.5% per 
annum as predicted by the latest Intergenerational Report, this will result in GDP per 
capita increasing by 81% in the next 40 years.54 If the tax burden rises to cover the 
2.75% of GDP deficit, after-tax incomes would still be drastically higher than they are 
today. Some economists using their own analysis have arrived at somewhat similar 
conclusions. For instance, one study found that in approximately 40 years’ time, after 
the costs of higher taxes, both retirees and working people will be, on average, 84% 
better off in real terms than they are presently.55 Another study has found that the 
increase in after-tax incomes is likely to be even higher.56 
Interestingly, the Productivity Commission in its report on ageing explicitly stated 
that ‘Population ageing is not a crisis’ and also commented that, under its assumptions, 
average per capita incomes will be twice as high in 2044-2045 in comparison with 40 
years earlier.57
The above analysis assumes that the current superannuation system will continue 
into the future. Does that mean that the future looks bright because of the current 
superannuation system, and that without it there would, in fact, be an economic crisis 
due to the ageing of the population? The following discussion demonstrates that even 
without the current superannuation system, Australians will still be dramatically 
better off in future decades.
It can be assumed that superannuation’s main impact on future government 
spending will be the consequent reduction in Age Pension spending.58 There is a lack 
of publicly-available figures on what government spending in the future would be 
51 Ibid 117.
52 Ibid 4.
53 Ibid 40.
54 A 1.5% increase compounded over 40 years equals 81.4%.
55 Ross Guest and Ian McDonald, ‘How Much Support Will the Taxpayer Provide for us When We 
are Old?’ (2003) 22(1) Economic Papers 1.
56 Creina Day and Steve Dowrick, ‘Ageing Economics: Human Capital, Productivity and Fertility’ 
(2004) 11(1) Agenda 3.
57 Productivity Commission, Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia (2005) XXXVIII.
58 Given the fact that Australia has a public non-means tested health system it is unlikely that 
superannuation will dramatically reduce government spending in other areas.
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‘but for’ superannuation. However, it is possible to make some ‘back of the envelope’ 
guesstimates. According to the latest Intergenerational Report, in the 2009-10 financial 
year, Age Pensions cost the government 2.7% of GDP, and this cost is predicted to 
grow to 3.9% of GDP in 2049-2050 if the current superannuation regime remains 
intact.59 Since the proportion of the population of pension age will have doubled by 
2049-2050 compared to 40 years earlier, if superannuation balances do not receive 
extra deposits for that time, it can roughly be assumed that pension expenditure 
will be double in 2049-2050 compared to 2009-10. These assumptions mean that 
‘but for’ superannuation, annual pension expenditures will be approximately 5.4% 
of GDP in the 2049-2050 financial year. This is in comparison to projected Age 
Pension expenditures of 3.9% of GDP in 2049-2050 if the current superannuation 
arrangements remain intact. 
Therefore, under these assumptions, in 40 years’ time the superannuation system 
will have resulted in annual savings on government pension spending of 1.5% of GDP. 
Given that GDP per capita in 40 years’ time is likely to be at least 80% higher than 
is currently the case,60 the impact of superannuation on future government pension 
spending is best described as marginal. Admittedly these ‘back of the envelope’ figures 
understate the savings on government spending because the 2.7% of GDP figure that 
represents current Age Pension expenditure already takes into account the partial 
maturing of the superannuation system. However, even if pension savings turn out to 
be in the order of several times more than these calculations, it is clear that the benefit 
of dramatically higher future incomes will eclipse any future higher government 
spending and consequent higher taxation that will be necessary, with or without the 
current superannuation system.
Furthermore, the claim that superannuation is necessary to avert an economic 
crisis becomes even weaker when tax expenditure calculations, which state that 
superannuation tax concessions currently cost the government around 1.9% of GDP, 
are taken into account.61 And whilst it is true that for various reasons tax expenditure 
calculations tend to overstate the revenue loss on tax concessions,62 this needs to 
be balanced against the fact that the current superannuation tax expenditure figure 
is materially lower than it has been in the past and is projected to be in the future 
due to the Global Financial Crisis.63 Furthermore, the cost of these concessions 
will also increase due to the superannuation contributions rate being increased to 
59 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergenerational Report 2010, above n 50, 47. 
60 As discussed elsewhere in this paper, there is little evidence that compulsory retirement systems 
increase domestic savings, which in turn makes it unlikely they have any major impact on 
growth that might flow from higher investment levels.
61 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 4.
62 Rosanne Altshuler and Robert Dietz, Tax Expenditure Estimation and Reporting: A Critical 
Review (2008) [23-24] NBER Working Paper 14263 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14263.
pdf> at 16 March 2010; George Rothman, Assessing the Equity of Australia’s Retirement Income 
System (2009) [4] Retirement & Intergenerational Modelling & Analysis Unit, Department of 
the Treasury <http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/fce/Research/ResearchMicrosites/CPS/2009/
papers/Rothman.pdf> at 16 March 2010.
63 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 3-4.
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12%. Unsurprisingly, it has been estimated that the cost to the government of the 
superannuation tax concessions will far outweigh any future savings on pensions.64
 *OUFSHFOFSBUJPOBMFRVJUZ
As discussed earlier in this paper, one of the reasons for the introduction of 
compulsory superannuation was that, at the time, most workers were entitled to 
superannuation, but the government wanted to ensure near universal coverage. In 
contrast, one of the current justifications for superannuation is intergenerational 
equity.65 The argument is that, since the ageing of the population will lead to greater 
government spending, this extra cost should not be fully borne by the generation that 
will be working in several decades’ time when the dependency ratio is higher. This 
rests on the assumption that the superannuation regime will make substantial savings 
to future government spending.
If this assumption is correct, and superannuation does lessen future increases 
in the tax burden, this in itself does not necessarily justify its existence. This is 
because, as previously discussed, incomes will be drastically higher in real terms 
when the population is older in several decades’ time. To take the view that allowing 
future generations to experience a higher tax burden is contrary to the principle of 
intergenerational equity,66 without taking into account their higher future incomes, 
is a very narrow view of what is equitable. In other words, it is arguably quite fair to 
let future generations shoulder a greater tax burden due to their drastically higher 
incomes. This is reinforced by the fact that a material portion of the extra spending 
that will be required in the future will not be due to the ageing of the population 
but, instead, will be due to other reasons such as higher health costs for the whole 
population.67 
Furthermore, even if intergenerational equity is seen as an admirable goal, it is 
unclear whether the current superannuation system will achieve it. As discussed 
earlier in this paper, over time, the superannuation system will cost the government 
more than it saves on government spending. 68 The fact that superannuation has a net 
cost over time does not preclude it from lowering future tax burdens; however, it will 
only lower future taxation if, at some point in time, the superannuation system starts 
saving more in government expenditure than it costs in lost revenue. It is unclear 
64 Institute of Actuaries of Australia, Response to ”Future Tax System: Retirement Income 
Consultation Paper”(2009) Institute of Actuaries of Australia [13] <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.
au/content/submissions/retirement/Institute_of_Actuaries_of_Australia_20090312.pdf> at 20 
March 2010; see also Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: the Retirement 
Income System: Report on Strategic Issues, above n 15, 11, where it is projected that increasing 
the superannuation levy will result in a net long term increase in government expenditure.
65 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper (December 2008) 34.
66 Robert Fenge and Martin Werding, ‘Ageing and the Tax Implied in Public Pension Schemes:
Simulations for Selected OECD Countries’ (2004) 25(2) Fiscal Studies 159.
67 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergenerational Report 2010, above n 50, 49, 51.
68 Institute of Actuaries of Australia, above n 64, 13. 
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whether this will or will not be the case, and will depend on what superannuation 
concessions future generations of workers will be entitled to. 
Lastly, if it is assumed that intergenerational equity is a worthy goal, there are other 
effective ways to obtain it. The most obvious is to run structural budget surpluses over 
the economic cycle and invest the surpluses in a sovereign fund; though, as discussed 
later in this paper, there are potential problems that can arise with public investment 
funds. Australia’s Future Fund is an existing sovereign fund which has the goal of 
improving intergenerational equity.69 
 )JHIFSEPNFTUJDTBWJOHT
One of the arguments put forward to justify the existence of superannuation is that it 
increases domestic savings, which can have positive flow-on effects such as reducing 
the current account deficit.70 Higher domestic savings have been linked to higher 
investment – this principle is known as the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’.71
The reality is that Australia’s chronic current account deficits have not been tempered 
by many years of compulsory superannuation.72 Furthermore, there is a lack of firm 
evidence that countries that have introduced mandatory funded retirement savings 
have increased domestic savings.73 Although this is a complex area beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is far from clear that superannuation has brought us the economic 
benefits that its proponents claimed it would.
 *ODPNFTNPPUIJOH
According to the World Bank, one of the functions of the Second and Third Pillars 
of retirement policy is to achieve income smoothing.74 As previously mentioned, 
Australia’s equivalent of the Second Pillar is compulsory superannuation savings, and 
the Third Pillar equivalent is voluntary superannuation and other retirement savings. 
 )SINCOMESMOOTHINGDESIRABLE
Some international studies in jurisdictions without compulsory retirement savings 
schemes have found that most people are satisfied with their chosen lifetime 
69 Wilson Au-Yeung, Jason McDonald and Amanda Sayegh, ‘Future Fund and Fiscal Policy’ 
Winter (2006) Economic Round-Up, Winter 2006: 27-37 <http://www.treasury.gov.au/
documents/1156/PDF/02_Future_Fund.pdf> at 20 March 2010.
70 Malcolm Edey and Luke Gower, ‘National Savings: Trends and Policies’ (Paper presented at 
The Australian Economy in the 1990s, Kirribilli, 24-25 July 2000) <http://www.rba.gov.au/
PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/2000/EdeyGower.pdf> at 20 March 2010.
71 Saten Kumar, Scott Fargher and Don J. Webber, Testing the validity of the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle for Australia (2009) Econpapers <http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/0911.pdf> at 20 March 2010. 
72 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Number 5302.0.
73 World Bank, Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World 
Bank Assistance, above n 44, 35-36. 
74 Holzmann, Hinz and Dorfman, above n 38, 7.
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consumption patterns.75 If this is the case, the argument for an income smoothing 
regime like superannuation is significantly weakened. However, it has been pointed 
out that studies that have come to this conclusion incorporate wealth obtained by 
owner-occupied housing, whereas those that find to the contrary do not.76 It follows 
that if it is assumed that the magnitude of housing gains that have occurred in previous 
decades cannot go on forever, most people will end up unhappy with their lifetime 
consumption patterns. This means there is some substance to policies that promote 
income smoothing.
On the other hand, there are some firm arguments against income smoothing. 
Income smoothing policies like superannuation, by their nature, promote post-
retirement income inequality. Inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries has increased in 
the past 30 years.77 In the USA the evidence shows that increasing inequality has been 
due to both tax and non-tax factors78 and, given the changes in tax rates and policies 
that have occurred in Australia in recent decades, there is reason to believe the same 
would be true here. The Head of Treasury, Ken Henry, recently referred to the basic 
principle that equality of income is desirable but must be balanced against destroying 
people’s incentive to work and save.79 This discussion was in the context of a speech 
regarding modifying our taxation system.80 If it is accepted that government policy 
needs to play a larger role in reversing the long-term trend of increasing income 
inequality, one way to accomplish this is to put into place retirement policies whose 
purpose is to give all retirees a comfortable retirement, rather than policies based on 
income smoothing.
By aiming to smooth incomes, the current superannuation policies also arbitrarily 
discriminate against certain types of workers. For instance, overall, women benefit 
much less from superannuation because of their shorter average working lives and 
lower incomes.81
On the other hand, income smoothing schemes like superannuation have a less 
detrimental effect on work incentive than non-income smoothing retirement regimes 
75 Richard Disney, ‘Australia: Issues in the Tax Treatment of Pensions and Housing’ (Paper 
presented at the Conference on Australia’s Future Tax System, Melbourne, 18 and 19 June 2009) 
[15] <http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/austax/Papers/Disney,%20Richard_paper.pdf> at 21 
March 2010.
76 Ibid 16.
77 ‘More or Less Equal?’ The Economist, 2 April (2009) 11.
78 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Update 
using 2006 preliminary estimates) (2008) Pathways Winter 2008 [6] <https://www.stanford.edu/
group/scspi/pdfs/pathways/winter_2008/Saez.pdf> at 20 March 2010.
79 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (2008), Chapter 3.
80 Ken Henry, ‘How Much Inequality Should we Allow?’ (Speech delivered at the Australian 
Council of Social Service National Conference, 3 April 2009) <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/
content/Content.aspx?doc=html/speeches/05.htm#_ftn1> at 20 March 2010. 
81 Eva Cox, ‘Financing our Futures - How Privatising Retirement Discriminates Against Women’ 
(2007) 26(3) Dialogue 42.
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that are funded by taxation receipts.82 For instance, a system that funds a generous 
pension that applies equally to all retirees, and is funded with taxation revenues, 
would provide less incentive to work than one that bases retirement incomes on 
working incomes.83 
 $OESSUPERANNUATIONHELPACHIEVEINCOMESMOOTHING
There is evidence that superannuation increases private savings.84 After all, it is logical 
that mandating savings will increase net savings for many individuals. Having said 
that, to some extent this is abated by the fact that superannuation ‘crowds out’ other 
savings and investment vehicles.85 There are varying estimates as to what extent this 
crowding out occurs.86 For instance, a recent study has estimated the leakage to be at 
about 10-30%,87 whereas another has estimated the leakage rate to be 38%.88 So, yes, 
Australia’s superannuation system does promote income smoothing to some degree.
 3OMEALTERNATIVESTOSUPERANNUATION
The previous discussion shows that income smoothing is one of the few goals of 
superannuation that has substantial merit. However, there is also a strong counter-
case for not having income smoothing retirement policies. It is useful to examine 
some alternative retirement policies, including ones that do, and ones that do not 
promote income smoothing.
 "MUFSOBUJWFTUPTVQFSBOOVBUJPOUIBUQSPNPUFJODPNFTNPPUIJOH
 !LTERNATIVEk'OVERNMENTRETIREMENTBENEÛTSFUNDEDBYAPUBLIC
INVESTMENTFUND
A number of countries have a system where government-paid retirement benefits are 
linked to the salary that the retirees earned prior to their retirement.89 
82 John Freebairn, Some Policy Issues in Providing Retirement Incomes (2007) Melbourne Institute 
Working Paper No 6/07 <http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp2007n06.pdf> at 21 March 
2010.
83 Ibid. 
84 Disney, above n 75, 12-14. 
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ellis Connolly, The Effect of the Australian Superannuation Guarantee on Household Saving 
Behaviour (2007) Economic Analysis Department, Reserve Bank of Australia <http://www.rba.
gov.au/publications/rdp/2007/2007-08.html> at 16 March 2010.
88 Ellis Connolly and Marion Kohler, The Impact of Superannuation on Household Saving 
(2004) Economic Research Department, Reserve Bank of Australia <http://www.rba.gov.au/
publications/rdp/2004/2004-01.html> at 16 March 2010.
89 World Bank, Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World 
Bank Assistance, above n 44. 
 $8675$/,$17$;)2580
In Australia, if such a system were implemented, it could be fully-funded by having 
the 9% superannuation levy changed into a 9% government surcharge. The money 
raised from this surcharge could be placed into a public fund which would fund 
future pensions based on people’s lifetime contributions to this surcharge. The benefits 
payable under this system could be calculated in a manner so that they are roughly 
equivalent to what people would get under the current compulsory superannuation 
system assuming that they took out a private pension upon retirement. In fact, given 
that such a system would eliminate many of the deadweight losses in the current 
system, such as marketing, administration of separate funds, and bonuses given 
to fund managers, the resulting benefits should be potentially larger under such 
a system. The current aggregate management expense ratio for superannuation 
accounts is 1.35%, which according to some assumptions can reduce average lifetime 
superannuation balances by 25%.90
Apart from the savings on fees and related expenses, this type of system has several 
advantages over the current superannuation system. First, it would eliminate the 
longevity risk that taxpayers experience under the current superannuation system. 
Longevity risk is defined as the risk that a person might outlive their superannuation 
savings in retirement.91 This is because a public pension fund could withstand a 
minority of the population living materially beyond their life expectancy, as this would 
be balanced by a minority living materially less than their life expectancy. Although 
under the current superannuation system people can purchase lifetime annuities with 
their superannuation savings, the current market for such annuities is perceived by 
many as inefficient and expensive.92 Furthermore, whilst other solutions have been 
proposed to addressing the issue of longevity risk, such as the government issuing 
longevity and long term indexed bonds,93 it is unclear how effective and efficient such 
solutions would be. 
Secondly, Australia’s current superannuation system is also vulnerable to inflation 
risk. This is the risk that an accumulated rise in price levels eats into people’s retirement 
savings.94 This risk is more likely to affect retirement funds that are invested in non-
inflation proof investments such as fixed interest government bonds, especially if the 
real interest rate becomes negative, or a large proportion of the investments are in 
long-term bonds. Those approaching retirement and those already in retirement are 
90 David Ingles and Josh Fear, The Case for Universal Default Superannuation Fund (2009) [9] The 
Australia Institute <https://www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=/media_releases/PB%203%20UDF%20
paper%20final.pdf> at 21 March 2010. 
91 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper (2008) Australia’s Future Tax System [25] <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/
downloads/retirement_income_consultation_summary/Retirement_Incomes_Consultation_
Paper.pdf> at 29 May 2010.
92 Michael Sherris and John Evans, Longevity Management Issues for Australia’s Future Tax System 
(2009) [10] Australia’s Future Tax System. <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/html/
commissioned_work/downloads/Longevity_Management_Issues.pdf> at 19 March 2010.
93 Ibid 13. 
94 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper, above n 91, 25.
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more likely to have their funds invested in such a manner due to their risk profiles. 
On the other hand, a public pension fund could invest a large proportion of its funds 
in non-fixed income producing investments such as equities, given the futility of 
a government fund investing in the government’s own bonds (though, apparently, 
many public pension funds do this despite its futility).95 This means that a public 
pension fund would be less subject to inflation risk. 
Such a system would also eliminate the investment risk that exists in the 
superannuation regime. Investment risk is the risk of a decline in the value of the 
retirement savings due to a decline in the value of investments.96 This can lead to 
either a delayed retirement or a retirement where there is a lower standard of living 
than there otherwise would have been. The current superannuation system can 
produce large variations in retirement benefits depending on what year the person 
happens to retire.97 Whilst it is true that investment risk can be minimised under the 
current system by methods such as utilising a private defined benefit superannuation 
account, or choosing a low-growth option in the years approaching retirement, these 
options will often lead to materially reduced returns.98
Since the public pension fund retirement system would have entitlements based 
on a formula linked to taxpayers’ lifetime contributions, in theory there would be 
no investment risk from the retirees’ perspective. However, the investment risk 
might, in some circumstances, be replaced with a political risk, which is the risk that 
governments will reduce the benefits that have been promised to shareholders.99 With 
a public pension fund system, in the short run any shortfall in investment returns 
could be made up by government borrowings, which could be paid back with surplus 
public pension fund earnings over the economic cycle. So, in the short term, there 
should be a low political risk. However, this would depend on precisely how the 
government would frame people’s entitlements under such a system. If those rights 
were legislated as being proprietary rights, the political risk would be low. It is worth 
noting that, in some other jurisdictions, governments have made numerous changes 
to the public defined benefits entitlements of their workers.100 
But what if less than expected investment returns became a long-run phenomenon 
and the public pension fund chronically lacked sufficient funding to pay retirees’ 
95 World Bank, Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World 
Bank Assistance, above n 44, 32. 
96 Ibid.
97 Max Alier and Dimitri Vittas, ‘Personal Pension Plans and Stock Market Volatility’ in Robert 
Holzmann and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), New Ideas about Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable 
Pension Systems in the 21st Century (2001) 391, 393.
98 David Blake, ‘Does it Matter What Type of Pension Scheme You Have?’ (2000) 110(461) The 
Economic Journal 46 points out that employees suffer a substantial loss in private defined benefit 
schemes when they change employer; Alier and Vittas, above n 97.
99 Ibid.
100 Professor Axel Börsch-Supan, ‘Comments on Rethinking Pension Reform: 10 Myths about 
Social Security Systems Introduction’ in Robert Holzmann and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), New Ideas 
about Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century (2001) 57, 74-75.
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promised benefits? The consequences of such a scenario would potentially include 
higher taxes to make up for the shortfall and/or the government cutting retirees’ 
benefits. In other words, the circumstances that would lead to an investment risk 
eventuating in a superannuation-type system might also lead to a political risk where 
retirements are funded by a public pension fund. However, it is submitted that the 
political risk is the lesser of two evils, as ultimately the government could choose 
to trade-off a reduction in benefits by partially funding the shortfall through higher 
taxes. Again, the political risk could be minimised if people’s entitlements were 
legislated as proprietary rights.
There are other advantages to this system over our current superannuation regime. 
For instance, our current system often results in people accumulating a huge amount of 
capital which their beneficiaries will inherit. This means that that the superannuation 
tax concessions are to some degree being utilised to benefit taxpayers’ heirs; this is a 
use that is inconsistent with many of the goals of those concessions. Although there 
are ways to minimise this (such as forcing people to put a certain percentage of their 
lump sum benefit towards an annuity), they are cumbersome, costly and politically 
risky. On the other hand, a defined benefit system paid for by a public pension fund 
makes such ‘capital hoarding’ impossible.
Also, since governments can indulge in more risk-taking than individuals due to 
their ability to spread risk across cohorts,101 they could invest in riskier assets that 
have higher long-run returns, which would further bolster the benefits available to 
individuals. Governments can also leverage investments at lower interest rates than 
the private sector.
However, such a system has disadvantages other than the abovementioned 
political risk. Some have argued that these disadvantages mean this kind of system 
should not be used.102
One disadvantage is that under such a system, subjectively, people might not feel 
as wealthy or secure due to not having their own individual superannuation accounts. 
This subjective factor does need to be taken into account in weighing up which 
retirement system has the best overall outcomes.
More important is the distinct possibility that, for various reasons, government-
run investment bodies cannot in the long run obtain the same investment returns as 
the private sector;103 this is notwithstanding the previously made comments about 
governments being potentially able to benefit from a lower fee structure, and being 
able to invest in assets that offer higher long term returns.
101 Franco Modigliani, Marialuisa Ceprini and Arun Muralidhar, ‘A Solution to the Social Security 
Crisis from an MIT Team’ Sloan (Working Paper 4051, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1999) 5.
102 Martin Feldstein, ‘Introduction’ in Martin Feldstein (ed), Privatising Social Security (1998) 1,2.
103 Börsch-Supan, above n 100, 72; Augusto Iglesias and Robert J. Palacios, ‘Managing Public 
Pension Reserves: Evidence from the International Experience Comments’ in Robert Holzmann 
and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), New Ideas about Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems 
in the 21st Century (2001) 213, 214.
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This is firstly because governments might invest on the basis of political favours 
or electoral pressure rather than seeking investments that are likely to deliver the best 
returns.104 This can manifest itself in many ways. For instance, governments might 
make investments based on electoral donations, or invest in media organisations that 
have given the government positive coverage. Or governments might not invest in 
companies involved in industries perceived as sinful, such as tobacco or gambling 
organisations. Another possibility is that governments might show an aversion to 
relatively risky but potentially high return investments such as shares105 to avoid a 
political backlash that might arise from such an investment doing badly. It is also 
possible to imagine that governments might choose to invest in the share market at 
times of its decline to boost electoral sentiment.106
Secondly, a public sector investment body might be less effective at enforcing 
corporate governance than non-government investors would.107 This is especially the 
case for small listed companies,108 as a large public pension fund would be more likely 
to have a majority interest in such companies as opposed to larger ones.
Furthermore, there are conflict of interest issues that could arise if a government 
public pension fund held substantial business interests.109 For instance, if the 
government owned large holdings in a major supermarket chain that had a significant 
amount of market power, it might compromise the government’s decision to enforce 
or introduce pro-competition legislation that would adversely affect the supermarket 
chain.
In addition, a public pension fund that is a major player in the market could not 
avoid the problems of sub-optimal returns by resorting to indexing. Specifically, two 
problems would be likely to arise. First, the presence of less active players in the market 
would mean that the market as a whole would be less efficient.110 Consequently, those 
using index funds would obtain sub-optimal returns. Secondly, given that index 
investors are passive, there would be a complete lack of enforcement of corporate 
governance.111 This would allow company boards to get away with overpay and 
underperformance. 
And, whilst it remains undeniable that the current superannuation regime’s fees 
make it, in one respect, a less efficient system than a public pension fund, there is scope 
for minimising fees under the current system. At an individual level, taxpayers could 
104 Iglesias and Palacios, above n 103, 226-227. 
105 Ibid 230.
106 Ibid 226-227.
107 Ibid 226-227.
108 Estelle James, ‘Comments on Rethinking Pension Reform: 10 Myths about Social Security 
Systems Introduction’ in Robert Holzmann and Joseph ^ƟŐůŝƚǌ(eds), New Ideas about Old Age 
Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century (2001) 57, 69.
109 Iglesias and Palacios, above n 103, 226-227.
110 Ajay Shah and Kshama Fernandes. ‘The Relevance of Index Funds for Pension Investment 
in Equities’ in Robert Holzmann and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), New Ideas about Old Age Security: 
Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century (2001) 336, 353-354.
111 Börsch-Supan, above n 100, 72.
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choose to utilise one of the many industry superannuation funds; these have average 
management fees of around 0.75% per annum whilst usually providing investment 
returns superior to the retail superannuation funds.112 The current Cooper Review 
is looking at ways of minimising superannuation account fees;113 a Deloitte report 
predicts that if some of the Cooper Review’s more recent recommendations were 
implemented, a substantial number of account holders would have their fees more 
than halved.114 However, only time will tell how successful the Cooper Review will 
be at reducing fees. Overseas experts have claimed that proper reforms might lead to 
superannuation-type systems having management fees equivalent to those of some 
American mutual funds, which are approximately 0.25%, though it remains to be seen 
if this is achievable in Australia.115
Some have attempted to rebut the above criticisms of a retirement system funded 
by public pension funds. It has firstly been pointed out that comparing previous 
returns of public pension funds with private ones is an unfair comparison, because 
the former have traditionally invested in low-yielding assets such as government 
bonds, whereas the latter have had a greater weighting in equities.116 This problem 
could be eliminated by various means. For instance, legislation could require public 
pension funds to invest a certain proportion of their funds in equities. Similarly, 
explicit benchmarks could be set for risk and targeted returns.117
It has also been pointed out that many of the disadvantages of public pension funds, 
including poor performance, can be eliminated if the fund has a board of management 
that is independent from political influence and runs the fund in a competent and 
transparent manner.118 In contrast, many public pension funds have government 
representatives on their boards.119 Though there is some empirical evidence that 
government investment bodies have, on average, materially underperformed private 
112 Industry Super Network, Supernomics: Addressing Failures of Competition in the Superannuation 
Market (2010) [6] Industry Super Funds. <http://www.industrysuper.com/resources.
ashx/DocumentLibrary/61/FileName/9F6F97ADE7D5C6096B8BDBEEF48B661C/ISN_
SUPERNOMICS_final_rpt.pdf> at 16 March 2010.
113 Commonwealth of Australia, Phase Two: Operation and Efficiency - Issues Paper (October 
2009) Super System Review <http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/
operation_efficiency_issues_paper/Phase_Two_Operation_and_Efficiency_Issues_Paper.pdf> 
at 16 May 2010; Commonwealth of Australia, MySuper: Optimising Australian Superannuation 
(April 2010) Super System Review <http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/
mysuper_paper/mysuper_second_phase_one_20100420.pdf> at 16 May 2010.
114 Deloitte Actuaries & Consultants, Phase Two: Operation and Efficiency - Issues Paper (October 
2009) Super System Review <http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/
mysuper_paper/Deloitte_report.pdf> at 16 May 2010.
115 Feldstein, above n 102, 2. 
116 Robert Holzmann and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Rethinking Pension Reform: 10 Myths about Social 
Security Systems’ in Robert Holzmann and Joseph Stiglitz (eds), New Ideas about Old Age 
Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century (2001) 17, 26. 
117 Iglesias and Palacios, above n 103, 219.
118 Holzmann and Stiglitz, above n 116, 42.
119 Iglesias and Palacios, above n 103, 220.
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ones,120 there are examples of public pension funds, such as the Canada Pension 
Plan, that have delivered very good returns for the last decade.121 Consistent with 
claims that good governance leads to good returns, successful public funds such 
as the Canada Pension Plan usually have independently appointed boards, wide 
disclosure requirements, and other checks and balances to assure good governance 
and accountability.122 
It has also been argued that, in a truly efficient market, it makes little difference 
what investments a public body makes within an asset class, as the price at any time 
will reflect its true market value.123 This last point only has merit if the investing body 
is not a dominant investor in the market and so can free-ride an efficient market. The 
instant a poor investor becomes a major market player, the market will becomes less 
efficient and so the dominant investor will receive sub-optimal returns.
On balance, it would be unwise for the current superannuation system to be fully 
replaced by a defined benefits system funded by a public fund. As outlined, the risks 
of doing so would be substantial.
In contrast, there is a strong argument for such a system to complement the 
current superannuation system. For instance, part of the 9% superannuation levy 
could be shifted to funding such a system. In other words, there could be a lower 
superannuation levy offset by a higher surcharge, and the latter would generate the 
money for a public pension fund. Alternatively, the government could change its 
policy so that the planned future increase in superannuation contributions could 
instead be channelled into a public pension fund. This would result in a healthy trade-
off between the different advantages and disadvantages that the two systems offer; it 
would also eliminate some of the problems that would exist if the public pension fund 
system was the dominant retirement regime. 
Specifically, the efficiency of equity markets is likely to be retained if a public 
pension fund is not the dominant player124 and invests in open markets; the retention 
of an efficient market will mean that the public pension fund will have dramatically less 
scope for suffering the consequences of poor decision making. Furthermore, a public 
pension fund partially substituting the current superannuation system would lessen 
the impact of the disadvantages of the current superannuation system. Specifically, 
in dollar terms, superannuation fees would be lower given that superannuation 
management fees are usually charged as a percentage of funds and have not shown 
120 Ibid.
121 CPP Investment Board, 2009 Annual Report (2009) <http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/Annual_
reports/CPPIB_2009_Annual_Report_English.pdf> at 20 March 2010.
122 Anne Maher, ‘Transparency and Accountability of Public Pension Funds’ in Alberto Roque 
Musalem and Roberto J. Palacios (eds), Public Pension Fund Management: Governance, 
Accountability, and Investment (2003) 91, 97-98; Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott, and Cagri 
Kumru, ‘Managing Public Investment Funds: Best Practices and New Questions’ (2008) 7(3) 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 321, 341.
123 Holzmann and Stiglitz, above n 116, 40-41. 
124 Shah and Fernandes, above n 110, 353.
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any economies of scale.125 Also, the impact of inflation, investment and longevity risks 
that are inherent characteristics of the superannuation system would be lessened. It 
was stated earlier in this paper that the World Bank is of the view that diversifying 
pillars helps minimise the risks of the retirement system.126 Although Australia’s 
current system already has some measure of diversification, having superannuation 
supplemented by a defined benefits system, paid for by a public pension fund, would 
add another level of diversification.
 !LTERNATIVEk'OVERNMENTRETIREMENTBENEÛTSNOTFUNDEDBYA
PUBLICINVESTMENTFUND
Another alternative to the current superannuation system is to have retirement 
benefits that are linked to lifetime incomes funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. This is 
similar to the previous option but instead of benefits being funded by a public pension 
fund, they would be funded by recurring government taxation receipts. This is what 
is referred to by the World Bank as the First Pillar of retirement policy.127 Out of fiscal 
concerns, the World Bank is trying to shift countries that have this system across to 
Second Pillar Australian-type superannuation systems.128 If, however, a First Pillar 
system were introduced to replace our current system, what would be the outcome? 
For the sake of consistency, let us assume that such a system would promise taxpayers 
a pension of a similar size to what they would get under the current superannuation 
system.129 In other words, in this hypothetical case, taxpayers could have their 9% 
superannuation contributions paid to them as salary, and still have a pension of a 
similar magnitude to the private pension they could have purchased had they 
continued to receive a 9% contribution to their superannuation accounts for the rest 
of their working lives.
Clearly, such a proposal would put a greater strain on future government revenue 
compared to either a system where benefits are funded by a public pension fund, 
or the current superannuation system. In other words, it would mean that salary 
earners would be better off now at the expense of materially higher taxes in the 
future. However, materially higher taxes in the future should not be confused with 
lack of affordability, given that it is likely that in 40 years’ time GDP per capita will be 
approximately 80% higher.
Like the previously discussed public pension fund regime, under a First Pillar 
system there would be no inflation risk, longevity risk or investment risk.
125 Industry Super Network, above n 112, 5-6. 
126 Holzmann, Hinz and Dorfman, above n 38, 5. 
127 Ibid 5. 
128 Heinz Rudolph and Roberto Rocha, Enabling Conditions for Second Pillars of Pension Systems 
(2008) World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0824 [12] <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/0824.pdf> at 20 March 
2010.
129 Although a very unrealistic assumption, this makes a good theoretical ‘apples with apples’ 
comparison.
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Something worth consideration when evaluating a First Pillar system is what is 
known as the ‘social insurance paradox’.130 This is the principle that if the aggregate of 
population and real earnings growth is greater than the real interest rate, society will 
collectively be better off if retirement benefits are funded through a pay-as-you-go 
system.131 If our benchmark for the rate of return is the return a public pension fund 
receives on its investments, then the more accurate way of stating the principle is as 
follows: a First Pillar system is more beneficial for society if GDP growth is greater 
than the returns that a public pension fund would generate. It is unlikely that in the 
long run GDP growth would match the returns from a public pension fund, given 
that a material percentage of public pension fund investments would be likely to be 
in equities, and that equity returns typically outstrip GDP growth.132 Furthermore, 
the ‘social insurance paradox’ does not take into account the loss of productivity that 
might emerge due to the comparatively higher taxes such a system would impose on 
future generations.133
Another negative is that a pay-as-you-go system of this nature involves a 
substantially higher political risk when compared to a system where benefits are 
paid for by a public pension fund. In other words, there would be a higher risk of 
the government reneging on some of the promised benefits if it does not have those 
benefits funded. 
A further disadvantage is that, like the current superannuation system or a defined 
benefit system funded by a public pension fund, a pay-as-you-go system would 
reduce domestic savings. This is because like the other two alternatives it would, to a 
limited extent, ‘crowd out’ voluntary savings134, but, unlike the other two alternatives, 
it would not offset this with higher government or compulsory savings.
In conclusion, the comparative disadvantages that a First Pillar system would 
bring means that, on balance, it is far from the most ideal retirement system.
 "MUFSOBUJWFTUPTVQFSBOOVBUJPOUIBUEPOPUQSPNPUFJODPNF
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The previous discussion noted that there are legitimate arguments against policies 
that encourage income smoothing, especially in light of the long-term trend towards 
more wealth inequality. Non-income smoothing retirement policies would mean 
130 Henry Aaron, ‘The Social Insurance Paradox’ (1966) 32 Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 37.
131 Ibid.
132 Simon Grant and John Quiggin, ‘The Risk Premium for Equity: Implications for Resource 
Allocation, Welfare and Policy’ (2006) 45(3) Australian Economic Papers 253.
133 John Creedy and Justin Van De Ven, ‘Retirement Incomes: Private Savings versus Social 
Transfers’ (2000) 68(5) The Manchester School 539.
134 Disney, above n 75, 10. 
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abolishing the current superannuation system, and maintaining the Age Pension.135 
The Age Pension could continue to be means-tested or be available universally.
It is worthwhile examining the consequences of such policies in more detail. 
 2ETAINTHECURRENTMEANSTESTEDPENSIONANDDISCARD
SUPERANNUATION
It is quite feasible to maintain the current means-tested pension and discard the 
superannuation system. As mentioned elsewhere in this article, there would be no 
problems with affordability, especially given that superannuation tax concessions cost 
more than any pension savings that are likely to eventuate from the superannuation 
system.
Whilst some may claim that it is inhumane to let people survive on the pension, a 
recent government report showed that, for most retirees, a life on the pension is not 
one of desperate poverty.136 Furthermore, given that the pension is tied to average 
weekly earnings, it has been predicted that in 50 years’ time the single pension in 
today’s dollars will be $28,310.137 The reality is that Australia had no compulsory 
superannuation for many decades without any widespread catastrophic outcomes. 
Furthermore, given that superannuation is a system that will take a long time to 
mature, one can only assume that if living on a pension was so bad, a policy that 
matured faster than the superannuation regime would have been implemented. 
The abolition of superannuation would also mean an improvement in the 
government’s budget position given the loss of revenue due to the superannuation 
tax concessions. The improvement in the government budgetary position could be 
used in a variety of ways, including tax cuts or higher pensions. If it is decided that 
intergenerational equity is a worthy goal, the improved budgetary position could be 
used to achieve this through a structural budget surplus which is invested in a public 
pension fund, which could be used to pay the standard Age Pension in decades to 
come. Though, as discussed earlier in this paper, care needs to be taken with the size 
and governance structure of such funds.
135 To avoid the possibility of economic shocks any abolition of superannuation would have to be 
done in a gradual manner.
136 Jeff Harmer, Pension Review Report (February 2009) Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs <http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/about/
publicationsarticles/corp/BudgetPAES/budget09_10/pension/Documents/Pension_Review_
Report/PensionReviewReport.pdf> at 21 June 2010. Although the report did comment that the 
single person Age Pension led to a lower standard of living than the Age Pension that couples are 
entitled to, the government has since increased the single person Age Pension.
137 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper, above n 91, 34.
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 (AVEANONMEANSTESTEDPENSIONANDDISCARDSUPERANNUATION
A non-means tested pension would obviously be more expensive than a means-
tested one. The cost is estimated to be approximately $6.5 billion a year.138 This is 
substantially less than the cost of superannuation tax concessions, which, according 
to the most recent Tax Expenditure Statements, are close to $23 billion for the current 
financial year.139 However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, Tax Expenditure 
calculations have their limitations. 
The precise marginal cost of what a non-means tested pension would be in the 
future is unclear. However, the current marginal cost of $6.5 billion is approximately 
0.55% of GDP.140 Even if in future decades this were to multiply in percentage of 
GDP terms many times over, it would still be affordable, given that higher future 
incomes (discussed earlier in this paper) would overshadow any necessary increase 
in tax burdens. 
It is unclear whether a non-means tested pension would provide a greater incentive 
to save compared to a means-tested one. This is because of two counteracting forces. 
The ‘substitution effect’ has the impact of encouraging retirement savings with a non-
means tested pension because extra individual savings will not reduce future pension 
benefits.141 On the other hand, the ‘wealth effect’ means that people will achieve their 
net retirement financial goals more easily with a non-means tested pension and so save 
less of their own money.142 The evidence as to which effect is stronger is equivocal143 
though there is some suggestion that the net effect is that a non-means tested pension 
gives people a greater incentive to save for retirement.144 This is in contrast to the 
current mix of superannuation tax incentives, which as discussed in the companion 
article do little to increase voluntary retirement savings due to the fact that they are 
targeted at higher income earners. 
The disadvantage of a non-means tested pension is that although it would be 
affordable, the reality is that higher taxes can also have an economic cost by way of 
work disincentives.145
138 Ross Clare, Superannuation and Australian Retirement Income (2009) Association 
of Superannuation Funds of Australia [11] <http://www.superannuation.asn.au/
ArticleDocuments/116/rc0901-age-pension.pdf.aspx> at 20 March 2010. Since this was before 
the recent pension increase the amount would be slightly higher now.
139 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 4.
140 Commonwealth, 2009-10 Budget Paper (2009).
141 Disney, above n 75, 6-7. 
142 Ibid 7.
143 Ibid 9.
144 Ibid 9-10.
145 Ibid 11.
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 #ONCLUSION
Retirement policies involve many trade-offs. For example, a system that puts more 
emphasis on equal retirement incomes might be more equitable but reduces work 
incentive. A system such as Australia’s superannuation regime that provides taxpayers 
with private entitlements will have a lower political risk but greater investment risk 
than a public system. 
As retirement policies have a substantial impact on people’s well-being, it is 
important that society encourage lawmakers to enact a set of policies that have the 
qualities and trade-offs that best suit society’s needs. This is more likely to happen if 
the important issues concerning retirement policies are subject to informed public 
debate. Specifically, the public needs to have an informed debate as to what extent 
retirement policies should be aimed at income smoothing and to what extent they 
should be aimed at providing a comfortable income for all retirees. Furthermore, 
if there is widespread opinion that income smoothing is an important goal of the 
retirement system then there needs to be a discussion as to whether the current 
superannuation system should be complemented with a fully funded defined benefit 
scheme. As discussed, such a policy would alleviate some of the investment and 
longevity risk, as well as the fee burden that troubles the current superannuation 
regime. Ideally, if such policy were to be implemented, the fund’s board would be 
independent from government control, and there would be checks and balances to 
ensure that the fund would operate in a transparent and accountable manner. 
An example of the lack of debate concerning retirement policy was the government’s 
recent policy announcement that the Superannuation Guarantee contributions rate be 
incrementally increased to 12%. There were important points that, ideally, should have 
been publicly discussed before this decision was made. Specifically, the fact that the 
Henry Review stated that such an increase was not desirable, and the negative impact 
of the increase on the government’s budgetary position were issues that warranted 
discussion. Even more importantly, there was no discussion on further diversification 
of the retirement system as an alternative to increasing the Superannuation Guarantee 
rate.
Despite the current public apathy, it is hoped that in the future the public will seek 
to have greater interest and input on Australia’s retirement policies. 
Copyright of Full Text rests with the original copyright owner and, except as 
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Article 2 considers ways to improve the Australian superannuation system in the wake of 
the final report of the Australia’s Future Tax System Review, commonly referred to as the 
Henry Review.  
Whereas Article 1 holistically examines the aims of retirement policy and then goes on to 
discuss the trade-offs of various mixes of retirement regimes, this article turns to examine 
possible improvements. The suggested improvements do not alter the current 
foundations of the retirement system, but are discussed within the confines of 
maintaining the current combination of superannuation and a means tested pension. 
Specifically, the relevant topics covered in this paper were based on retirement policy 
issues raised in the Henry Review. Three areas were addressed: 
• the taxation of superannuation; 
• ways to raise superannuation balances; and 
• encouragement of longevity insurance. 
The approach taken in this article is to undertake an independent analysis of policy 
changes that might be desirable for each of these three issues. It then compares its 
findings with the analysis and findings of the Henry Review. It found that in many, 
though certainly not all cases, the Henry Review recommendations were sound. 
Although the Henry Review and other papers67 have called for superannuation-related 
policy changes, the significance of Article 2 lies in the thoroughness of its research and 
the consequent analysis of the relevant issues. This gives it credibility as a basis for 
 
89 See, eg, Richard Denniss and David Richardson, ‘Can the Taxpayer Afford ‘Self-funded 
Retirement’?’ (Policy Brief No 42, Australia Institute, August 2012). 
 06
commenting on policy recommendations. For instance, when discussing superannuation 
tax concessions, rather than briefly stating their aims, as was done by the Henry 
Review,7. Part 3.2 of Article 2 undertakes a detailed evaluation of the professed aims of 
the concessions, and in so doing, analyses the relative merits of those aims. 
$"#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The first area of policy covered in Article 2 is the taxation of superannuation, which is 
discussed in Part 3 of the article. This part starts by examining the stated justifications of 
superannuation tax concessions and questioning which of those justifications are 
meritorious. It then focuses on whether the taxation of superannuation could be 
improved to better fit in with those aims. It finds that in this respect, the 
recommendations of the Henry Review are consistent with positive policy outcomes. 
""!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Regarding raising superannuation balances, Part 4 of the article reviews the research that  
found that on balance, once the superannuation system matured, retirees would have 
adequate retirement incomes when their superannuation balances were combined with a 
part-pension. It is, however, important to note that ultimately, what is an adequate 
retirement income is a subjective judgement. The article discusses the contradictory 
statements in the Henry Review which, on the one hand, are consistent with the article’s 
finding that the current policy setting are adequate, yet at the same time propose policies 
that would increase superannuation balances. Specifically, one of the proposals of the 
Henry Review meant that in essence workers would be forced to make extra 
contributions to their superannuation accounts. Further, the Henry Review 
recommended that as a means of increasing superannuation balances, superannuation 
 
90 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report: Part 2 Volume 1 (2 
May 2010) Australia’s Future Tax System, 96-7 
<http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/AFTS_
Final_Report_Part_2_Vol_1_Consolidated.pdf>. 
 07
earnings be taxed at half their current concessional rate. Article 2 takes a contrary 
position, arguing that not only were these recommendations counter to the finding that 
the current system gave adequate balances, but also that the tax concession suggestion 
markedly added to the inequity of the system, since the larger balances resulting from this 
policy would be at the expense of the taxpayer, and would predominantly benefit of 
those with larger superannuation balances. 
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The third main discussion point of Article 2 is in Part 5. It concerns longevity insurance. 
Currently, the superannuation system is highly developed in its accumulation phase, but is 
relatively undeveloped in the retirement phase. The article discusses, first, whether people 
should continue to be allowed to take their superannuation in the form of a lump sum, 
and concludes that on the current evidence, the answer should be in the affirmative. This 
conclusion is reached on the basis that, given the lack of evidence that retirees are on the 
aggregate irresponsibly squandering their superannuation balances, they should be 
allowed to maintain their current freedom of choice. However, the article does note that 
more research is required to determine whether retirees are in aggregate responsibly using 
their superannuation savings, and if this research results in solid evidence that they are 
not, then there is a strong argument for limiting the availability of lump-sum benefits. 
The article goes on to discuss longevity insurance, pointing to the lack of clarity about the 
reasons why Australia, like most other jurisdictions, has such a low uptake of life 
annuities. This phenomenon, known as the ‘annuity puzzle’, is discussed in greater detail 
in Article 4. Article 2 goes on to assert that while the government issuing of certain 
bonds could assist to develop the annuity market, it should on balance not issue longevity 
bonds,7/ given that the government is already sufficiently exposed to longevity risk, and 
that such bonds appear to be of limited assistance in developing annuity markets. The 
article also discusses, at some length, the advantages and disadvantages of the 
government assuming, on a limited basis, the responsibility for issuing life annuities. It 
argues that although this, too, would expose the government to further longevity risks, 
 
91 Longevity bonds are have payments that vary according to the degree to which systematic 
life expectancies deviate from expectations. 
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the idea is worth considering, given the substantial impact it could have on annuitisation 
levels and giving retirees a sense of financial security in retirement. The article noted that 
the Henry Review also sensibly recommended that the government should not issue 
longevity bonds, due to the impact on longevity risk, but did recommend that the 
government consider the possibility of issuing life annuities in a limited manner. 
$!!($" $#%#"
This article remains current in the area of policy analysis. However, some noteworthy 
changes to the law have been made since its publication. Some of these were mentioned 
in Chapter 2, where updates to Article 1 were discussed. The updates canvassed in 
Chapter 2 that also relate to this article are as follows. 
! 
Article 2, in Part 2.1, refers to the fact that at the time, only employees under the age of 
75 were entitled to mandatory superannuation contributions. This age limit has since 
been abolished.70 
 "! 
The thresholds for withdrawals of superannuation lump sums and income streams 
mentioned in Part 2.23 have been updated. Lump sum withdrawals from a taxed fund, 
for those who are less than 60 years of age, are tax-free for the first $195,000; amounts 
over this are taxed at 17 per cent.71 The thresholds for withdrawals from untaxed funds 
have also changed: the $150,000 threshold has increased to $195,000 and the $1,100,000 
threshold to $1,395,000.72 
 
92 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) s 4. 
93 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 301-20, 307-345. 
94 Ibid ss 301-95, 307-100. 
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The tax expenditure figure given in Part 3.13 for the cost of the superannuation tax 
concessions of $22.7b has most recently risen to $35.5b for the 2013–14 financial year.95 
Part 3.1.3 also makes the point that due to behavioural changes, in the real world, the net 
cost of concessional superannuation taxation would be markedly less than this. At the 
time the article was written, no known modelling had estimated what the ‘real world’ 
value of the superannuation tax concessions would be. However, as pointed out in the 
updates to Article 1, there is now Treasury modelling that estimates the real-world net 
cost of superannuation tax concessions to be $19.1 billion or $14.1 billion, depending on 
the assumptions made.74 
Some of the changes mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 are worthy of more detailed analysis 
here, because of their pertinence to the content of Article 2.  
!!%!! 
Article 2, in Parts 2.21, 3.3 and 3.4, states that the law at the time provided that 
concessional contributions into taxed superannuation funds were taxed at the flat rate of 
15 per cent. The taxation of superannuation continues to be a matter of debate, and was 
a major discussion point in the Federal Government’s 2011 Tax Forum.97 The law has 
been since changed, and from 1 July 2012, those earning an income over $300,000 
(inclusive of their superannuation contributions) are subject to an earnings tax of 30 per 
cent.76 In Parts 3.3 and 3.4 of Article 2, it is argued that progressive but concessional tax 
rates on superannuation contributions would be more equitable and efficient than the 
current flat rate. Specifically, Part 3.3 discusses a Treasury Report indicating that higher 
income deciles receive a disproportional fiscal benefit from the retirement system, 
compared with lower deciles. This skewed distribution would now be mildly abated due 
to the higher contribution rate for high-income earners. However, more recent figures 
 
95 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2014) 98–107. 
96 Charter Group, above n 15, 9. 
97  Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Prescriptions for Reform of Australia's Superannuation Tax Concessions’ 
(2012) 27 Australian Tax Forum 371, 382-3. 
98 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 293. 
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indicate that higher income deciles still disproportionally benefit from these tax 
concessions.77 Although the higher rate for those earning at least $300,000 does appear 
to be consistent with progressive tax rates on contributions, the reality is that it only 
affects a small percentage of taxpayers/.. and raises very little revenue././ 
" &!"!!
Parts 2.1, 2.21. 4.1 and 4.2 of Article 2 refer to the old 9 per cent compulsory 
superannuation contribution rate. Parts 2.1, 3.13, 4.1, 4.2 and 6 specifically refer to the 
fact that the government at the time had announced plans to increase the compulsory 
contribution rate to 12 per cent. The government subsequently followed through with its 
plans, and legislated a staggered increase in the compulsory superannuation rate. As a 
result the current rate is 9.5 per cent.102 The current Coalition government subsequently 
announced that these increases were to be delayed by two years,103 though negotiations in 
the Senate ultimately resulted in the final outcome being that the increase be deferred by 
six years.104 
As Article 2 reasons in Parts 4.1 and 4.2, modelling has indicated that on balance, an 
increase beyond the 9 per cent rate was not required. Further, it argues that if such a 
move is to be considered, an evaluation of the trade-offs of higher retirement incomes at 
the cost of lower working incomes and less government revenue is warranted. 
Unfortunately, the then ALP government, with almost no debate, pushed through the 
legislated rise. When the current government did ultimately negotiate in the Senate and 
agree to defer any further rises for six years, the Prime Minster did subsequently state that 
 
99 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 138. See also Siobhan Austen, 
Rhonda Sharp and Helen Hodgson, ‘Gender Impact Analysis and the Taxation of 
Retirement Savings in Australia’ (2015) 30 Australian Tax Forum 763 explaining how the 
current superannuation taxation regime disproportionately benefits men due to factors 
such as gender discrepancies in earnings and typical lifetime work patterns.  
100 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Fairer Taxation of Excess 
Concessional Contributions) Bill 2013 (Cth) 1.19. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) s 19(2). 
103 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2014-5, 17. 
104 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Repeal and Other Measures Act 2014 (Cth) sch 6. 
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this would mean, in relative terms, greater take-home pay for workers./.3 Although on 
the evidence a deferral in the increase appears to be a positive move, there is still an 
apparent lack of balanced public discussion on this very important issue. 
%!!&
As noted in Chapter 2, although the government previously announced a policy of 
indexing the age pension to the CPI, it has since announced that it will no longer be 
attempting to legislate such a policy./.4 However, it has instead passed legislation through 
both houses of parliament to modify the age pension asset test. This will have the effect 
of reducing or eliminating the eligibility of the age pension for some retirees as from 
2017, though for some others their payments will be increased./.5 The abovementioned 
study of retiree income adequacy relied on most retirees being eligible for a part-
pension./.6 Consequently, the outcome of the analysis in Article 2 might differ to some 
extent, given that now some future retirees will have reduced pension eligibility. The 
effect of a tighter asset test, however, needs to be seen in light of the fact that, as 
mentioned in Part 4.1 of Article 2, the retiree income paper modelling was based on the 
single age pension being 25 per cent of average weekly male earnings, whereas it was 
raised to 27 per cent a few years ago. If modelling based on the new laws indicates that 
the current system does not provide adequate retirement incomes, it is arguable that there 
is a case for a higher superannuation contribution rate to make up for the fact that some 
retirees will suffer decreased pension payments. However, this would appear to be an 
inferior outcome than would be obtained with greater reliance on the pension and less on 
the superannuation system. As discussed in Chapter 2 and Article 1, there is a strong case 
on an equitable level for shifting the emphasis towards, rather than away from, the age 
pension. 
 
105 Chris Uhlmann, Interview with Tony Abbott, 2 September 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4079649.htm>. 
106 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2015, 170. 
107 Social Services Legislation Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Pensions) Act 2015 (Cth) sch 3 pt 1. 
108 George Rothman, 2007. ‘The Adequacy of Australian Retirement Incomes – New 
Estimates Incorporating the Better Superannuation Reforms’, Fifteenth Colloquium of 
Superannuation Researchers, University of New South Wales, 19–20 July 2007 
Conference Paper 07/1 <http://rim.treasury.gov.au/content/CP07_1.asp>. 
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Parts Part 2.21 and 3.4 of Article 2 make references to the concessional and non-
concessional superannuation contribution caps. Part 3.4 also references the Henry 
Review recommendation that there be a $50,000 cap for those at least 50 years of age, on 
the condition that they have superannuation balances of less than $500,000. Although 
this recommendation was not subsequently implemented, the cap for those at least 50 
years of age is now $35,000.109 
Due to indexation, the cap for those who are under 50 is currently $30,000.110 As the 
$35,000 cap does not grant mature workers much of a comparative extra benefit as 
compared to younger workers, it falls short of fulfilling the aim of the proposed $50,000 
cap, which was give older workers an opportunity to play ‘catch up’, since they had been 
unable to benefit from a mature superannuation system for a substantial portion of their 
working lives./// Further, as noted in Part 3.4 of Article 2, a higher mature age worker 
cap should ideally only be available to those who do not have a substantial 
superannuation balance, so as to limit the fiscal impact of the measure. This would also 
limit the extent to which much of the benefit of a higher cap would disproportionally 
flow to higher income earners. Arguably however, when the differential between the 
mature and younger worker caps is as small as is currently the case, it might not be worth 
the administrative trouble to impose such an asset test.  
!"!!
Parts 2.24 and 3.4 of Article 2 refer to the co-contribution scheme, which at the time 
involved the government matching dollar for dollar low-income earners’ non-
concessional contributions. The article (in Part 3.4) endorses the Henry Review’s 
criticism of this scheme. Further, the same part of the article discusses the then 
government’s intention to introduce an offset of up to $500, which effectively refunds 
the contribution tax for lower income earners. It also states that such an offset is 
 
109  Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20. 
110 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20(1)(a), 291-20(1)(b). 
111 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 90, 
100.  
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superior, in policy terms, to the co-contribution scheme, since it is more equitable and 
better targeted. Since publication of Article 2, the government has watered down the co-
contribution scheme, and now only matches 50 cents for every dollar contributed by low-
income earners. 112 Also of importance is that the $500 offset has now been legislated, 
and is referred to as the low-income superannuation contribution offset.//1 This offset 
gives those who earn up to $37,000 per tax year a rebate of 15 per cent of their 
concessional superannuation contributions, up to a limit of $500.//2  
These developments are consistent with good policy, though given the criticisms of the 
co-contributions scheme, the continued winding down of its existence (ending with its 
abolition) is desirable.  
However, the low-income contribution offset is legislated to be phased out from 1 July 
2017.//3 This is unfortunate, given the inherent inequity of low-income earners paying 
the same concessional contribution rate as those with higher incomes, especially given 
that an ‘income smoothing’ regime such as superannuation already gives relatively 
unfavourable treatment to low-income earners. The current government, when in 
opposition, had originally stated its intention to abolish this offset,//4 though senate 
negotiations caused its abolition to be deferred to 1 July 2017.//5 
!#!"! 
The income tax rates discussed in Part 2.2.1 have been modified, and there is now a tax-
free threshold of $18,200; for income between $18,201 and $37,000 the marginal tax rate 
 
112 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) ss 9, 10, 
10A. 
113 Ibid pt 2A. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Repeal and Other Measures Act 2014 (Cth) sch 7. 
116 Jessica Irvine, ‘Abbott to Up Super Tax on Battlers’, Herald Sun (online), 1 Feb 2013 < 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/abbott-to-up-super-tax-on-battlers/story-
fncynkc6-1226566241450>. 
117 David Crowe, ‘Superannuation Delay is Price of Crossbench Deal to Repeal Mining 
Tax’, The Australian (online), 2 Sep 2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/superannuation-delay-is-price-of-crossbench-deal-to-repeal-mining-tax/story-
fn59niix-1227044980509>. 
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is 19 per cent; for income between $37,001 and $80,000 it is 32.5 per cent; for income 
between $80,001 and $180,000 it is 37 per cent; and for anything above $180,000 it is 47 
per cent.//6 Further, the Medicare levy has been increased to 2 per cent from 1 July 
2014.//7 Part 3.4 of Article 2 discusses the Henry Review’s recommendations that 
superannuation contributions be subject to an offset rather than a flat tax rate and that 
such an offset be implemented in a manner that results in most taxpayers paying a net tax 
rate of 15 per cent on their contributions. As most taxpayers are now on the 34.5 per 
cent tax rate (including Medicare levy), this would mean that the offset would have to be 
19.5 per cent rather than 16.5 per cent, the rate that was relevant when the article was 
written. Further, it would mean that the net tax rates applied to superannuation 
contributions under the Henry Review’s recommendations would be 2.5 per cent, 15 per 
cent, 20.5 per cent and 30.5 per cent respectively. 
Part 2.2.2 refers to a budget announcement to concessionally tax interest on bank 
deposits. However, the former government announced in the 2012 budget that it would 
not proceed with this concession./0. 
Part 5.1 states that just under 50 per cent of superannuation benefits are withdrawn in the 
form of a lump sum rather than an income stream. More recent figures show that this has 
not changed, and lump sums still constitute just under 50 per cent of superannuation 
benefits./0/ 
Part 5.1 also discusses research relied upon by Treasury indicating that most retirees do 
not irresponsibly squander lump sum retirement benefits. However, it does note the 
limitations of this research, and suggested that further research is desirable. Recently, 
more research on this issue has been undertaken by Rice Warner. This research supports 
 
118 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 12(1), pt 4, and sch 7, pt 1. 
119 Medicare Levy Act 1986 (Cth) s 6. 
120 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2012-3, 35-36. 
121 APRA, June 2013 Statistics Annual Superannuation Bulletin (5 February 2014) APRA, 19 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Publications/Documents/Revised%202013%20Annual
%20Superannuation%20Bulletin%2005-02-14.pdf >. 
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the conclusion that most retirees are using superannuation funds responsibly./00 
Specifically, it found that the higher the superannuation balance, the more likely it was 
that a higher proportion of it would be taken in the form of an income stream./01 For 
instance, for those with a superannuation balance of $300,000 or more, 91 per cent of 
accounts were taken as an income stream./02 In contrast, for those with balances of 
$50,000 or less, only 30 per cent of accounts were converted to an income stream./03 
Further, relying on ABS data, Rice Warner found a substantial amount of superannuation 
funds taken as a lump sum to have been used responsibly./04 These findings have been 
largely confirmed by a recent report by the Productivity Commission, which arrived at its 
conclusions using evidence from a range of sources.127 Specifically, it found that an 
increasing majority of superannuation funds were being taken in the form of an income 
stream,128 and it too found that the minority of retirees who took most of their benefits 
in the form of a lump sum typically had small superannuation balances.129 Further, this 
report also found that lump sum withdrawals were on the whole being used responsibly,  
with the majority of them being used for paying down debt or on expenditures with long-
term benefits such as house renovations.130 An important finding by this report was that 
the evidence suggesting that manipulating the system by drawing down on 
superannuation funds to get higher age pension entitlements is not a widespread 
practice.131 Such research reinforces the point that on the current evidence, there is no 
strong argument for mandating that superannuation benefits be taken in the form of an 
income stream. 
 
122 Rice Warner, ‘New Analysis Shows our “Lump Sum Culture” is an Exaggeration (Media 
Release, 28 April 2015) <http://ricewarner.com/new-analysis-shows-our-lump-sum-
culture-is-an-exaggeration-colonial-first-state-income-stream-index-launched/>. 
123 Ibid 10. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid 2. 
127  Productivity Commission, Superannuation Policy for Post-Retirement (2015) ch 4. 
128  Ibid 81-83. 
129  Ibid 82-86. 
130  Ibid 87-88. 
131  Ibid 94. 
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The recent final report of the Financial System Inquiry (‘Inquiry Report’) made some 
notable recommendations for the taxation of superannuation that are relevant to the 
discussion in Article 2. 
! !""! ' !
The Inquiry Report suggested that consideration be given to aligning the earnings rate of 
superannuation funds in accumulation mode (currently 15 per cent) and income-stream 
mode (currently tax-free).132 Part 3.4 of Article 2 discusses a similar suggestion made by 
the Henry Review. Specifically, the Henry Review recommended that earnings from both 
accumulation and income stream modes be set at a flat, consistent rate of 7.5 per cent. 
Article 2 (in Part 4.2) argued against this Henry Review recommendation, on the basis 
that its adoption would lead to a loss of government revenue. In contrast, the Inquiry 
Report noted that the unified rate could be set in a revenue-neutral manner.133 The 
Inquiry Report justified this alignment of rates on a few grounds. Amongst its reasons, it 
first argued that this would help increase product innovation by allowing ‘all of life’ 
superannuation accounts, and would lower costs to superannuation funds because 
individuals would not need as many funds.134 It gave the example of a taxpayer who has 
an account in income stream mode but wishes to make additional contributions, and 
under current laws would need to set one up an extra account in accumulation mode.135 
The logical assumption behind the Inquiry Report’s support for a consistent earnings tax 
rate is that this a unified rate is required for superannuation accounts to not be 
dichotomised into accumulation and income stream accounts. However, this 
dichotomisation could also be alleviated without changing the current two-tier earnings 
tax structure.  In other words, there could be a unified scheme without separate 
accumulation and income stream accounts, but a continuation of different tax rates 
depending on the situation. Specifically, where under the current regime a taxpayer is 
 
132 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 137. 
133 Ibid 140. 
134 Ibid 139-140. 
135 Ibid 139. 
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eligible and chooses to have their accumulations account commuted into an income 
stream account, under a hypothetical unified account regime, their unified account could 
go from having a 15 per cent earnings tax to tax-free earnings and minimum age-based 
withdrawals. Further, if under the current regime that taxpayer would be allowed to make 
further contributions into an accumulations account while having another account in 
income stream mode (from which withdrawals could be made), under this hypothetical 
unified account system, that taxpayer would be allowed to contribute and withdraw from 
this one unified account. And while it is true that such a system would mean that such 
taxpayers would pay no tax on the earnings of their contributions, under the current 
system they can in any case avoid paying material amounts of earnings tax, given that an 
eligible taxpayer can easily turn an accumulation account into a tax-free income stream 
account.136  
Second, it was argued that the current regime leads to suboptimal investment strategies, 
as prior to retirement, people are focused on investing towards retirement rather than 
beyond retirement.137 It would appear that logically speaking, if the proposed regime was 
to abate this behaviour, then – as with the previous justification – it would do so because 
it would obviate the need for dichotomisation of accumulations and income stream 
accounts. Consequently, a similar result would be likely to eventuate from adopting the 
suggested unified accounts while maintaining different tax rates based on the account 
holder’s age and financial stage.  
However, while the Inquiry Report’s reasoning does not, on closer scrutiny, appear to 
justify a unified earnings tax rate, there are some reasons to support such policy. A single 
tax rate is at face value simpler and fairer than having different earnings rates. Further, as 
stated in Part 3.4 of Article 2, the Henry Review noted that the tax-free status of the 
earnings from income stream accounts was now unnecessary – a redundant measure, 
since the zero rate had been introduced to complement the previous law relating to the 
taxation of income stream distributions in the hands of those aged over 60. Also, while 
the Inquiry Report’s suggestion was for a tax-neutral change, aligning these rates gives an 
 
136 Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: When a Superannuation Income Stream Commences and 
Ceases, TR 2013/5, 31 July 2013, [9-13]. 
137 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 139-40. 
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opportunity to effect a change that increases revenue, which might be worthwhile to 
prevent future revenue leakage due to an increasing proportion of the population 
entering the income-stream mode.138 
On the other hand, one possible argument against a unified tax rate on earnings, not 
brought up in the Inquiry Report but noted in Part 3.4 of Article 2, is that a lower 
differential rate on income stream earnings would encourage people to responsibly spend 
their retirement money by incentivising them to take their benefits in the form of an 
income stream. Importantly, as also discussed in the same part of this article, the Henry 
Review found that this argument was not persuasive, given the research indicating that 
retirees do not in the aggregate irresponsibly waste their retirement money. However, as 
mentioned in Parts 3.4 and 5.1 of Article 2, this research is not entirely reliable, though as 
noted above, the more recent research by Rice Warner does add equivocal support to its 
findings. The lack of strong certainty that retirees are responsibly using their retirement 
funds, or that they might start to be less responsible in the absence of a zero rate on 
income stream earnings, combined with the relative weakness of the arguments for a 
unified rate, means that a unified rate is not optimal policy at this point in time. Such a 
policy would best be instituted only if and when there was further reliable evidence that 
Australians spend their superannuation responsibly. This conclusion in no way 
contradicts the assertion of this thesis, discussed above, that the lack of evidence that 
Australians are irresponsibly using their retirement benefits makes the highly intrusive 
potential policy of coercing the taking of retirement benefits as an income stream 
unjustified. This is because, as discussed, while the evidence is not fully certain, it still 
points to most people responsibly using their retirement savings, and so does not justify 
laws which impede upon the freedom of retirees in choosing the form of their 
superannuation benefits.  
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 !#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The Inquiry Report also noted that the current superannuation tax arrangements 
disproportionally benefited higher income earners and those with large superannuation 
 
138 Commonwealth of Australia, Re: Think. Tax Discussion Paper (March 2015) Better Tax 
Australia < http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf>. 
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balances. 139 It stated that this is a misuse of resources, given that the superannuation 
balances of such funds is unlikely to save pensions.140 The Inquiry Report suggested that 
this issue be alleviated by better targeting of superannuation tax concessions, or through 
a larger earnings tax on those with high superannuation balances141 – though the latter is 
in reality a form of better targeting of superannuation tax concessions. That 
superannuation concessions need improved targeting is consistent with the findings in 
Part 3.3 of Article 2, though Article 2 justifies its conclusion with a wider spectrum of 
reasons than the Inquiry Report does. 
As to the first suggestion, that of better targeting of tax concessions, the Inquiry Report 
mentioned the progressive but concessional contributions tax system recommended by 
the Henry Review,142 then went on to more strongly advocate reducing the non-
concessional contributions cap as a way of better targeting of superannuation tax 
concessions.143 Part 3.4 of Article 2 specifically supported concessional contributions 
being taxed in a progressive, concessional manner. However, it did not consider the idea 
of reducing the non-concessional contributions cap. At face value, this idea has some 
appeal, as intuitively speaking, higher income earners are more likely to make large non-
concessional contributions than others. However, to the extent that the aim is to target 
the concessions away from such higher income earners, this would appear to be a blunt 
instrument, less effective than a regime that utilises progressive but concessional tax rates 
for concessional contributions. This is because progressive concessional contributions 
clearly target higher income earners in the most direct manner, rather than relying on the 
generalisation that higher income earners are more likely to make larger non-concessional 
contributions. In other words, while, logically speaking, there is likely to be a tendency 
for higher income earners to make greater non-concessional contributions, there might 
be many exceptions.  
 
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Nevertheless, there might be merit in cutting down the non-concessional contributions 
limit available to those that have superannuation balance above a certain threshold. Such 
a policy move need not be to the exclusion of the introduction of progressive tax rates on 
concessional contributions. Imposing stricter limits on non-concessional contributions 
only when a superannuation balance exceeds a certain amount is more likely to achieve 
the aims of targeting the concessions to those that are likely to use superannuation as a 
genuine retirement vehicle, and is more likely to target those whose wealth status is such 
that they would be unlikely to ever use the government pension. It would also address 
the reservation that the Inquiry Report had concerning reducing the non-concessional 
contribution limit, that such a reduction would remove flexibility from the system and 
would be to the detriment of those with broken work patterns.144 In a sense, such a 
means-tested limit is in a rough sense a ‘mirror image’ of the policy proposal, advocated 
in Part 3.4 of Article 2, that there be a higher concessional contributions limit for older 
workers whose superannuation balances do not exceed a certain threshold. 
The other main suggestion in the Inquiry Report regarding the taxation of 
superannuation was to increase superannuation earnings tax for those with balances over 
a certain limit.145 Previously the ALP, while in government, also had plans to increase the 
earnings tax payable by wealthier people.146 Specifically, it planned to introduce a tax on 
superannuation earnings that support income streams.147 The proposal was for earnings in 
a superannuation income stream account that exceeded $100,000 in any particular 
financial year to be subject to a 15 per cent tax rate rather than being tax-free.148 This was 
not implemented. The ALP has more recently, while in opposition, announced its 
 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Bill Shorten and Wayne Swan, ‘Reforms to Make the Superannuation System Fairer’ 
(Media Release, 14 September 2010) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2013/020.htm&
pageID=&min=brs&Year=&DocType=0>. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
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intention to implement a tighter version of this, where income stream earnings in excess 
of $75,000 in a particular year be subject to a 15 per cent tax.149  
It should be noted that the Financial System Inquiry’s suggestion is not identical to the 
one proposed by the Labor government. Specifically, the Labor government’s proposal is 
aimed at making some tax-free earnings for the targeted taxpayers subject to the same tax 
rate as earnings on superannuation accumulation funds.150 The Inquiry Report’s proposal, 
on the other hand, is not targeted solely at earnings from income-stream accounts and 
would include earnings from accumulation funds as well.151 Further, given the 
recommendation made by the Inquiry Report to align accumulations and income stream 
mode earning rates,152 its proposal would be aimed at lifting the rate above the non-zero 
one that would hypothetically apply to most members of those funds. A further 
difference between the Inquiry Report’s proposal and that of the ALP is that this 
proposal uses the superannuation fund balance, rather than its earnings, as the criterion 
for determining whether the higher earnings rate is applicable. However, the advantage of 
using earnings as opposed to balance as the criterion is that the long-term returns of 
assets can change over time, meaning that what would be regarded as a balance able to 
support a reasonable lifelong income stream may change over time. Furthermore, since 
the issue is one of the taxation of earnings, it makes sense that the rate should be based 
on the size of the earnings.  
The current government initially announced that it will not implement a means-tested 
increase to the superannuation earnings rate.153 It justified this on the basis that such a 
change would lead to higher compliance costs on the part of superannuation funds, and 
that avoiding such changes will help bring certainty to the superannuation system.154 The 
 
149 Australian Labor Party, Fairer Super Plan <http://www.alp.org.au/fairer_super_plan>. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 141. 
152 Ibid 140. 
153 Arthur Sinodinos and Joe Hockey, ‘Restoring integrity in the Australian Tax System’ 
 (Media Release, 6 November 2013) <http://axs.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-
release/003-2013/>. 
154 Ibid. 
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Inquiry Report, however, stated that the compliance issue could be overcome.155 
Specifically, it suggested that the liability for tax on earnings for funds supporting a 
superannuation income stream be imposed directly on the taxpayer rather than on their 
superannuation funds, but that the taxpayer have the option of withdrawal of funds from 
their superannuation account should they wish to access their superannuation money to 
pay the tax liability.156 The current government has, however, since had a change of Prime 
Minister, and has subsequently opened the door to the possibility of extensive 
superannuation tax reform.157 
The Inquiry Report made the point, accurately, that the advantage of policies aimed at 
imposing higher taxes on present superannuation balances is that they will apply to high 
balances now and the future, whereas policies aimed at capping contributions will only 
abate high balances building in the future and will not affect those that already have high 
balances.158 This is an important consideration if it is decided that policy makers need to 
be highly selective regarding policies aimed at abating the disproportional use of 
superannuation tax incentives by the financially better off. 
Although the government has recently released an official response to the Inquiry Report, 
this response did not comment on these specific tax matters.159 Rather, the government 
has released an initial tax discussion paper as part of a wide-ranging tax review process, 
and stated that it will consider the Inquiry Report’s superannuation tax recommendations 
as part of this process.160 In light of this report and the abovementioned willingness of 
 
155 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 141. 
156 Ibid. As correctly pointed out by this report, this is the approach used for superannuation 
contributions that exceed the currently legislated caps. 
157 Shalailah Medhora, ‘Turnbull to Meet Business and Union Leaders to Outline Reform 
Agenda’, The Guardian (online), 29 September 2015 
<http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/29/turnbull-to-meet-with-
business-and-union-leaders-to-outline-reform-agenda>. 
158 Ibid 142. 
159 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Government Response to the Financial System Inquiry’, 
above n 44. 
160 Commonwealth of Australia, Re: Think. Tax Discussion Paper (March 2015) Australia’s 
Future Tax System, 67-70 Re: Think Better Tax, Better Australia. < 
http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf>. 
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the new Prime Minister to modify superannuation policy, it is possible that there might 
be some positive changes to superannuation taxation in the near future. 
  
 24
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Article 2 is reproduced in the following pages. The citation for this article is as follows: 
Rami Hanegbi, ‘Improving our Superannuation Regime: A Post-Henry Review Look at 
Superannuation Taxation, Raising Superannuation Balances and Longevity Insurance’ 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 425–57.  
  

3WZ\Y`SXQ
Y_\
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX

\OQSWO$
K
ZY]^2OX\c
\O`SOa
VYYU

K^
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
^KbK^SYX
\KS]SXQ

]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
LKVKXMO]
KXN

VYXQO`S^c
SX]_\KXMO
Rami Hanegbi*
!BSTRACT
>RS]
ZKZO\
ObKWSXO]
aRK^
SP
KXc
MRKXQO]
]RY_VN
LO
WKNO
\OQK\NSXQ
MO\^KSX

K]ZOM^]
YP
^RO
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
]c]^OW
=ZOMSPSMKVVc
S^
VYYU]
K^
ZY]]SLVO
MRKXQO]
^Y

^RO
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
^Kb
\OQSWO
WOK]_\O]
SX^OXNON
K^
SXM\OK]SXQ
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX

LKVKXMO]
K]
aOVV
K]
ZYVSMSO]
KSWON
K^
SWZ\Y`SXQ
^RO
Z\SMO
KXN
K`KSVKLSVS^c
YP
\O^S\OWOX^

SXMYWO
]^\OKW]
>RO
\OMYWWOXNK^SYX]
YP
^RO
PSXKV
\OZY\^
YP
^RO
2OX\c
<O`SOa
YX

^RO]O
S]]_O]
K\O
KV]Y
M\S^SMKVVc
O`KV_K^ON
>RO
ZKZO\
PSXN]
^RK^
K
Q\OK^O\
^K\QO^SXQ
YP

]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
^Kb
MYXMO]]SYX]
^YaK\N]
WSNNVO
KXN
VYaO\
SXMYWO
OK\XO\]
aY_VN

WKUO
^RO
]c]^OW
WY\O
O[_S^KLVO
KXN
KMRSO`O
Y^RO\
NO]S\KLVO
QYKV]
]_MR
K]
SXM\OK]SXQ

`YV_X^K\c
]K`SXQ]
0_\^RO\WY\O
^RO
K`KSVKLVO
O`SNOXMO
]_QQO]^]
^RK^
^RO
M_\\OX^

WKXNK^Y\c
MYX^\SL_^SYX]
\K^O
YP
#
S]
KNO[_K^O
KXN
K
RSQRO\
MYX^\SL_^SYX]
\K^O

S]
VSUOVc
^Y
RK`O
WY\O
MY]^]
^RKX
LOXOPS^]
9X
^RO
S]]_O
YP
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
SXMYWO

* Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University; Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, 
Monash University. The author would like to thank both the referee and Professor Rick Krever 
for their suggestions, ideas and feedback on this article.
This paper was accepted for publication on 11 September 2010.
 $8675$/,$17$;)2580
]^\OKW]
^RO
K\^SMVO
PSXN]
^RK^
aRSV]^
^KbZKcO\]
]RY_VN
MYX^SX_O
^Y
LO
KVVYaON
^Y
^KUO

^ROS\
]_ZO\KXX_K^SYX
K]
K
V_WZ
]_W
ZYVSMSO]
]RY_VN
LO
SWZVOWOX^ON
^Y
WKUO
VSPO^SWO

KXX_S^SO]
WY\O
\OKNSVc
K`KSVKLVO
KXN
LO^^O\
`KV_O
PY\
WYXOc
>RO
2OX\c
<O`SOav]

\OMYWWOXNK^SYX]
YX
^RO]O
S]]_O]
aS^R
]YWO
ObMOZ^SYX]
K\O
PY\
^RO
WY]^
ZK\^
]Y_XN

KXN
LK]ON
YX
VYQSM
 )NTRODUCTION
Australia’s maturing superannuation system will play an increasingly important 
role in the retirement income of most Australians. It is a regime with rules and tax 
concessions that are subject to modification from time to time. An earlier companion 
article1 evaluated what the goals of the superannuation system are, and discussed 
which combination of retirement systems best fulfilled the more worthwhile of those 
goals. This article focuses on the existing superannuation regime and aims to examine 
whether some of its current characteristics could be improved. This will include an 
evaluation of the relevant recommendations in the final report of the Australia’s 
Future Tax System Review. This review is colloquially known as the Henry Review. 
Part two of this article will provide an overview of the superannuation system as 
well as a detailed explanation of the taxation of superannuation savings. Part three will 
then examine the justifications for the concessional tax treatment of superannuation. 
It will also discuss how the tax concessions could be modified so that they will be 
both more equitable and more consistent with their justifications. Part four will then 
discuss whether certain measures aimed at increasing superannuation balances are 
worth implementing. Part five will then discuss some difficult policy issues that 
arise on the subject of retirement income streams. This will include a consideration 
as to whether it is worthwhile mandating each retiring taxpayer to convert their 
superannuation savings into an income stream. 
 !USTRALIANSUPERANNUATIONLAWANDTAXATION
 "OPWFSWJFXPGTVQFSBOOVBUJPOMBX
The earlier companion article described the history and laws of the Australian 
superannuation system, as well as how it fits into the World Bank categorization of 
retirement policies.2 This article, on the other hand, will only give a brief overview of 
Australia’s superannuation regime.
1 Rami Hanegbi, ‘Australia’s Superannuation System: A Critical Analysis’ 25(2) Australian Tax 
Forum 303.
2 Ibid.
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Under the current law, employers are required to contribute to each employee’s 
superannuation account an amount equal to 9% of the employee’s salary.3 However, 
they are only required to do this if the employee is under 70 and earns at least $450 
a calendar month. 4 These payments are referred to as Superannuation Guarantee 
payments.5 The government has announced a proposal that this 9% mandatory 
contribution be incrementally increased to 12%.6 It has also proposed that the upper 
age limit for entitled employees is to be lifted from 70 to 75.7 Neither of these proposals 
has yet to be legislated. Some employers, under industrial awards or voluntarily, might 
choose to pay a higher contribution rate than the mandatory 9%.
Employees have the option of making further voluntary contributions to their 
superannuation accounts either through ‘salary sacrifice’, or by making deposits from 
their post-tax income or capital.
Self-employed persons can also make voluntary contributions to their 
superannuation accounts, and are generally eligible for a tax deduction for such 
contributions.8
Apart from some rare exceptions, taxpayers are only eligible to withdraw money 
from their superannuation account once they reach preservation age, which is 
currently 55 years of age but is gradually being lifted to 60.9 
Upon reaching preservation age, the law does not prohibit taxpayers from taking 
their superannuation money in a lump sum; this means that they can either choose 
to take it all in the form of a lump sum, convert it to an income stream, or as a 
combination of the two.
 5BYUSFBUNFOUPGTVQFSBOOVBUJPO
Savings such as superannuation can be potentially taxed at three points. The first of 
these is when money is contributed into an account, the second is when the account 
generates earnings on its investments, and the third is upon the disbursement of funds 
from the account to the taxpayer. In general, superannuation has concessional tax 
treatment at the contributions and earnings stage. Furthermore, the disbursements of 
funds are usually tax-free. 
3 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
4 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
5 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
6 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent (May 2010) Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/6_Fact_Sheet_SG%20_rate_increase.pdf>.
7 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Raising the Superannuation Guarantee 
Age Limit from 70 to 75 (May 2010) Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future <http://
www.futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/7_Fact_Sheet_SG_age_increase.pdf>.
8 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 290-C.
9 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.01 and sch 1.
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 4AXUPONCONTRIBUTIONS
Superannuation deposits that are taxable in the hands of the superannuation 
fund upon contribution are termed ‘concessional contributions’.10 They include 
the compulsory 9% that employers are mandated to pay plus any contribution 
that the employer makes on top of this (including amounts that an employee has 
‘salary sacrificed’).11 Concessional contributions made by the employer will be tax-
deductible to them.12 Concessional contributions also include contributions made by 
self-employed taxpayers if they claim a tax deduction on them.13 When concessional 
contributions are deposited into a taxpayer’s superannuation fund they are taxed at 
the rate of 15%, which is a substantially lower rate than the standard marginal tax 
rates faced by full time earners.14 The standard marginal rates that apply to income 
such as salary are a nil rate for the first $6,000 of income, 15% for amounts between 
$6,001 to $37,000, 30% for amounts between $37,001 to $80,000, 37% for amounts 
between $80,001 and $180,000, and 45% for amounts in excess of $180,000.15 Income 
subject to these marginal rates is also typically subject to a flat 1.5% Medicare Levy 
which helps fund the Australian public health system.16
There is a concessional contribution cap of $25,000 per taxpayer a year, and any 
amounts above this will be subject to an ‘excess contributions tax’ that effectively 
makes such payments taxable at the highest marginal tax rate.17 As part of transitional 
arrangements, up to 30 June 2012 this cap is raised to $50,000 for all taxpayers aged 
50–74.18 The government has recently announced a proposal that the higher limit for 
this age group will continue to apply after 1 July 2012, but only for taxpayers that will 
have superannuation account balances of less than $500,000.19 This proposal has yet 
to be legislated.
Superannuation contributions that are not taxed upon being deposited into the 
superannuation fund are termed non-concessional contributions.20 Non-concessional 
contributions include those made by salary earners from their after-tax salary or 
10 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 292-25.
11 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 295-B.
12 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 290-B.
13 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 295-C.
14 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 295-160.
15 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 12(1) and sch 7, pt 1.
16 Medicare Levy Act 1986 (Cth). Low income earners are exempt from this levy.
17 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 292-B and Superannuation (Excess Concessional 
Contributions Tax) Act 2007 (Cth).
18 Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 292-20.
19 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent (May 2010) Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for our Future 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/documents/attachments/Fact_Sheet_SG%20_rate_increase.pdf>.
20 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 292-90.
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capital.21 Non-concessional contributions also include contributions made by self-
employed persons on which they do not claim a tax deduction.22 Non-concessional 
contributions are not tax-deductible in the hands of the contributing taxpayer.23 
Each taxpayer may make up to $450,000 per three-year period of non-concessional 
contributions before such contributions are subject to a very high penalty tax rate.24
In some instances, a taxpayer might choose to make a non-concessional 
contribution into their spouse’s superannuation account. If their spouse is a low-
income earner then the contributor might be entitled to a spouse contribution tax 
offset in the amount of 18% of their contribution.25 However, this offset only applies 
to the first $3,000 contributed annually, and the full offset is only available where the 
spouse earns less than $10,800 in that financial year; if the spouse earns more the 
eligible contributions gradually become smaller and cuts out at $13,800.26
The government has also recently announced a policy to introduce a superannuation 
account offset for low-income earners.27 However, this offset will only apply to 
contributions made from the 2012-13 income year onwards.28 Specifically, when (and 
if) this scheme commences, the government will deposit up to $500 a year into the 
superannuation accounts of taxpayers who have a taxable income of up to $37,000 
per year.29 This offset will result in the concessional contributions of such low-income 
earners being effectively tax-free.30 
There are a limited number of public sector superannuation funds that do not pay 
tax on their contributions or earnings;31 as explained later in this paper, disbursements 
made from such funds are taxed more highly than disbursements from other funds. 
 4AXUPONEARNINGS
Earnings of superannuation funds, whilst they are in their accumulation phase, are 
typically taxed at the rate of 15%.32 The main exception to this is a 10% tax rate on 
21 This is an example of a non-concessional contribution because they are not assessable 
contributions in the hands of the superannuation fund under Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(Cth) div 295.
22 This is also an example of a non-concessional contribution because they are not assessable 
contributions in the hands of the superannuation fund under Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(Cth) div 295.
23 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 290.
24 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 292-C and Superannuation (Excess Non-
Concessional Contributions Tax) Act 2007 (Cth).
25 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 290-230.
26 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 290-235.
27 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent, above n 6.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 50-25.
32 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ss 26(1), 27(1), 27A. 
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realised capital gains made on assets that are held for at least 12 months.33 In contrast, 
earnings from some other investments, such as interest on bank deposits, are often 
taxed more highly due to being subject to normal marginal tax rates. However, there 
are a number of non-superannuation investment earnings that are concessionally 
taxed. Specifically, most realised capital gains on non-superannuation investments 
that are held for at least 12 months are subject to a 50% discount.34 Owner-occupied 
housing is fully exempt from Capital Gains Tax35 and its imputed rent is not assessable. 
Also, although rental income is fully assessable,36 the costs of owning such a property, 
including interest on the relevant loan is deductible,37 and can be used to offset income 
from other sources.38 Furthermore, the most recent federal budget announced that 
from 1 July 2011, interest from normal bank deposits will be concessionally taxed; 
specifically, each taxpayer will be entitled to only be assessable on 50% of the first 
$1000 of interest earned annually.39 
Earnings of superannuation funds that support a retirement income stream 
benefit from greater concessional tax treatment than those that are in their 
accumulation phase. Specifically, where a taxpayer has chosen to take all or part of 
their superannuation savings in the form of an income stream, the earnings of the 
fund that underlies the income-stream will usually be tax-free.40 
Furthermore, superannuation funds benefit from the imputation credit system 
that exists in Australia. Under this system shareholders who receive dividends from 
resident companies are entitled to a tax credit for income tax paid by the company.41 
As the company tax rate of 30% is higher than the tax rate that superannuation funds 
pay on earnings, superannuation accounts can end up receiving a tax credit on the 
receipt of dividend income. This will sometimes result in superannuation accounts 
being entitled to a refund from the Australian Taxation Office.42
As mentioned earlier, a small number of public sector superannuation funds do 
not pay tax at the contribution and earnings stage. 43 However, in such instances there 
will be comparatively more tax payable when the benefits of such funds are paid to 
the taxpayer.
 4AXATIONUPONDISBURSEMENTOFBENEÛTS
The tax rates that apply upon disbursement of superannuation benefits to the taxpayer 
depend on several factors. These include the taxpayer’s age, whether the savings 
33 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 115-100.
34 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 115.
35 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 118-B .
36 Adelaide Fruit and Produce Exchange Co Ltd v DCT [1932] SASR 116.
37 FCT v Janmor Nominees Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 348.
38 Ibid.
39 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2010-11, 38.
40 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-10.
41 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 207.
42 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 67-25.
43 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 50-25.
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are withdrawn as a lump sum or converted into an income stream, and whether 
the superannuation account was exempt from paying tax on its contributions and 
earnings. Regarding the last mentioned factor, the small number of funds that are 
exempt from paying tax on their contributions and earnings can be referred to 
as untaxed funds. The vast majority of funds that have no such exemption can be 
referred to as taxed funds. 
In comparison, there is typically no tax payable upon the withdrawal of other 
savings. And whilst the sale of non-superannuation assets is subject to Capital Gains 
Tax, this can be considered a tax on earnings rather than a tax on withdrawals. 
Taxpayers who are 60 years or older can take their superannuation entitlements 
in the form of a lump sum from a taxed fund without paying any tax.44 They can 
also choose to convert any portion of their superannuation that originates from a 
taxed fund into a tax-free private income stream.45 Taxpayers who have reached their 
preservation age, but are less than 60 years old, can also take any portion of their 
superannuation entitlements from a taxed fund in the form of a lump sum. If they 
do so they will pay no tax on the first $160,000 of superannuation entitlements, and 
16.5% tax on every dollar above this amount.46 Taxpayers of that age who choose to 
take any portion of their superannuation entitlement from a taxed fund in the form 
of an income stream will have the income stream payments taxed at normal marginal 
tax rates less a 15% offset.47 
As untaxed funds do not pay tax at the earnings or contribution stage, benefits 
paid from such funds are comparatively harshly taxed. Specifically, taxpayers who 
are at least 60 and withdraw a lump sum from an untaxed fund will pay a maximum 
rate of 16.5% for the first $1,155,000, and tax at the rate of 46.5% for amounts greater 
than this. 48 Taxpayers who are at least 60, and decide to have their superannuation 
benefits from an untaxed fund paid as an income stream, will pay tax on that income 
stream at the normal marginal tax rates less a 10% offset.49 Taxpayers who have 
reached preservation age but are under 60 and take their benefits from an untaxed 
superannuation fund in the form of a lump sum, are subject to a maximum rate of 
16.5% for the first $160,000, 31.5% for amounts from $160,000 to $1,155,000, and at 
46.5% for any portion over $1,155,000.50 Taxpayers of preservation age, but under 60, 
who have their superannuation benefits in an untaxed fund paid as an income stream 
will pay normal marginal tax rates on payments from that stream.51 
44 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-10.
45 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-10.
46 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-20 and s 307-345.
47 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-25.
48 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-95.
49 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-100.
50 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-105.
51 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301-110.
 $8675$/,$17$;)2580
Any benefits paid from non-concessional contributions are tax-free, regardless of 
the taxpayer’s age, whether the fund is taxed or untaxed, and regardless of whether the 
benefit is taken in the form of a lump sum or income stream.52 
 #OCONTRIBUTIONSSCHEME
Low-income earners are already on a low tax rate and, so have limited opportunities to 
benefit from the abovementioned superannuation tax concessions. Furthermore, they 
typically have low superannuation balances. Consequently, there is a co-contribution 
scheme aimed at assisting low-income earners to build their superannuation accounts.
This co-contribution scheme involves the government matching, dollar-for-dollar, 
non-concessional contributions made by a taxpayer into their own superannuation 
fund.53 Both self-employed and employee taxpayers are eligible to participate in this 
scheme. There is a limit of $1,000 per year that each eligible taxpayer is entitled to 
receive under this scheme.54 The highest annual income at which taxpayers are eligible 
for the full $1,000 is $31,920.55 The entitlement is gradually phased out with higher 
incomes until there is no entitlement at an annual income of $61,920.56 Although 
originally these thresholds were to be subject to indexation, the government has 
announced that these co-contribution thresholds will not be indexed until the 2012-
13 income year.57
 3UPERANNUATIONTAXCONCESSIONS
The preceding discussion describes the manner in which Australian superannuation 
is subject to concessional tax treatment. Such concessional treatment is not unique 
to Australia, as many jurisdictions tax retirement savings concessionally, including 
those that base their retirement systems on voluntary savings.58 
The relative magnitude of Australia’s tax concessions on retirement savings 
compared to those of other jurisdictions is unclear. There have been two major 
international comparative studies on the relative size of retirement tax concessions. 
The earlier study found that Australia gave more generous tax concessions than most 
OECD countries. 59 The latter study, using different methodology, found that the net 
fiscal cost per unit of contribution to retirement savings was higher in Australia than 
52 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) subdiv 307-D.
53 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) s 9.
54 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) s 10.
55 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) s 10
and s 10A.
56 Superannuation (Government Co-contribution for Low Income Earners) Act 2003 (Cth) s 10
and s 10A.
57 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No 2 2010-11, above n 39, 299.
58 Kwang-Yeol Yoo and Alain de Serres (2004), ‘Tax Treatment of Private Pension Saving in OECD 
Countries’, OECD Economic Studies No. 39; Edward Whitehouse (1999), ‘Tax Treatment of 
Funded Pensions’, Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9910, World Bank.
59 Whitehouse, above n 58.
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most OECD countries. 60 However, this latter study also found that the effective tax rate 
in Australia on retirement savings was amongst the highest of the OECD countries;61 
this was a measure of the taxation rate of retirement savings, rather than a measure of 
how much tax taxpayers saved by utilising retirement accounts. However, the different 
benchmarks used in the two studies, as well as other factors such as the sensitivity of 
the findings to certain assumptions, result in insufficient data being available for a 
thorough cross-country comparison.62 In addition, there have been some changes to 
the tax treatment of superannuation in Australia since the studies were undertaken. 
For instance, in 2007 changes were enacted that made disbursements to those at least 
60 years of age generally tax-free.63 Other material changes made since those studies 
include modifications to the limit of pre-tax contributions taxpayers can make without 
incurring penalties; the most important changes to these limits were the substantial 
reductions that were made to them in 2009.64
The analysis of the superannuation tax concessions will firstly examine their 
monetary value. It will then discuss the merits of the various claimed justifications for 
their existence. This will then be followed by suggestions as to how the concessions 
could be improved. Lastly, there will be critical analysis of the recommendations 
made by the Henry Review regarding these concessions. 
 6ALUEOFSUPERANNUATIONCONCESSIONS
There is some debate regarding how to value superannuation tax concessions. 
The debate is centred upon whether the benchmark should be an expenditure tax 
or a comprehensive income tax, with the superannuation industry supporting the 
former.65 Treasury uses a comprehensive income tax benchmark in its annual Tax 
Expenditure Statements when valuing superannuation tax concessions.66 
Using a pre-paid expenditure tax benchmark, superannuation concessions were 
valued at $4.6 billion in the 2006-07 financial year,67 whereas using a comprehensive 
60 Yoo and de Serres, above n 58, 36. 
61 Ibid 37.
62 Richard Warburton and Peter Hendy, International Comparison of Australia’s Taxes, (3 April 
2006) International Comparison of Australia’s Taxes, 234 <http://comparativetaxation.treasury.
gov.au/content/report/downloads/CTR_full.pdf>.
63 Sinclair Davidson and Ross Guest, ‘Superannuation Tax Reform: Fiscal Consequences’ (2007) 
14(1) Agenda 5.
64 George Rothman, Assessing the Equity of Australia’s Retirement Income System (6 July 
2009) University of New South Wales, 4 <http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/fce/Research/
ResearchMicrosites/CPS/2009/papers/Rothman.pdf>.
65 Ross Clare, Superannuation and Australian Retirement Income (December 2008) 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, 11 <http://www.superannuation.asn.au/
ArticleDocuments/116/rc0901-age-pension.pdf.aspx>.
66 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 117.
67 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper (10 December 2008) Australia’s Future Tax System, 23 <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.
au/content/ConsultationPaper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Retirement_Income_
Consultation_Paper/index.htm>.
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income tax system, they were valued at approximately $30 billion in the same financial 
year.68 It is anticipated that, by using a comprehensive income tax model, the value of 
these concessions will rise in the future owing to superannuation balances rising over 
time with the maturing of the superannuation system.69 If the government’s policy to 
increase the compulsory superannuation levy comes to fruition, the increase will be 
even higher.70
 $IFFERENCEBETWEENMEASUREMENTSOFSUPERANNUATIONTAX
CONCESSIONS
The key to understanding the difference between the expenditure tax and 
comprehensive income tax benchmarks is to appreciate that savings can be taxed 
at three points. They can be taxed upon contributions, upon the funds producing 
earnings, and upon benefits being disbursed to the retiree.
Under an expenditure tax benchmark, superannuation savings are taxed on a 
neutral basis if disbursements are fully-taxed, but contributions and earnings are 
tax-free.71 In other words, under such a benchmark only the payment of retirement 
benefits are taxed. Under a pre-paid expenditure tax benchmark, superannuation 
savings are taxed on a neutral basis if they are fully-taxed upon contribution but 
earnings and disbursements are tax-free.72 Taking into account the time value of 
money, the pre-paid expenditure tax approach should yield the same results as the 
expenditure tax approaches, assuming the taxpayer is on the same tax rate pre and 
post retirement, and that their savings and investments generate normal returns.73 
On the other hand, for tax neutrality, a comprehensive income tax benchmark 
requires that gains be fully taxed upon contributions and earnings. Consistent with 
normal savings, it requires that no tax be paid upon disbursement.74 This means that 
for tax neutrality, a comprehensive income tax benchmark requires savings returns 
to be taxed, whereas an expenditure tax benchmark requires that savings returns be 
tax-free.
68 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 4. The figure is $22.7 billion for 
the 2008-9 financial year, having dropped recently due to the Global Financial Crisis.
69 David Ingles, The Great Superannuation Tax Concession Rort (February 2009) Australia Institute 
Research Paper, 2 <https://www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=super_tax_concessions_final.pdf>.
70 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: the Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues (12 May 2009) Australia’s Future Tax System, 11 <http://www.
taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/StrategicPaper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/
Retirement_Income_Strategic_Issues_Paper/index.htm> where it is projected that increasing 
the superannuation levy will result in a net long term increase in government expenditure.
71 Yoo and de Serres, above n 58,6-7.
72 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper, above n 67, 23.
73 Whitehouse, above n 58, 21. 
74 Ibid 21.
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 4HEPREFERREDBENCHMARKFORMEASURINGSUPERANNUATIONTAX
CONCESSIONS
An argument for using an expenditure tax benchmark is that since taxpayers are 
indifferent between current and future consumption, if investment returns are taxed, 
then the present value of after tax returns will be less than the pre-saved amount; this 
will encourages consumption over saving.75 
Whilst at some reductionist level this might be accurate, the reasoning is very 
circular. The discount rate for present value calculations is hardly a definitive figure, 
so, assuming it is the same as the pre-tax rate of return is not necessarily correct. 
Such circular reasoning could be used to justify concessional tax treatment on 
other types of income, such as returns from labour. For instance, it could be argued 
that people are only willing to work for a certain return on their labour, and that taxes 
distort this and result in people working less, so it follows that income on labour 
should be concessionally taxed.76 The reality is that taxes do cause distortions. The 
way to minimise distortions is not to single out and abolish one type of distorting tax 
which then necessitates higher distorting taxes on other kinds of income, resulting in 
reduced equity and efficiency. 
Overall, whilst a detailed discussion of the preferred benchmark is beyond the 
scope of this article, the reality is that a comprehensive income tax benchmark most 
accurately measures the divergence between the tax treatment of superannuation 
and non-concessionally taxed receipts and savings. This is not to deny, as discussed 
further on in this paper, that tax expenditure calculations based on a comprehensive 
income tax benchmark do have their own limitations.
The final report of the Henry Review, whilst not explicitly advocating that 
superannuation tax concessions be calculated using an expenditure tax benchmark, 
did state that many countries taxed retirement savings in an expenditure tax-like 
manner by only taxing benefits whilst leaving contributions and earnings untaxed. 77 
It stated that these countries did this because there were legitimate reasons for taxing 
retirement savings in a concessional manner. 78 The report also pointed out that the 
Australian approach was different, as it used a system of embedding tax concessions 
in an income tax framework so as to approximately achieve the same outcome as 
an expenditure tax treatment.79 However, just because there are some justifications 
for superannuation being concessionally taxed, it does not automatically follow that 
those concessions should be of a similar magnitude to those offered by an expenditure 
tax system.
75 Ibid 4-5.
76 This is describing is what is popularly known as the “substitution effect”.
77 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report: Part 2 Volume 1 (2 
May 2010) Australia’s Future Tax System, 97 <http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/
FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_2/index.htm>.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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 6ALUEOFTAXCONCESSIONSINTHEMOSTRECENTÛNANCIALYEAR
Recent tax expenditure statements show that using a comprehensive income tax 
benchmark, superannuation tax concessions were worth approximately $22.7 billion 
in the 2008-9 financial year.80
Having said this, tax expenditure calculations do have their limitations. One of 
the main limitations is that tax expenditure figures ignore the behavioural changes 
that would occur if the relevant concessions ceased to exist.81 For instance, if 
superannuation was not concessionally taxed people would make smaller voluntary 
contributions into superannuation funds, and would place greater reliance on 
other tax-preferred techniques such as negative gearing.82 On the other hand, such 
limitations are less applicable to superannuation than other tax concessions because 
of the compulsory nature of a large portion of superannuation contributions. 
However, these limitations mean that the real-world savings that would arise from 
abolishing superannuation tax concessions would be materially less than the size of 
the concessions as measured by tax expenditure statements. Having said that, this 
needs to be balanced against the fact that, due to the Global Financial Crisis, the most 
recently available superannuation tax expenditure figure, being the one in the 2009 
Tax Expenditure Statements, is materially lower than it has been in the past and is 
projected to be in the future.83 Furthermore, implementing the plan to increase the 
compulsory superannuation contributions rate to 12% will further increase the size of 
the superannuation tax expenditure.84
 +VTUJÙDBUJPOTGPSTVQFSBOOVBUJPOCFOFÙUJOHGSPNUBYDPODFTTJPOT
There are several possible justifications for superannuation benefiting from the 
current concessional tax treatment. They include that the concessions lead to higher 
voluntary savings, that they save government spending on future government 
pensions, that they compensate people for locking their money away until retirement, 
that they are a form of income averaging, and that they are necessary to stop after-
inflation returns being taxed at an excessive rate. The merit of these justifications will 
be individually discussed.
80 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 4.
81 Rosanne Altshuler and Robert Dietz, Tax Expenditure Estimation and Reporting: A Critical 
Review (August 2008) National Bureau of Economic Research, 23-24 <http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14263.pdf>. 
82 Rothman, ‘Assessing the Equity of Australia’s Retirement Income System’, above n 64, 4.
83 Commonwealth Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statements’ (2009) 3-4.
84 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 11, where it is projected that increasing the superannuation 
levy will result in a net long-term increase in government expenditure.
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 (IGHERVOLUNTARYSAVINGS
Although Australia’s superannuation system has increased private savings,85 logically 
speaking, this is largely due to a substantial portion of superannuation contributions 
being of a mandatory nature. Whether the concessional treatment of superannuation 
has led to higher voluntary private savings, including both superannuation and non-
superannuation savings, is a different matter.
To the extent that superannuation is funded by compulsory contributions, the tax 
concessions will not lead to higher gross contributions. The lower tax will lead to 
higher net contributions, but common sense would dictate that, at least in the short 
term, there would be a similar decline in public savings given the loss in government 
revenue.
If the current superannuation tax concessions lead to higher voluntary savings this 
could be an argument for their existence, as higher voluntary savings, amongst other 
things, will lead to greater income smoothing.
What impact do the tax concessions have on voluntary savings? Additional 
savings made to concessionally-taxed vehicles, like superannuation funds, will often 
be, to some extent, at the expense of other forms of savings.86 The net result of tax 
concessions on voluntary private savings is unclear, with some studies showing there 
is no net increase and others finding that, to varying degrees, there are increases in 
savings.87 Research also suggests that the tax concessions most likely to lead to higher 
voluntary savings are those aimed at middle income earners, whereas those aimed at 
higher income earners merely lead to shifting of savings to the tax-preferred vehicle.88 
However, as discussed later in this paper, Australia’s superannuation tax concessions 
are skewed towards higher income earners. This means that, in their current form, it 
is very unlikely that they increase voluntary private savings.
 3AVINGOFFUTURESPENDINGONGOVERNMENTPENSIONS
If superannuation tax concessions led to a long-run improvement in the government’s 
net fiscal position due to reduced future pension expenditure, this would be a 
strong argument for their existence. However, notwithstanding the limitations of 
tax expenditure calculations, research indicates that the cost of superannuation tax 
concessions is materially less than the amount of government expenditure they will 
85 Ellis Connolly and Marion Kohler, The Impact of Superannuation on Household Saving 
(2004) Economic Research Department, Reserve Bank of Australia <http://www.rba.gov.au/
publications/rdp/2004/2004-01.html>.
86 Commonwealth of Australia, Architecture of Australia’s Tax and Transfer System (August 2008) 243.
87 Pablo Antolin, Alan de Serres and Christine de la Masonneuve, Long-Term Budgetary 
Implications of Tax-Favored Retirement Plans (2004) OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers No. 393 at 30 discusses various empirical studies on American 401(k) plans that have 
inconsistent findings on this issue.
88 OECD, No. 15 Encouraging Savings Through Tax-Preferred Accounts (2007) OECD Tax Policy 
Studies.
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save.89 This appears to be partially due to the fact that the concessions are targeted at 
higher income earners who are unlikely to receive the pension irrespective of whether 
they get the benefit of such concessions.90 
If superannuation concessions could be reformulated and/or reduced in such a 
way that they lead to net savings in long-term government expenditure, there is some 
justification for them. However, that is certainly far from the case now, and there is 
no clear evidence that any set of tax concessions on savings will lead to net long-term 
government savings. 
If the government’s aim is to materially save net long-term expenditure, an 
effective way to do this would be to abolish or diminish the current superannuation 
tax concessions and dramatically raise the rate of mandatory superannuation 
contributions. Clearly, this would be hard to justify given its many other negative 
consequences.
 !REWARDFORDEFERRINGSPENDING
It could also be argued that superannuation tax concessions are justifiable on the 
grounds that they compensate people for the fact that they will be unable to access 
their money until they reach preservation age. However, this justification has little 
merit.
One of the major reasons for the existence of superannuation is for the purposes of 
income smoothing.91 The mandating of savings so that people will benefit from more 
income smoothing only exists because people do not always act in their own long-
term self-interest. In other words, if it is assumed that income smoothing is a noble 
goal, then superannuation forces people to do something that is for ‘their own good’. 
It seems absurd in such a situation to reward people for doing something for their 
own benefit by giving them tax concessions. There are many laws primarily aimed at 
forcing people to act in their own self-interest, including drug prohibition, alcohol 
and tobacco restrictions, and mandatory use of seatbelts. In none of these instances 
does the government compensate people for restricting their freedoms. There is no 
reason why forcing people to save for their retirement, if one assumes it is a desirable 
goal, should be interlaced with a reward of concessional tax treatment.
89 Institute of Actuaries of Australia, Response to ”Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper” (12 March 2009) Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 13 <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.
au/content/submissions/retirement/Institute_of_Actuaries_of_Australia_20090312.pdf>; 
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 11, projects that increasing the superannuation levy will 
result in a net long-term fiscal cost.
90 Institute of Actuaries of Australia, above n 89, 13.
91 Hanegbi, above n 1, 313-315.
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 !SAFORMOFINCOMEAVERAGING
Another justification for the existence of superannuation tax concessions is on 
the grounds of income averaging.92 Specifically, the argument is that although 
superannuation contributions and some of its earnings are earned during a taxpayer’s 
working life, they are utilised when the taxpayer is in retirement and on a lower tax 
rate. Since it is money intended for use when the taxpayer is on a lower tax rate, it 
should be taxed at a lower rate.93 
On one level this argument has appeal. After all, taxing people based on their yearly 
income is an arbitrary concept and, in principle, it would be fairer to base their tax 
liability on their lifetime income. On the other hand, for the most part the Australian 
income tax system will continue to be based on yearly income. Concessionally taxing 
superannuation savings on the grounds of income averaging, whilst not allowing 
income averaging in most other situations, gives a comparative tax advantage to 
higher income earners given that they can make greater use of the superannuation 
system. For instance, a low-income earner who earns an income of $35,000 in one 
year and zero the next, cannot smooth their income over the two years; yet a higher 
income earner that puts a substantial amount into their superannuation balance can 
benefit from the superannuation tax concessions, partially in the name of income 
smoothing.94 This comparative tax advantage will be borne by the whole community. 
In summary, although income averaging is an admirable goal, it does not 
necessarily justify superannuation being concessionally taxed, given that most forms 
of income cannot benefit from income averaging. Having said this, on the assumption 
that superannuation tax concessions will continue to exist, some superannuation tax 
regimes are better at achieving income averaging than others. As discussed later 
in this paper, those regimes that tax on a progressive but concessional basis offer 
a preferable form of income averaging to those that tax superannuation on a flat, 
concessional basis. 
 4OPREVENTTHEREALVALUEOFSAVINGSBEINGTAXEDATAN
EXCESSIVERATE
The final report of the Henry Review stated that one of the justifications for 
superannuation tax concessions is that they counteract the fact that inflation often 
results in savings being over-taxed.95 The report noted that, whilst inflation can 
lead to excessive taxation on other savings, the effect is particularly pronounced on 
superannuation because it is a form of long-term savings.96
92 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 97.
93 Ibid.
94 For the case against introducing a broad-based income averaging regime, see Neil Buchanan, 
‘The Case Against Income Averaging’, (2006) 25(4) Virginia Tax Review 1151.
95 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 96-97. 
96 Ibid.
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As for the previous income averaging argument, this justification has some appeal. 
After all, it is seemingly unfair to tax people on their full nominal investment returns 
when part of the return is compensation for the effects of inflation. However, like 
the previous income averaging argument, this one does not necessarily justify the 
superannuation tax concessions. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, returns from some investments other than 
superannuation benefit from concessional tax treatment. An example of this is capital 
gains from assets held for at least 12 months.97 However, there are also investment 
returns do not benefit from concessions and, so, end up being excessively taxed 
on their after inflation gain. To allow a limited range of savings and investments, 
including superannuation, to benefit from concessions that balance the effects of 
inflation, whilst not allowing other savings and investment vehicles to do the same, 
gives a disproportional tax advantage to those people who most utilise superannuation 
and other tax-preferred vehicles. This advantage is funded by the general taxpaying 
community.
A better approach would be to legislate tax concessions that would have the 
approximate effect of only taxing after-inflation returns on most savings and 
investment vehicles. This could be done in a variety of ways. For instance, the final 
report of the Henry Review recommended that a 40% discount be applied to a broad 
range of returns such as interest and rentals.98 The government has announced that it 
will not implement such plans,99 though, as mentioned previously, the latest budget 
did announce that a discount on interest from savings will apply from 1 July 2011. 
However, this concession is very limited in that it only applies to the first $1,000 per 
year that a taxpayer earns in interest.100 
 4VHHFTUJPOTGPSNPEJGZJOHDVSSFOUTVQFSBOOVBUJPOUBY
DPODFTTJPOT
Under the realistic assumption that superannuation tax concessions will continue 
in some form, it is worth considering whether there is merit in modifying them 
to increase their fairness and the extent to which fulfil the more worthy of their 
abovementioned justifications. 
It is clear that the current concessions are skewed towards higher income earners.101 
This is firstly because most contributions to superannuation funds are taxed at a flat 
97 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) div 115.
98 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 70.
99 Wayne Swan, ‘Stronger Fairer Simpler: A Tax Plan for Our Future’ (Media Release, 2 May 2010) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/028.htm&pageID
=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0>.
100 Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Paper No. 2 2010-11, above n 39, 38.
101 David Tellis, Projecting the Distributions of Certain Superannuation Tax Expenditures (July 
2009) University of New South Wales, 16<http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/fce/Research/
ResearchMicrosites/CPS/2009/slides/Tellis.pdf>.
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rate of 15%, as opposed to taxpayers’ marginal tax rates.102 Therefore, on a dollar-
for-dollar basis, someone on a higher tax rate saves more money on superannuation 
contributions than a taxpayer on the lower rates.103 Secondly, those on higher incomes 
will usually have higher contributions placed into their superannuation accounts. 
Thirdly, superannuation earnings are taxed at a flat 15% rate in contrast to the 
progressive marginal rates that most personal income is subject to.104 The evidence 
suggests that these factors lead to a substantial percentage of the tax benefits flowing 
to a small percentage of higher income earners.105 For instance, it has been shown 
that for higher income earners the tax concessions are worth more than any pension 
a low-income earner would ever be entitled to.106
However, the skewing of benefits to higher income earners has been, to some 
degree, moderated by the 2009 changes to the superannuation tax concessions; 
specifically, under these changes the limit that individuals could annually contribute 
to their superannuation accounts from pre-tax income was halved.107 Furthermore, 
when the benefits of the superannuation tax concessions are aggregated with the 
benefit of future government pensions, the net retirement benefits across a range of 
income deciles become less skewed. Specifically, the top 10% income decile have a net 
retirement benefit valued at approximately 27% more than the net retirement benefits 
of the lower deciles.108 It is also worth noting that the benefits of superannuation tax 
concessions do not stop the overall income tax system from being progressive, but 
merely reduce the extent of its progressivity.109 
In an income smoothing system like superannuation it makes sense that the 
benefits of tax concessions on retirement savings do, to some degree, correlate with 
a taxpayer’s income. However, a system that distributes the tax benefits in a less 
regressive manner than the current one would be more equitable. It would also make 
the concessions more likely to fulfil or come closer to fulfilling the more worthy of 
their abovementioned justifications. Compared with the current system, a set of 
superannuation tax concessions that have greater equity would be more likely to lead to 
an increase in savings, because, as discussed earlier, tax concessions aimed at middle-
income earners are more likely to increase savings than those aimed at higher-income 
102 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 295-160.
103 Allan Borowski, ‘Back at the Crossroads: The Slippery Fish of Australian Retirement Income 
Policy’ (2008) 43(2) Australian Journal of Social Issues 311.
104 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ss 26(1), 27(1), 27A.
105 ACOSS, ‘Submission to the Taxation Review Panel – Adequate, Fair, Sustainable and Simple: 
Retirement Incomes Reform’ (February 2009) ACOSS, 21 <http://acoss.org.au/images/uploads/
ACOSS_Submission_-_retirement_incomes09-final.pdf>. 
106 Richard Denniss, ‘The cost of a ‘comfortable’ retirement [The costs of taxation concessions 
for superannuation]’ (2006) 21 Dissent 36. Although this was written before the concessional 
contributions cap was reduced in the 2009-10 budget, it still appears to be the case but to a lesser 
degree.
107 Rothman, ‘Assessing the Equity of Australia’s Retirement Income System’, above n 64, 10-11. 
108 Ibid 16. 
109 Ibid 16. 
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earners.110 Furthermore, logically speaking, concessions aimed at middle-income 
earners are more likely to save future pension payments than those aimed at higher-
income earners. This is because it can be assumed that the higher a person’s income, 
the less likely they are to go on the pension with or without tax concessions on their 
retirement savings. It does not necessarily follow that well-targeted superannuation 
tax concessions will mean a net savings to the government; however, they are likely 
to lead to a lower net cost to the government than is currently the case. Also, well-
targeted tax concessions would provide a fairer form of income averaging than is the 
case under current laws, as taxpayers would be subject to concessional yet progressive 
tax rates on their contributions, rather than those contributions being subject to a flat, 
concessional tax. This is more in line with the aims of income averaging, because, if 
the income of higher-income earners was averaged over their working and retirement 
years, a higher tax rate would typically be payable in their retirement than if the same 
was done for medium-income earners.
 5IF)FOSZ3FWJFXmTSFDPNNFOEBUJPOTGPSNPEJGZJOHUIFUBYBUJPO
PGTVQFSBOOVBUJPO
The final report of the Henry Review recommended changes to the taxation of 
superannuation at both the contributions and earnings stages.111 Specifically, it 
recommended that superannuation contributions be taxed at the taxpayer’s marginal 
tax rate, but that they be subject to an offset so that most taxpayers will effectively 
pay net tax of 15% on their superannuation contributions.112 As most taxpayers 
are currently on no more than a 31.5% marginal tax rate,113 this would equate to 
an offset of 16.5%; it would also mean that the marginal rates that would apply to 
superannuation contributions would be 0%, 15%, 22% and 30%.114 Furthermore, the 
final Henry Review report recommended that the tax on earnings of superannuation 
funds in their accumulation phase should be halved, from 15% to 7.5%.115 
The implementation of the final report’s recommendations on the taxation of 
superannuation contributions would shift some of the tax benefit away from higher-
income earners and more towards middle and lower-income earners. 116 This would 
increase equity. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, better targeted concessions 
are more likely to fulfil some of the justifications for tax concessions as compared with 
the current ones. 
110 OECD, Encouraging Savings through Tax-Preferred Accounts, above n 88.
111 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 100 – 107. 
112 Ibid 100.
113 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Number 6302.0; Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 
12(1) and sch 7, pt 1 and Medicare Levy Act 1986 (Cth). This figure includes the Medicare Levy.
114 Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 12(1) and sch 7, pt 1 and Medicare Levy Act 1986 (Cth). This 
assumes that marginal income tax rates were to remain at their current levels.
115 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 100, 106.
116 Ibid 73.
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However, it is far from clear that the recommended halving of the earnings 
rate is justified in policy terms. This is notwithstanding the fact that it will increase 
superannuation balances. On the one hand, a halving of the earnings rate would result 
in concessional earnings treatment for nearly all superannuation account holders. This 
is in contrast to the current system, where low-income earners on the 15% marginal 
tax rate get little benefit from having a superannuation earnings rate that is virtually 
the same as their marginal tax rate. On the other hand, a halving of the earnings rate 
would lead to a further loss of revenue and, looked at in isolation, would be regressive 
as higher income earners have higher average superannuation balances. Given that, 
as discussed later in this paper, there is evidence that the current system, once mature, 
will provide most retirees with an adequate retirement, there is limited justification in 
halving the superannuation earnings tax. 
The final report of the Henry Review recommended that earnings of assets 
supporting superannuation income streams also be subject to a 7.5% tax rate, as 
opposed to their current tax-free treatment.117 It pointed out that the justification for 
the tax-free treatment of such earnings is redundant; this is because such earnings 
were originally made tax-free to complement the previous law that, unlike the current 
law, did to some degree tax the receipt of income streams received by over 60’s.118 
There is undoubtedly merit in this recommendation. However, it is also arguable that, 
whilst income stream earnings should be subject to tax, the rate should be set lower 
than for earnings from superannuation funds that are in accumulation mode, so as 
to encourage retirees to take their superannuation in the form of an income stream. 
The final report of the Henry Review argued that such an incentive was unnecessary, 
as a study indicated that retirees can control their spending of superannuation 
lump sums in a disciplined manner.119 As discussed later in this paper, this study 
has several limitations, and it is quite possible that future research might point to a 
contrary conclusion. However, on the current evidence there appears to be no need 
for superannuation funds supporting a retirement income stream to be subject to 
lower tax rate than those in accumulation mode. 
The final Henry Review report also stated that the government co-contribution 
scheme and spouse contribution tax offset be removed. 120 According to the report, 
as the former is only utilised by 20% of eligible taxpayers,121 and as they both cause 
needless confusion in retirement tax planning,122 they are far from being an effective 
or equitable method of assisting low-income earners in lifting their superannuation 
balances.123 The report stated that a preferable way of assisting low-income earners 
would be to implement the above-mentioned contributions tax offset in place of 
the current flat 15% contribution tax. The effect of this would be for low-income 
117 Ibid 100, 106.
118 Ibid 107.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid 100.
121 Ibid 104.
122 Ibid 99.
123 Ibid 104.
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earners to have no tax payable on their superannuation contributions.124 There is 
considerable merit in the report’s views that such an offset is preferable to the current 
co-contribution scheme and spouse contribution tax offset.
The government has, so far, not indicated whether it plans to adopt the report’s 
recommendations regarding the taxation of superannuation contributions or 
earnings. Nor has it indicated how it will respond to the recommendations regarding 
the abolition of the co-contribution scheme and spouse contributions tax offset. 
However, it has announced a proposal that from the 2012-13 income year, those 
earning up to $37,000 per annum will benefit from the government depositing $500 
per annum into their superannuation accounts.125 For eligible taxpayers, this has a 
very similar net effect as if they were paying no contributions tax.126 In other words, 
at the contributions level, the effect of this policy change on eligible taxpayers is the 
same as if the government had implemented the Henry Review’s contributions tax 
recommendations. Whilst the planned implementation of this offset will improve 
equity, it is an arbitrary, ad-hoc measure, that is lacking inflation indexation and 
will ultimately increase the system’s complexity. An overhaul of the superannuation 
contributions tax laws as suggested by the final Henry Review report would be 
preferable to this limited approach.
The final report of the Henry Review also recommended that the cap for 
concessional contributions for those at least 50 years of age be set at $50,000, which 
is double the amount for those under 50.127 At the time of the release of the report, 
there was already a limit of $50,000 for over 50’s, but it was merely a transitional 
measure that was to last until 1 July 2012.128 The government has announced since 
the release of the report that when the transitional measure ends, the $50,000 cap will 
continue, but only for those taxpayers who have superannuation balances of less than 
$500,000. 129 The government’s plan to deny the increased cap to those that have at 
least $500,000 in balances is sensible given that this limits the amount of lost revenue 
that occurs from the utilisation of the superannuation system.
 )NCREASINGSUPERANNUATIONBALANCES
There are various policies that would have the effect of increasing superannuation 
balances. It is worth evaluating the government’s policy of increasing balances through 
a higher superannuation mandatory contributions rate. It is also worth evaluating the 
recommendations that were made by the final Henry Review report with the aim of 
increasing superannuation balances. 
124 Ibid.
125 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent, above n 6. 
126 Ibid.
127 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 100.
128 Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 292-20.
129 Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Increasing the Superannuation 
Guarantee Rate to 12 Per Cent, above n 6.
04796=05.6<9:<7,9(55<(;0659,.04,
 )JHIFSNBOEBUPSZDPOUSJCVUJPOT
As discussed, the government has announced that it plans to incrementally increase 
the Superannuation Guarantee contributions rate over the next decade until it 
reaches 12%. However, at the time of writing, the opposition has stated that it was not 
committed to this increase.130 As the government does not have a majority in either 
house of parliament it is unclear whether it will be able to implement this increase.
Given that one of the major aims of superannuation is income smoothing, the 
precise amount of superannuation that should be mandated depends on many 
factors, some of which are uncertain or subjective. The uncertain factors include 
future investment returns, future life expectancy, future economic growth and future 
medical advances. The major subjective factor involved is deciding what ‘replacement 
rates’ superannuation is aiming to achieve. 
Replacement rates are the extent to which retirement incomes will replace pre-
retirement incomes.131 However, the exact term can have several definitions. For 
instance, it can mean a raw comparison of pre-retirement and post-retirement 
incomes.132 It can also mean comparing pre- and post-retirement incomes whilst 
taking into account the drastically lower living costs that a retiree has due to not 
having to support children and pay a mortgage.133
A Treasury study has found that those who receive the 9% superannuation 
guarantee for most of their working lives will enjoy a similar standard of living in 
retirement to that which they enjoyed pre-retirement.134 Although there is another 
unbiased study that came to a different conclusion,135 it has been criticised for not 
considering the fact that most retirees would still be eligible for a part pension.136 
Furthermore, the latter study did concede that the current system, once mature, will 
give retirees a modest but adequate retirement income.137 
One of the preliminary Henry Review reports found that there is no strong case 
for increasing the compulsory contribution rate above the current 9%.138 This report 
130 Tony Jones, Interview with Andrew Robb, 28 July 2010 <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/
content/2010/s2967115.htm>.
131 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper, above n 67, 46. 
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 George Rothman, 2007. ‘The Adequacy of Australian Retirement Incomes – New Estimates 
Incorporating the Better Superannuation Reforms’, Fifteenth Colloquium of Superannuation 
Researchers, University of New South Wales, 19–20 July 2007 Conference Paper 07/1 
<http://rim.treasury.gov.au/content/CP07_1.asp>. 
135 Thomas Morrison and Simon Kelly, Superannuation – the right balance? (2008) CPA Australia 
<http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/cps/rde/xbcr/cpa-site/superannuation-the-right-balance.pdf>. 
136 Ingles, above n 69, 18.
137 Morrison and Kelly, above n 135.
138 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 11-12.
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reasoned that the current arrangement will give most retirees a substantial replacement 
of their pre-retirement income and that those wishing to enjoy a higher standard of 
living can choose to make voluntary superannuation contributions.139 The report did 
state that under the current system higher income earners have comparatively lower 
replacement rates. 140 However, it went on to say that this does not justify higher 
mandatory contributions, as the retirement incomes of these taxpayers are already 
higher than those of middle income earners, and many of them already choose to 
make further voluntary superannuation contributions.141 The report’s finding was 
also influenced by the fact that since higher superannuation contributions would 
lead to lower pre-retirement incomes, raising the contributions rate would potentially 
adversely affect the living standards of low- and medium-income earners. 142 As most 
future retirees will rely on a part pension, the preliminary report’s finding has been 
further strengthened by the fact that the government has since increased the single 
pension from 25% to 27% of Average Weekly Earnings.143 However, the final report of 
the Henry Review did have a different viewpoint. Despite stating that there should be 
no increase in employer mandated superannuation contributions,144 it recommended 
other measures, discussed further on in this paper, which would have the effect of 
raising superannuation account balances. 
Overall, the government’s policy to increase compulsory contributions to 12% 
does not appear justified when the benefits and costs of such a policy are weighed 
up. On the one hand, it will give taxpayers higher retirement incomes. However, as 
mentioned, independent research has stated that this will not strictly be necessary once 
the current system matures. In addition, the costs of higher mandatory contributions 
will be lower wages, which will affect lower- to middle-income earners.145 It will 
also have a fiscal cost given that superannuation costs more revenue than it saves. 
146 Given these facts, the government should have allowed more, open debate before 
announcing its plans to increase the compulsory superannuation levy. 
 )FOSZ3FWJFXSFDPNNFOEBUJPOTGPSJODSFBTJOHTVQFSBOOVBUJPO
CBMBODFT
As mentioned, whilst the final report of the Henry Review did not recommend raising 
the rate of compulsory superannuation payable by employers, it did recommend 
some other measures to raise superannuation balances. This appears to be at odds 
with the above-mentioned preliminary report’s finding that the current system will 
give adequate retirement incomes. The final report did not explicitly state why it felt 
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 108-109. 
144 Ibid 109-110.
145 Ibid.
146 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 11.
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that the preliminary report’s findings were in any way inaccurate. However, the final 
report did point to some of the advantages of higher superannuation balances, such as 
higher replacement rates147 and an increase in savings.148 Specifically, it did state that 
the effect of its recommendations would be to lift superannuation account balances 
more than if the mandatory contributions rate was lifted to 12% under the current 
regime.149
One of the measures that the final report recommended to increase superannuation 
balances is that the individual rather than the superannuation fund pay the 
superannuation contributions tax.150 Such a policy would mean that the employee’s 
net receipt would be 9% of their salary, rather than 9% being the gross receipt as is 
currently the case. If implemented, this would in effect be the same as mandating 
that employees make a minor contribution from their salary to their superannuation 
fund. Another recommendation made by the final report to increase superannuation 
balances is the previously discussed measure to halve the tax on superannuation fund 
earnings from 15% to 7.5%. 
The recommended measure to make employees directly pay the contributions tax, 
which, as discussed, is in substance the same as mandating employees to make a minor 
superannuation contribution, can be considered as equivalent to a slight increase in 
the compulsory employer superannuation levy. This is because higher employer and 
employee contributions are effectively substitutes, given that they both lead to lower 
working incomes.151 In effect, such a policy would have the same disadvantages, 
though to a lesser degree, as increasing the mandatory contributions rate to 12%. 
Logically speaking, implementing the recommendation to increase superannuation 
balances by cutting the earnings tax would have a substantially net higher fiscal cost, 
as compared to obtaining similar increases in balances through mandating higher 
employer contributions. Additionally, it is a more inequitable method of obtaining 
higher balances when compared to increasing balances through a higher contributions 
rate; whilst under both methods higher income earners will have a larger increase to 
their balances than lower income earners, in the case of cutting the earnings tax, the 
increase is fully borne by the taxpaying public. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
the package of changes to the superannuation taxation regime recommended by the 
final Henry Review report, looked at as a whole, would make the system both more 
progressive and simpler than is currently the case. 
In summary, the final Henry Review report’s recommendations to increase 
balances involve lower working incomes and a substantial fiscal cost. As discussed, 
there is research that indicates that the current system is likely to give most people 
adequate retirement incomes. The final Henry Review report should have expressly 
147 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 108-112.
148 Ibid 115.
149 Ibid 114.
150 Ibid 100.
151 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 11.
" $8675$/,$17$;)2580
stated why policies to increase superannuation balances are required. Good policy 
decisions are reached by discussing and balancing trade-offs, not just by outlining the 
advantages of a particular policy choice. 
 3UPERANNUATIONINCOMESTREAMS
 4IPVMEJUCFNBOEBUPSZUPDPOWFSUTVQFSBOOVBUJPOTBWJOHTUPBO
JODPNFTUSFBNVQPOSFUJSFNFOU 
The Australian superannuation system does not restrict taxpayers from withdrawing 
their superannuation entitlements in the form of a lump sum once they reach the 
relevant preservation age. Just under 50% of superannuation funds are withdrawn in 
the form of a lump sum as opposed to being drawn as an income stream.152 By far 
the most common form of superannuation income streams are phased withdrawal 
products.153 With phased withdrawal products, a taxpayer is entitled to intermittently 
withdraw as much of their invested superannuation balance as they wish. 154 
However, these products are subject to government legislated, annual, age-based 
minimum withdrawal percentages as a condition of the fund maintaining its tax-free 
status on earnings.155 In contrast, only a very small percentage of retirees have their 
superannuation income streams paid as lifetime annuities.156 A larger minority have 
their income streams in the form of fixed term annuities.157 
It could be argued that it is ironic that whilst the underlying assumption of 
Australia’s superannuation scheme is that workers lack the foresight and discipline 
to save for their retirement, it allows taxpayers to do as they please with their 
superannuation savings once they retire. This includes taking it as a lump sum and 
spending it quickly. In contrast, there are jurisdictions where the legislation mandates 
that a portion of some types of retirement savings be used to purchase a pension.158
The ability of taxpayers to take out their superannuation savings upon retirement 
as a pure lump sum poses the risk that taxpayers will use it for consumption purposes 
in a relatively short time. At the other extreme it also tempts taxpayers to accumulate 
152 APRA, 2009 Annual Superannuation Bulletin (10 February 2010) APRA <http://www.apra.gov.
au/Statistics/upload/June-2009-Annual-Superannuation-Bulletin-PDF.pdf>.
153 Amandha Ganegoda and Hazel Bateman, Australia’s disappearing market for life annuities 
(January 2008) University of New South Wales, 3 <http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/fce/
Research/ResearchMicrosites/CPS/cpsdp200801.pdf>.
154 Adam Creighton, Henry Jin, John Piggott, and Emiliano Valdez, Longevity Insurance: A Missing 
Market (September 2005) University of New South Wales, 6 <http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.
edu.au/actuarial/research/papers/2006/Longevity%20Insurance%20-%20A%20Missing%20
Market_28Aug_JP_Final.pdf>.
155 Ibid. 
156 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 4.
157 Ibid 13.
158 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: Retirement Income Consultation 
Paper, above n 67, 27.
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large amounts of superannuation so that a substantial portion of the capital component 
can be willed to their beneficiaries.159 Whether the taxpayer consumes their lump 
sum superannuation quickly or engages in ‘capital hoarding’, both of these extremes 
defeat one of the main purposes of superannuation, which is income smoothing. 
Furthermore, the cost of superannuation tax concessions will only be abated by future 
government pension savings if taxpayers do not spend their lump sum quickly and go 
on the pension. Similarly, using the superannuation system to accumulate capital to 
be bequeathed to future generations also defeats many of the goals of superannuation 
tax concessions.
Although it is likely that such a move would be politically unpopular, mandating 
that all or most of superannuation funds be converted to an income stream in a form 
that is likely to support a taxpayer for their lifetime, would lead to a greater amount 
of income smoothing and certainty. Specifically, taxpayers could be mandated to 
place their superannuation savings upon retirement into either a phased withdrawal 
product or to use it to purchase a lifetime annuity. If such a policy were implemented, 
it would be logical for it to be accompanied by new rules that cap the annual 
withdrawals that taxpayers can make from phased withdrawal products. This would 
make it more likely that retirees have sufficient incomes for life. Such rules would 
complement the above-mentioned age-based minimum withdrawal rules that already 
exist to discourage excessive capital hoarding. However, such new rules would far 
from guarantee that retirees would have sufficient superannuation savings for their 
lifetime. This is because superannuation income streams taken in the form of phased 
withdrawal products will sometimes result in retirees outliving their savings,160 and, 
in other cases, result in retirees still having a substantial superannuation balance upon 
their death. A relatively low maximum annual withdrawal cap would make the former 
less likely, and the latter more likely. A relatively high maximum annual cap would 
have the opposite effect.
A more certain way of ensuring longevity insurance is to mandate that taxpayers 
use their superannuation savings to purchase lifetime annuities.161 At current annuity 
prices, it is arguable that this would be unfair, given that annuities represent poor 
value for money in Australia when their purchase price is compared to the present 
value of their expected income stream.162 The difference between an annuity’s 
purchase price and the discounted value of its expected income is referred to as its 
loading.163 However, mandating retirees to purchase life annuities would go some way 
to reducing the loadings on Australian life annuities. This is because, under a voluntary 
system, the price of life annuities is inflated by the fact that sellers perceive the average 
annuity purchaser as having above average longevity.164 The resulting higher annuity 
159 ACOSS, above n 105, 17. 
160 Creighton and Jin, above n 154, 6.
161 Ibid.
162 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 4.
163 Ibid 5.
164 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues, above n 70, 46.
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price then acts as a further deterrent to potential purchasers that perceive themselves 
as having relatively low longevity, resulting in further price increases through a 
spiralling effect.165 This effect is known as ‘adverse selection’.166 However, eliminating 
adverse selection would be likely to make immediate life annuities only moderately 
better value for money. This is because there is research that indicates that adverse 
selection effect is only responsible for a small portion of the loadings on annuities.167 
In contrast, getting rid of the adverse selection effect creates a dramatically greater 
improvement to the price of some deferred annuities.168 
It is also possible that making the purchase of life annuities compulsory will 
dramatically improve their value due to economies of scale and greater competition;169 
however, it is difficult to predict the extent of such an improvement. 
Some economic modelling has found that life annuities are already good value for 
money in Australia notwithstanding their relatively large loadings. This conclusion is 
based on the finding that the utility gained from the risk-free income of life annuities 
outweighs the burden of their loadings.170 There have been similar findings in other 
jurisdictions.171 It remains unclear why there is such a gulf between the modelled 
economic value of life annuities and their lack of popularity.172
On the other hand, a policy of forcing people to convert their superannuation 
savings into an income stream is coercive and so can only be justified if there is a 
strong case for it. This is especially the case as far as lifetime annuities are concerned, 
in light of the fact that, at least from a money’s worth measure, they represent poor 
value in Australia, and that, as discussed, it is unclear whether mandating their 
purchase would dramatically improve this. And whilst the abovementioned research 
points to annuities offering their purchasers a net gain in utility, people should be 
allowed to exercise a choice in whether they purchase such annuities unless there are 
strong reasons for coercion.
In support of taxpayers being allowed to continue to take their superannuation as 
a lump sum is a study that has indicated that the overwhelming number of retirees 
165 Creighton and Jin, above n 154, 6-7.
166 Ibid.
167 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 21,38.
168 Michael Sherris and John Evans, Longevity Management Issues for Australia’s Future Tax System 
(24 August 2009) Australia’s Future Tax System, 17-24 <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/
content/html/commissioned_work/downloads/Longevity_Management_Issues.pdf>.
169 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 35; Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 19.
170 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153.
171 Olivia Mitchell, James Poterba and Mark Warshawsky, ‘New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of 
Individual Annuities’ (1999) 89(5) The American Economic Review 1299.
172 Jeffrey Brown, ‘Rational and Behavioural Perspectives on the Role of Annuities in Retirement 
Planning’ (October 2007) National Bureau of Economic Research <http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13537>.
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exercise self-control when spending their retirement funds.173 The study examined a 
sample of retirees who were newly entitled to a part pension during the 1999-2000 year, 
and traced their asset holdings between that time and the 2003-04 financial year.174 It 
found that 57.4% of them had kept at least 80% of their assets, and that another 14.6% 
had kept between 70-80% of their assets at the end of those years.175 However, certain 
limitations in this study make it unclear whether it is possible to conclude that the vast 
majority of retirees can, using self-discipline, smooth their lump sum superannuation 
over their expected retirement years. One limitation involved the fact that as 21% 
of the sampled pensioners were landlords, the rise of real estate values during the 
study period made the closing value of their assets higher than it otherwise would 
have been.176 Another limitation was that some of the subjects inherited assets from 
a deceased person during the relevant period; this, too, led to an artificial inflation of 
their closing asset values.177 The author of the study described the magnitude of this 
latter factor as ‘significant, but not large’.178 More importantly, the sample in question 
was restricted to those who commenced receiving a part rate Age Pension in the 
1999-2000 financial year.179 As, at that time, the superannuation system was far from 
mature, it is likely that the sample size would be over-represented with retirees who 
had funded their retirement through disciplined saving and investment. As a result, it 
is plausible that the sample was biased with retirees who had an above average level of 
self-control and money-management skills. If this is the case, it would be incorrect to 
extrapolate the behaviour of the subjects of this study onto the typical retiree whose 
dominant form of retirement savings is compulsory superannuation.
The final Henry Review report, persuaded by the above-mentioned study, 
recommended that taxpayers be able to continue to withdraw their superannuation 
savings in the form of a lump sum.180 On balance, this appears to be a sensible 
conclusion. If the evidence indicates that the vast majority of retirees can be self-
disciplined and not quickly consume their retirement savings, it is best to continue 
to allow them the freedom to access their superannuation in the form of a lump sum. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that problems such as capital hoarding will continue 
to exist. However it would be worthwhile for further studies to be undertaken in this 
area given the limitations of the currently available research. If, in the future, evidence 
emerges that a sizeable proportion of retirees are over-spending their retirement 
savings, the introduction of laws mandating that a portion of superannuation be 
converted to an income stream should be considered.
173 Hazel Lim-Applegate, Peter McLean, Phil Lindenmayer and Ben Wallace, Part Rate Pensioners: 
Characteristics and Changes (July 2005), Department of Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs <http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/about/publicationsarticles/research/
austsocialpolicy/Documents/austsocpolicy_2006/aust_soc_policy_2006.pdf>.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid 16.
176 Ibid 17.
177 Ibid 18.
178 Ibid 18.
179 Ibid 15.
180 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 122-123.
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As discussed, in Australia retirees who choose to convert their superannuation 
into an income stream can do so in the form of a phased withdrawal product or an 
annuity. In general, there is a risk with most phased withdrawal products that the 
money will not last the whole of the taxpayer’s lifetime, given the unpredictability of 
future investment returns and individual taxpayer’s longevity.181 And, whilst there are 
some new phased withdrawal products that guarantee a taxpayer an income stream 
for life, these typically have high fees that potentially erode a substantial portion of 
the yearly investment returns of such products.182 A further consideration is that 
such products do not typically protect against inflation risk.183 Also, as discussed, 
lifetime annuities, which do provide a form of longevity insurance, are from a purely 
monetary perspective poor value for money due to their large loadings.184 This is in 
contrast to some other countries where life annuities are materially better value for 
money.185 In Australia, their poor monetary value for money is accompanied by a 
perception by many of their poor value.186 
As a result, it is important to consider what policies can be implemented to improve 
the availability, popularity and value of products that offer longevity insurance. 
However, once it is accepted that taxpayers should not be mandated to purchase 
products such as life annuities, there are limits as to how popular such products will 
be, given that their lack of popularity appears to be an international phenomenon.187
 -AKINGPRIVATESECTORLIFETIMEANNUITIESBETTERVALUE
One of the reasons that lifetime annuities are poor value from a money’s worth metric is 
due to annuity providers finding it hard to estimate risks such as longevity, investment 
and long-term inflation risks, thus requiring a relatively large amount of capital to 
insure against such risks.188 This inflates the purchase price of such annuities.189 It 
follows that lifetime annuities could be made more affordable by the government 
181 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 10-11.
182 Tony Rumble, Investment Road Test: ING Money for Life (1 February 2010) Eureka Report 
<http://www.eurekareport.com.au/iis/iis.nsf/pages/C51B99F21505FF71CA2576BD00131628?
OpenDocument>.
183 ING, Superannuation – Money for Life (2010) ING <http://www.ing.com.au/personal/
superannuation/ing-moneyforlife.aspx#features>
184 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 4.
185 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 35-36.
186 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 10.
187 Creighton and Jin, above n 154, 5-6.
188 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 11-13.
189 Ganegoda and Bateman, above n 153, 4.
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issuing certain bonds that will help annuity issuers hedge against longevity, inflation 
and investment risk.190 
The issuing of long-dated and indexed bonds would help annuity providers hedge 
against investment and investment risk.191 However, as annuity issuers invest a portion 
of their funds in equities, the government issue of such bonds would have a limited 
impact on the hedging of investment risk. It is likely that the only way that annuity 
providers could hedge against a long-term decline in equity movements would be for 
the government to issue certain unique financial instruments.192 
Similarly, issuing longevity bonds would assist providers in hedging against 
systematic longevity risk, which is the risk of average longevity rising more than 
forecast.193 However, according to some modelling, eliminating the excess need 
for the capital that annuity providers currently require due to systematic longevity 
risks, whilst lowering the price of annuities, will only do so by a limited amount.194 
Furthermore, the government is already exposed to longevity risks in its provision of 
the age pension, as well as its provision of other types of spending aimed at the elderly; 
as a result, shifting systematic longevity risks to the government might be seen as 
overly subjecting government to such risks.195
If the government issue of longevity bonds is seen as too risky, there are other 
measures that can assist annuity providers in minimising their systematic longevity 
risk. However, one alternative that is unlikely to be feasible is for the private sector 
to issue longevity bonds, given that there is little evidence that they are able to do 
so effectively.196 A more realistic alternative is for annuity providers to offer lifetime 
annuities which have an income stream that will potentially decrease in payments if 
longevity across society rises more than predicted;197 this is, in effect, a shifting of 
systematic longevity risk onto the annuity purchasers.
 3HOULDTHEGOVERNMENTOFFERLIFETIMEANNUITIES
Another method of making longevity insurance cheaper and more widely available 
is to allow the government to step into the market and offer lifetime annuities. If 
the government did enter the annuity market, the purchase price of government 
annuities could be placed into a public investment fund which would be drawn upon 
190 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 14; Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System 
– Final Report, above n 77, 125.
191 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 125.
192 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 11-12. Although this would shift the risk of a long-term decline 
in equities onto the government, the government might be better suited to taking on such risk 
(as discussed later in this paper).
193 Ibid 14.
194 Ibid 21, 23-24.
195 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 15; Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System 
– Final Report, above n 77, 125.
196 Pablo Antolin and Hans Blommestein, Governments and the Market for Longevity-Indexed 
Bonds (January 2007) OECD, 10 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/23/37977290.pdf>.
197 Creighton and Jin, above n 154, 12-13.
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to pay future annuity payments. If the government implemented such a policy, then 
certain concerns that potentially flow from the existence of public investment funds 
would need to be addressed. These concerns, discussed in the earlier companion 
article, include the possibility of such funds generating suboptimal returns, as well 
as their existence leading to numerous conflicts of interest.198 However, as a fund 
used to pay government supplied annuities would be unlikely to dominate investment 
markets, these concerns would be limited, especially if the fund had a board that ran it 
in an open and transparent manner. 199 The reason that such a fund would be unlikely 
to dominate investment markets is because, if the government entered the annuity 
market, it would be likely to set limits as to the size of the annuity that each taxpayer 
could purchase. And although investments relating to the superannuation income 
streams constitute 20% of superannuation assets, and will rise to more than a third of 
superannuation assets in the future,200 the government and its hypothetical annuity 
public investment fund would be likely to only constitute a portion of this. 
The advantages of the government offering annuities are similar to those explained 
in the companion article regarding the government complementing the current 
superannuation system with a government-funded defined benefits regime.201 Firstly, 
a government system would not be subject to the high management fees that are a 
common feature of the private system. Furthermore, the government is better able 
to absorb investment risk as it could, in the medium-term, spread such risk across 
cohorts. However, were poor investments to become a long-term phenomenon, then 
the government would have to make some tough choices. In particular, it would have 
to make up the funding shortfall with higher taxes or lower benefits. Such a system 
would also be better able to adequately deal with inflation risks, as a government 
fund would invest much of its money in equities, given the futility of a government 
fund investing in its own bonds. However, the government would still be subject to 
systematic longevity risk. As the government is already heavily exposed to longevity 
risk through its spending on health care, this is an argument against the government 
offering such annuities. 
Overall, although the government has for now dismissed the idea, 202 at some time 
in the future it would be worthwhile reconsidering the prospect of the government 
entering the life annuity market to a limited degree. This is especially the case 
if measures aimed at improving the private market for annuities do not end up 
producing the desired results.
198 Hanegbi, above n 1, 318-322.
199 Ibid.
200 Commonwealth of Australia, Final Report - Part Two: Recommendation Packages (5 July 2010) 
Super System Review, 197-198 <http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/
final_report/part_two/Final_Report_Part_2_Consolidated.pdf>.
201 Hanegbi, above n 1, 315-318. 
202 Swan, above n 99.
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 4HEVIEWSOFTHE(ENRY2EVIEWREGARDINGLONGEVITYINSURANCE
The final report of the Henry Review did state that government-offered annuities 
are an option worth considering.203 To limit the amount of further exposure of the 
government to longevity risk, the report did sensibly suggest that the government 
limit the value of an annuity that it can sell to each taxpayer.204 Furthermore, it also 
made the worthwhile suggestion that if such a system was introduced, the government 
would have to ensure that there be adequate safeguards so that such annuities would 
be sold at actuarially fair prices.205 However, the government has responded that it 
will not enter the annuities market.206
As mentioned, despite the government rejecting the idea, the concept of publicly 
offered life annuities in a limited form might be worth reconsidering sometime in the 
future.
The final report of the Henry Review made some further recommendations on 
the subject of longevity insurance. Despite recommending that the government 
should consider issuing life annuities, it stated that the private sector is in a better 
position to supply products that provide retirement income streams.207 The final 
report specifically recommended that the government assist private annuity 
providers to hedge against investment and inflation risk by issuing indexed and long-
dated bonds.208 As mentioned earlier, such action should, to a limited degree, help 
products such as lifetime annuities be offered at cheaper prices. The final report also 
recommended that the government not offer longevity bonds, as the government is 
already exposed to longevity risk due increased longevity leading to more government 
spending on health, aged care and pensions.209 
A further recommendation made by the final Henry Review report was that the 
government provide the data required to set up and maintain a longevity index.210 This 
index would state the risk of the general population-wide longevity increasing more 
than expected.211 However, as much of this risk is either unknown, or difficult and 
unreliable to model,212 it is unlikely that such an index would make much difference 
to the private annuity market. 
The final Henry Review report also recommended the scrapping of the prescriptive 
rules that relate to income streams.213 This includes scrapping the rules that mandate 
minimum age-dependent payments on phased withdrawal products as a condition of 
203 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 121.
204 Ibid 121, 126.
205 Ibid.
206 Swan, above n 99.
207 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 123.
208 Ibid 121, 125.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Antolin and Blommestein, above n 196. 
212 Sherris and Evans, above n 168, 6-7.
213 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report, above n 77, 121, 124.
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the availability of certain tax concessions.214 It pointed out that doing so will increase 
innovation in the income stream market and encourage more suppliers into the 
market.215 Whilst this reasoning is correct, it needs to be balanced against the fact 
that the superannuation regime is there as an income smoothing instrument, rather 
than as a concessional estate planning vehicle;216 the removal of the caps will make it 
easier to use it as the latter. On the other hand, the earlier discussed recommendation 
that earnings on assets supporting retirement income streams lose their tax-free 
status217 will lessen the opportunity for using phased withdrawal products as an estate 
planning vehicle. Overall, there is considerable merit in scrapping the prescriptive 
rules concerning income streams if accompanied by the introduction of an earnings 
tax on assets supporting such streams.
 #ONCLUSION
Certain aspects of the current superannuation system could be improved. Whilst 
there is some basis for the concessional treatment of superannuation, the current 
concessions are on the whole inequitable. Furthermore, for the most part, they do 
not achieve their policy goals, such as higher voluntary savings, to the same extent 
that well targeted concessions could. Consequently, there are strong arguments for 
targeting them more strongly at low and middle-income earners. Politically, this 
would not be particularly difficult to do as most voters would end up with a larger 
tax benefit. The recommendations made by the Henry Review’s final report regarding 
changing the superannuation contributions tax would improve the targeting of these 
concessions. 
The ideal superannuation mandatory contributions rate will, to some extent, 
always be a subjective decision. However, given its compulsory nature, there should 
be a bias at leaving the rate at the lowest level that, on current predictions, will provide 
most people with a comfortable retirement once the system has matured. The available 
evidence would suggest that the current rate of 9% will fulfil this requirement. It is 
disappointing that the government has announced plans to incrementally increase 
the contributions rate to 12% without any widespread community debate as to the 
costs and benefits of doing so. It is also disappointing that the final Henry Review 
report has made recommendations aimed at increasing superannuation balances 
without explicitly weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of implementing 
such changes. 
The issue of retirement income streams is a policy area that has many trade-offs 
and challenges. The Henry Review’s recommendation that retirees should continue 
to be allowed to take their superannuation as a lump sum is very sound, given that 
the current research indicates that the vast majority of retirees exercise self control 
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid 124.
216 Ibid 115-116.
217 Ibid 124.
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regarding their savings. Only if and when there is evidence that clearly contradicts 
the current research should any consideration be given to mandating that any portion 
of superannuation be taken as an income stream. However, the government should 
attempt to implement some policies that will improve the availability and price 
of products that are likely to provide a secure retirement income for the rest of a 
taxpayer’s life. Whilst ageing is an inevitable part of everyone’s existence, the ability to 
purchase a reasonably priced, reliable income stream will give some retirees a sense of 
security that will greatly enhance their quality of life. 
Copyright of Full Text rests with the original copyright owner and, except as 
permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyright material is 
prohibited without the permission of the owner or its exclusive licensee or 
agent or by way of a license from Copyright Agency Limited. For information 
about such licences contact Copyright Agency Limited on (02) 93947600 (ph) or 
(02) 93947601 (fax) 
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Article 3 discusses the Transition to Retirement (TTR) provisions, offering a critical 
analysis and a consideration of policy alternatives. The significance of this research is that 
while the TTR provisions have received occasional criticism,161 such commentary usually 
lacks depth of analysis. Specifically, the commentary does not examine what the TTR 
provisions are supposed to do, to what extent they fulfil such professed goals, and 
whether other policies might achieve those goals better. This article aims to fill the gap by 
making a thorough examination of the original purpose of the TTR provisions, their 
current justifications, and whether they are the best policy for fulfilling those outcomes. 
Such an analysis is very useful for positive policy recommendations and modifications. It 
is also important to justify policy changes and defend them against claims by self-
interested groups who wish to maintain the provisions in their current form. 
$"#!#2
As explained under the heading ‘Operation of the TTR Provisions’ in Article 3, as the 
superannuation system is aimed at providing retirement incomes, superannuation 
withdrawals in general can only be made by those who have ceased their employment. 
However, the same part of the article explains that the TTR provisions allow 
superannuation account holders who are still working but have reached their preservation 
age to access their superannuation in a limited form. Specifically, they can access their 
superannuation by converting any of the balance in their accumulations account into a 
 
161 See, eg, Richard Denniss and David Richardson, ‘Can the Taxpayer Afford ‘Self-funded 
Retirement’?’ (Policy Brief No 42, Australia Institute, August 2012) 13. 
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non-commutable income stream, though they are prohibited from withdrawing more 
than 10 per cent of the funds supporting this income stream per year. 
The part of Article 3 under the heading ‘Background’ explains that the TTR provisions 
were originally enacted so that people could transition to retirement by going from full to 
part-time work, and use their superannuation to top up their lower income to meet day-
to-day expenses. However, as explained under the heading ‘Use of the TTR Provisions’, 
in reality the provisions are predominantly used as a tax minimisation vehicle by full-time 
workers. Specifically, full-time workers will salary sacrifice money into superannuation, 
and convert their superannuation balance into a TTR income stream to make up for the 
lost salary-sacrificed income, and thus benefit from a substantial tax saving. This part of 
the article points out that utilising the TTR provisions in such a way is not discouraged or 
disapproved of by the authorities, and is even encouraged through the government’s 
Moneysmart web site. 
By way of background, the superannuation system involves concessional tax treatment, 
which, as stated in Part 3.1 of Article 1, is not fully counterbalanced by future pension 
savings. Consequently, when the TTR provisions, as commonly used, allow a further tax 
saving beyond that available to those who do not utilise them, it is important to critically 
evaluate these provisions. Specifically, a logical process involves first examining whether 
these provisions provide benefits that exceed the cost of revenue loss. Second, even if 
they do provide such benefits, it is desirable to examine whether those benefits could be 
provided by other policies that are potentially fairer, more direct and with a lower fiscal 
cost. 
Article 3 applies this procedure, and concludes that, while its supporters proffer certain 
justifications for the TTR provisions, analysis does not justify their availability for full-
time workers. Specifically, regarding the first step, the evidence that the TTR provisions 
as used by full-time workers brings the system within the ambit of the supposed 
justifications is equivocal. As far as the second step is concerned, other policies could 
fulfil the stated goals in a more direct, targeted manner. 
 27
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Although there have not been many relevant changes following the publication of Article 
3, it should be noted that the concessional contribution rate (referred to under the 
heading ‘TTR Provisions To Allow Older Workers to Build up Their Superannuation’) 
has now, due to indexation, increased from $25,000 to $30,000./40 Further, at the time 
the article was written, as explained in the same part of the article, it was legislated that 
from 1 July 2014 the higher concessional contributions threshold of $35,000 would apply 
to those aged at least 50. That legislative change is now in effect. 163 
  
 
162 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20(1)(a), 291-20(1)(b). 
163 Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 (Cth) s 291-20. 
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Article 3 is reproduced in the following pages. The citation for this article is as follows: 
Rami Hanegbi, ‘The Transition to Retirement Provisions: a Critical Analysis and a 
Consideration of Policy Alternatives’ (2013) 23 Revenue Law Journal 1–22. 
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THE TRANSITION TO RETIREMENT PROVISIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND A 
CONSIDERATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
RAMI HANEGBI* 
 
The Transition to Retirement (TTR) provisions allow workers who have reached 
preservation age to access their superannuation despite not ceasing 
employment. Full-time mature workers commonly use these provisions for tax 
minimisation purposes. Such use is inconsistent with their original aim of 
enabling mature workers to transition to retirement by lightening their workload 
while accessing their superannuation to top up their reduced income. 
Furthermore, despite claims that the ability of full-time workers to use the TTR 
provisions helps to achieve certain policy goals, a number of alternative policies 
considered in this paper are better suited to fulfilling such goals. 
The Transition to Retirement (TTR) provisions allow workers who have reached 
preservation age to access their superannuation despite not ceasing employment. 
Full-time mature workers commonly use these provisions for tax minimisation 
purposes. Such use is inconsistent with their original aim of enabling mature workers 
to transition to retirement by lightening their workload while accessing their 
superannuation to top up their reduced income. Furthermore, despite claims that the 
ability of full-time workers to use the TTR provisions helps to achieve certain policy 
goals, a number of alternative policies considered in this paper are better suited to 
fulfilling such goals.  
INTRODUCTION 
The Transition to Retirement (TTR) provisions in the superannuation legislation have 
now been around for a number of years. They allow people who have reached 
preservation age but are still working to access their superannuation through a non-
commutable income stream. When these provisions were enacted they were 
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primarily aimed at allowing workers who had reached their preservation age and 
wished to reduce their work responsibilities (usually by working part-time) to top up 
their reduced incomes with some of their superannuation savings. In contrast, their 
main use has become that of a tax minimisation vehicle for full-time workers who 
have reached preservation age. 
Lately, there have been calls for the TTR provisions to be reviewed.1 Whether the TTR 
provisions should remain in their current form depends on what their claimed 
justifications are, and their effectiveness in fulfilling these justifications when 
compared to other alternative policies. 
BACKGROUND 
Before the enactment of the TTR provisions, superannuation access for those who 
had reached the preservation age of 55 but were under 65 was generally conditional 
on them ceasing their employment. Furthermore, if they were under 60 an added 
condition was that the taxpayer had to intend to not be gainfully employed again. 
The TTR provisions were enacted to allow workers who had reached preservation 
age but had yet to cease employment to access some of their superannuation savings. 
The TTR provisions were originally announced in the 2004 Federal Budget. 2 
However, some of their operational details had yet to be finalised at the time. The 
government subsequently issued a consultation paper that outlined the main aims of 
the proposed TTR provisions.3 Specifically, this consultation paper stressed that the 
TTR arrangements were being introduced to prevent people from retiring early due 
to them wanting to access their superannuation.4 The paper stated that this aim 
would be fulfilled by giving workers transitioning towards retirement, such as by 
reducing their working hours, the ability to dip into their superannuation, which 
would give them the economic ability to sustain such an arrangement: 
As the population ages, it will become increasingly important for people to 
retain a connection with the workforce at older ages. However, the current rules 
which require people below the age of 65 to retire or leave their job before they 
                                                                    
1  Australian Law Reform Commission, Access All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth 
Laws (2013) 210–11 <http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/whole_ 
final_report_120_.pdf > at 9 August 2013. 
2  Australian Government, Budget 2004–05: Budget Paper No. 2 (2004) 17 <http://www. 
budget.gov.au/2004-05/bp2/download/bp2.pdf > at 6 December 2012. 
3  Retirement Income and General Rules Unit, The Treasury, Transition to Retirement 
Consultation Paper (2004) <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/928/PDF/Transition_ 
to_retirement_Consultation.pdf> at 6 December 2012. 
4  Ibid 3-4. 
2
Revenue Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/rlj/vol23/iss1/1
can access their superannuation benefits may lead to people deciding to retire 
prematurely. The current rules also do not adequately cater for more flexible 
workplace arrangements where people may choose to reduce their hours of 
work as they approach retirement. 
Allowing people to access their superannuation from their preservation age 
without having to retire or leave their job will give them more flexibility to 
develop strategies in their transition to retirement. For example, they may 
choose to continue working on a part-time basis, using part of their 
superannuation to supplement their employment income, instead of leaving the 
workforce altogether. The objective in providing greater flexibility in the rules 
for accessing superannuation benefits is to encourage people to retain a 
connection with the workforce for a longer period.5 
The consultation paper also raised for discussion some of the unresolved details 
regarding the implementation of the provision. These included whether the TTR 
provisions should be subject to a work test so they will only be applicable to part-
time workers, and whether superannuation funds should be mandated to offer their 
eligible members the option of an income stream that complies with the TTR 
provisions.6 
Subsequently, regulations were introduced to enact the TTR provisions, with a 
commencement date of 1 July 2005. 7  These regulations, which amended the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994, allowed taxpayers who had 
reached preservation age but were still working to convert a portion of their 
superannuation funds into a non-commutable income stream. The Explanatory 
Statement that accompanied these regulations stated that the policy benefits of the 
changes were to allow older workers flexibility in transitioning to retirement, and 
like the initial consultation paper, gave the example of someone reducing their full-
time work to part-time while accessing their superannuation to top up their reduced 
salary.8 It followed by further reiterating what was said in the consultation paper, 
that these regulations would increase workforce participation and contribute to 
economic growth, as workers would not have to completely cease their employment 
to access their superannuation.9 
                                                                    
5  Ibid 3-4. 
6  Ibid 10-11. 
7  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment Regulations 2005 (No. 2). 
8  Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument 2005 No. 56, Retirement Savings 
Accounts Act 1997, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, 4. 
9  Ibid 5. 
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The Explanatory Statement also discussed how the unresolved operational issues 
raised in the earlier consultation paper had been decided, as well as the basis for 
those decisions. Specifically, it was mentioned that a decision had been made to not 
make the TTR provisions subject to a part-time work test. The reasoning behind this 
was, first, because some people might transition to retirement by reducing their work 
responsibilities rather than working fewer hours.10 Secondly, there was a view that a 
work test would burden superannuation funds by necessitating them to check 
whether those using the TTR provisions had complied with such a test.11  
While both the initial TTR consultation paper and Explanatory Statement made it 
clear that the TTR provisions were intended to allow people transitioning towards 
retirement (whether it be by going part-time or by undertaking fewer work 
responsibilities) to top up their lower incomes through accessing superannuation, 
there was nothing to indicate they were to be used by mature workers who did not 
change roles or hours and so did not experience a pay reduction. 
OPERATION OF THE TTR PROVISIONS 
The general rule before the implementation of the TTR provisions was that, in most 
cases, for a taxpayer to access their superannuation they must have reached their 
preservation age, and if under 65, they must have ceased their employment. 12 
Furthermore, if they were under 60 an added condition was that they must have 
intended to not be gainfully employed again.13 The preservation age is currently 55 
years of age, though legislation is in place to incrementally raise it to 60.14 The laws in 
place prior to the TTR provisions meant taxpayers who had reached preservation age 
but were under 65 and had reduced their work hours in their job could not access 
their superannuation savings. 
The effect of the TTR provisions is that a taxpayer who has reached preservation age 
but has not ceased employment can withdraw his/her superannuation in the form of 
a non-commutable income stream. 15  In contrast, there is no such limitation for 
taxpayers that access their superannuation upon ceasing employment, meaning that 
they can do so in the form of a lump sum or income stream. 
                                                                    
10  Ibid 5. 
11  Ibid 6. 
12  Ibid 2. 
13  Ibid 2. 
14  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (‘Sis Regs’) Reg 6.01. 
15  Reg 6.01(2) and Sch 1 to the Sis Regs. 
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To a large degree the tax implications applicable to a TTR income stream are the 
same as those applicable to taxpayers that have ceased employment and have 
converted all or part of their superannuation savings into an income stream. In both 
instances the earnings of the underlying funds that support the income stream are 
tax-free,16 and, the income stream can be in the form of a phased withdrawal product 
or an annuity. 17  Also, in both instances, there are age-based, annual minimum 
withdrawal percentages.18 Furthermore, in both instances, for those at least 60 years 
of age the receipt of the income stream is tax-free,19 and for those under 60 but at least 
of preservation age it is taxed at marginal rates less a 15% rebate.20 However, one 
difference is that for a retired taxpayer there is no legislated maximum withdrawal 
limit of the income stream, whereas a TTR taxpayer can only annually withdraw up 
to 10% of the balance of the funds supporting the income stream.21 
USE OF THE TTR PROVISIONS 
As discussed, when the TTR provisions were enacted, they were aimed at older 
workers who wanted to transition towards retirement through going part-time, or 
continuing to work full-time in a role with lower responsibilities. However, it has 
become popular for full-time mature workers to utilise the TTR provisions as a tax 
minimisation tool.22 Specifically, the first step in doing so is for a taxpayer to salary 
sacrifice into their superannuation accumulation account up to or near the limit of 
their concessional contribution cap, which in isolation lessens their take home pay.23 
Using the TTR provisions they then convert part of the balance of their 
superannuation account into a non-commutable income stream, which they use as 
money to replace what they have salary sacrificed, so as to pay for day-to-day living 
expenses. The net effect of this arrangement, if done properly, is that there is no 
change to take home pay, but less tax is paid, meaning that the overall 
superannuation balance becomes higher than it otherwise would be without this 
                                                                    
16  Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (‘ITAA’) s 301-10. 
17  Reg 6.01(2) to the Sis Regs. 
18  Sch 7 to the Sis Regs. 
19  ITAA s 301-10. 
20  ITAA s 301-25. 
21  Reg 6.01(2) and Sch 1 to the Sis Regs. 
22  ASIC’s Moneysmart website <https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/superannuation-and-
retirement/income-sources-in-retirement/income-from-super/transition-to-retirement> 
states that this is a legitimate use of these provisions. 
23  While a taxpayer can salary sacrifice to a lower degree, so that their concessional 
contributions is nowhere near reached, this will lessen the tax benefit of such an 
arrangement.  
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arrangement.24 The reason for this tax effect is two-fold. First, this technique, in 
essence, makes more of the taxpayer’s income taxed at the concessional contribution 
rate of 15%25 rather than the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. Secondly, earnings on 
funds used to support the income stream are tax free, 26  whereas, if the TTR 
provisions had not been entered into, the full superannuation money would still be 
in accumulation mode and earnings would be taxed at 15%.27 However, as income 
streams for taxpayers who are under 60 years of age are taxed at their marginal rate 
less a 15% rebate, the net tax benefit for such taxpayers is smaller than for those who 
are aged at least 60 and so are subject to no tax on their income streams.  It is also 
worth noting that as that concessional contributions cap is smaller than it was prior 
to 1 July 2012,28 the potential tax-benefit that full-time mature workers can gain 
through use of the TTR provisions is not as large as it used to be.29 
Although it was originally feared by some that this use of the TTR provision could 
trigger Part IVA30, the income tax legislation’s general anti-avoidance provision, the 
ATO has since made it clear that it would not.31  
SHOULD THE TTR PROVISIONS BE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY FULL-
TIME WORKERS? 
Consistency with Specific Original Aims of Legislation 
As described, the initial aim of the TTR provisions was to allow those transitioning to 
retirement through an arrangement that offers lower pay to dip into their 
superannuation. This was to encourage such workers to maintain some employment, 
it being speculated that their only viable alternative in some cases being to cease 
working and enter full retirement. The resulting decrease in the workforce 
participation rate was seen as being suboptimal at both the individual and aggregate 
level.  
                                                                    
24  Jones S, Australian Superannuation Handbook 2012-13 (2012 Thomson Reuters) 801-802.  
25  ITAA s 292-25 and s 295-160. 
26  ITAA s 301-10. 
27  Income Tax Rates Act 1986 s 26(1), s 27(1) and s 27A. 
28  ITAA subdiv 291-B, Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 s 291-20 and 
Superannuation (Excess Concessional Contributions Charge) Act 2013. 
29  This is because the maximum amount of money that can be salary sacrificed and replaced 
with a TTR income stream is lower with the smaller concessional contributions cap. 
30  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 part IVA. 
31  See ATO, Guidance on Transition to Retirement Pensions Media Release Nat – 2005/66 (2005) 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.aspx?doc=/content/66276.htm> at 10 December 
2012. 
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In contrast, the use of the provisions as a tax minimisation tool by full-time workers 
who are entitled to the same pay as they were before entering a TTR arrangement 
does not appear to be consistent with this aim. Such workers would generally not 
need to use the TTR provisions to access their superannuation as they are not 
experiencing a lowering of their income. Consequently, it would be difficult to argue 
that such workers fulfil the aims of the TTR provisions that were envisioned when it 
was first enacted. 
Consistent with the Aim of Increasing Workforce Participation 
While use of the TTR provisions by full-time workers as a tax tool is inconsistent with 
their original specific intent, it could be argued that such a use is still broadly 
consistent with the over-riding intention of the TTR provision, in that such a use 
potentially increases participation rates amongst older workers. 32  Specifically, 
although full-time mature workers do not require the TTR provisions to maintain 
their income, it could it be argued that the provisions give such workers an incentive 
to stay in the work force, due to the lower tax burden leading to the workers 
benefiting from a higher superannuation balance than would otherwise be the case. 33 
However, the accuracy of such a claim requires closer scrutiny. 
A worker who has the option of being able to utilise the TTR provisions to effectively 
lessen the tax on their superannuation is subject to two opposing effects. The first is 
the ‘substitution effect’, which makes the opportunity cost of not working more 
expensive because of the higher after-tax superannuation one would receive from 
working. 34  Consequently, the substitution effect acts as an incentive to continue 
working. The counter to this is the ‘income effect’, where superannuation, being 
more concessionally taxed, leads to retirement goals being reached more quickly, and 
                                                                    
32  Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument 2005 No. 56, Retirement Savings 
Accounts Act 1997, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, 4-5. 
33  See Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ACCI Response to Grey Areas – Age 
Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Issues 
Paper 41 (2012) 7-8 <http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/44_acci.pdf> at 14 
January 2013; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, AIST Submission, ALRC – 
Grey Areas – Age Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws (2012) 8 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/47._australian_institute_of_superannuati
on_trusteesalrc_grey_areas_barrier_to_work_jun_2012_final.pdf> at 14 January 2013.  
34  Headey B, Freebairn J and Warren D, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and 
Social Research, Dynamics of Mature Age Workforce Participation: Policy Effects and 
Continuing Trends, Final Report (2010) 53 <http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/ 
downloads/labour/5-10FinalReport.pdf > at 6 December 2012. 
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so acts as a disincentive to continue working.35 The fact that some people who had 
planned to retire, but as a result of the Global Financial Crisis diminishing their 
retirement savings, continue to be in the workplace is an example of the income effect 
operating in reverse. 
There is some international evidence that as far as retirement savings are concerned, 
the substitution effect is the stronger of the two, and, consequently, a greater increase 
in retirement savings does increase workforce participation, albeit to a very mild 
extent.36 However, the limited evidence suggests that the TTR provisions specifically 
may not have been effective in increasing workforce participation, 37  though the 
evidence is far from conclusive. 
If it is assumed that the TTR provisions, as used by full-time workers, increase 
workforce participation, and it is assumed that this benefit exceeds the relevant fiscal 
cost, it does not necessarily follow that the TTR provisions should be available for 
full-time workers. Rather, the net benefits of their use by full-time workers should be 
compared with those of alternative policies that have similar goals.38 Specifically, it is 
useful to compare the TTR provisions to other tax incentives that are aimed at 
increasing full-time mature worker participation. 
Increasing Mature Worker Participation Rates through Lower Superannuation 
Taxation 
To the extent that there is a goal of increasing the workforce participation rate 
amongst older workers by giving them a tax break on their superannuation, there are 
fairer, more direct ways to achieve this. Specifically, the government could lower the 
                                                                    
35  Ibid. 
36  Brown K, ‘The Link between Pensions and Retirement Timing: Lessons from California 
Teachers’ (2013) 98 Journal of Public Economics 1. 
37  Headey et al., above n 34, 84. However, this only concerns data between 2005-2007, and 
so did not examine the effect that the TTR provisions had on participation rates after the 
major changes that were made to the superannuation system in 2007. See also ALRC, 
Access All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, above n 1, 209-10, stating that 
some have suggested that the reason that this study did not find increased participation 
rates was due to positive economic conditions at the time giving people a greater ability 
to enter early retirement.  
38  There is a very wide range of policies aimed at increasing mature worker participation 
rates that can be implemented by governments. The potential policies include 
possibilities such as implementing awareness campaigns and targeted training subsidies. 
A consideration of which mix of all these potential policies has the largest net benefit is a 
highly complex subject and beyond the scope of this article. The analysis here is confined 
to comparing the TTR provisions to other similar policies.  
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superannuation contributions tax rate or earnings tax rate for mature workers. This 
would have a few advantages over the use of TTR provisions by full-time workers to 
effectively lower their superannuation taxation. First, it would allow all mature full-
time workers to benefit from such tax incentives. In contrast, the TTR provisions only 
allow a subset of mature workers to benefit. This is due to the fact that for someone 
to materially benefit from the TTR provisions they need to have a reasonably sized 
superannuation balance. The need for an adequate sized balance is related to the TTR 
provisions allowing a maximum of 10% of the funds supporting the non-commutable 
income stream to be distributed in any given year.39 As higher income earners are 
more likely to have higher superannuation balances, the availability of the TTR 
provisions is to some extent skewed towards higher income earners. Consequently, 
looked at in isolation, the TTR provisions appear broadly regressive in nature, 
though admittedly this needs to be seen in the context of a tax system that is still, 
overall, progressive.40 Secondly, for full-time workers to use the TTR provisions to 
effectively lower their tax burden, they need to have an employer who is willing to 
allow them to salary sacrifice higher amounts into superannuation, which, while 
common, is not always the case.41 A related issue is that many mature full-time 
workers do not use the TTR provisions because they do not have the knowledge, 
inclination or motivation to set up an arrangement to use them.42  
The specific fiscal cost of lowering superannuation tax rates for mature workers 
would be dependent  on the magnitude of the reduction granted to them. It would be 
possible for the cost of the current TTR provisions per full time worker that utilises 
them to be estimated,43 and the precise size of the lower superannuation tax rates for 
                                                                    
39  Reg 6.01(2) to the Sis Regs. 
40  Rothman G, Retirement & Intergenerational Modelling & Analysis Unit - Department of 
the Treasury, Assessing the Equity of Australia’s Retirement Income System (2009) 16 
<http://www.asb.unsw.edu.au/research/cps/Documents/G.%20Rothman%20-
%20Assessing%20the%20equity%20of%20Australia%E2%80%99s%20retirement%20inco
me%20system%20.pdf > at 17 December 2012.  
41  Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System: the Retirement Income System: 
Report on Strategic Issues (2009) 30 <http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/ 
downloads/retirement_income_report_stategic_issues/retirement_income_report_200905
15.pdf > at 14 January 2013. 
42  See Walter MM, Jackson N and Felmingham BS, ‘Keeping Australia's Older Workers in 
the Labour Force. A Policy Perspective’ (2008) 43(2) Australian Journal of Social Issues 291, 
299, where survey data indicate that a sizeable proportion of workers lack an awareness 
of TTR provisions. 
43  ecent Budget Papers and Tax Expenditure Statements do not contain specific estimates of 
the fiscal cost of the TTR provisions.  
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mature workers tailored so that they have a similar average fiscal cost per mature 
worker. While the ability of more workers to use these hypothetical provisions would 
lead to such provisions having a greater aggregate fiscal cost, this cannot be 
considered a bad outcome if it is assumed that there is a net overall benefit per full-
time mature worker who utilises the TTR provisions. Alternatively, a smaller cut to 
the mature worker superannuation tax rate, one that would have a lower cost per 
mature worker than the TTR provisions have per worker that uses them, could be 
introduced if it is considered that this would give a better trade-off between fiscal 
cost and benefit. Indeed, it would be a strange coincidence if such a concession, set at 
the rate that gave the ideal net benefit, would grant the same monetary benefit per 
mature worker as the TTR provisions do to full-time workers that use them. Such a 
policy could also be subject to means testing so as to restrict its total fiscal cost. 
Comparison of Tax Benefit Aimed at Mature Workers’ Superannuation to Tax 
Benefit Aimed at Mature Workers’ Salary  
While, as far as encouraging participation rates is concerned, a larger tax concession 
on mature workers’ superannuation has advantages over mature workers being 
allowed to utilise the TTR provisions so as to indirectly lessen their superannuation 
taxation, a broader issue is whether an even better solution would be to lower the 
income salary tax payable by mature workers.44 There is evidence that lower income 
taxes on salaries have a substantially stronger effect on work incentive for mature 
workers than younger cohorts.45 
A good starting point is to examine the justifications for concessionally taxing 
superannuation, so as to decide whether those justifications are more applicable to 
older workers. If they are, this strengthens the case of a lower mature worker 
                                                                    
44  While the TTR provisions could be used by full-time workers in a way that leads to most 
of the tax benefits increasing their take home pay rather than increasing their net 
superannuation balances, as far as full-time workers are concerned, they are generally 
promoted to be used in a manner that increases superannuation savings rather than take 
home pay. 
45  See French E, ‘The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and 
Retirement Behaviour’, 72 Review of Economic Studies (2005) 395, 396 which used 
modelling calibrated against data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and found 
that labour market elasticity markedly increased as workers reached retirement age. This 
was due to the ability of such workers to access Social Security and pension benefits. In 
Hemel D, ‘Should Tax Rates Decline with Age?’ (2011) 120 Yale Law Journal 1885 the 
authors make the point that lower income taxes on mature workers are consistent with 
the broader principle of inelastic supplies being subject to comparatively higher rates of 
taxation and vice-versa. 
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superannuation tax over a lower mature worker salary tax. The Henry Review said 
the following: 
Superannuation is the main form of lifetime saving outside the family home. 
There is a bias in the current taxation system against long-term saving, 
particularly lifetime saving such as superannuation. There are at least two 
reasons for taxing superannuation more favourably than other saving (with the 
exception of housing) to reduce this bias. 
The first reason is that taxing superannuation earnings, like the earnings on most 
forms of savings, means that the effective rate of tax on the real value of saving 
increases the longer an asset is held (see Section A1 Personal income tax). This 
effect is more pronounced in superannuation than other savings as 
superannuation saving is generally held for a longer time. This justifies a more 
favourable tax treatment. 
The second reason is that superannuation is a form of deferred income. People 
should be taxed on superannuation at the rate that would apply if their income 
had been spread over their entire life rather than merely over their working life. 
This is an income-smoothing argument. As a person's retirement income is 
generally lower than their income while they were working, it should be taxed 
at a lower rate.46 
None of these justifications for superannuation tax concessions are more applicable 
to mature workers. Specifically, the concessions being there as a means to prevent the 
after-inflation returns of retirement savings being excessively taxed is a reason that is 
not any more applicable to mature workers than other workers. Furthermore, the 
desire to tax retirement savings at a lower rate to account for the fact that taxpayers’ 
future retirement income will be lower is not any more relevant to mature full-time 
workers over younger cohorts. 
An important consideration when comparing the merits of a tax incentive on mature 
workers’ salary to lower taxes on their superannuation is that there is reason to 
believe that the former has a greater effect on their work incentive and so would have 
a greater effect on increasing the participation rate of mature workers. It has been 
suggested that for the general workforce, the work incentive effect for every extra 
dollar in superannuation is only approximately 50% as powerful as the work 
                                                                    
46  Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System – Final Report: Part 2 Volume 1 
(2010) 96-7 <http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/final_report_part_2/ 
AFTS_Final_Report_Part_2_Vol_1_Consolidated.pdf> at 10 December 2012. 
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incentive effect that lies with every extra dollar in salary.47 Certainly, the evidence 
supporting the work incentive effect of lower salary taxes, especially when compared 
to the evidence regarding the work incentive effect of lower retirement savings taxes, 
is highly comprehensive.48 While it is logical that the closer a worker is to full 
retirement and being able to fully access the superannuation, the less difference there 
is in the incentive effect of these two choices, there is some limited evidence 
indicating that as far as mature workers are concerned, lower salary taxes would 
have a substantially stronger work incentive effect than the lowering of 
superannuation taxes.49  
Another important consideration when deciding between such policies is their net 
fiscal cost. On the one hand, it is logical that dollar-for-dollar of lost tax revenue, a 
lower superannuation tax rate for mature workers has a smaller long-term fiscal cost 
when compared to a lower salary tax rate. This is because a superannuation tax cut 
can be assumed to have a greater impact on boosting retirement savings than a salary 
tax cut, and so will lead to a comparatively greater saving on future pensions; a 
superannuation tax cut will still however have a net long-term fiscal cost.50 The 
difference between the two options in boosting retirement savings would to some 
extent be diminished the closer the worker is to retirement given that such a worker 
would more readily substitute salary and retirement savings in achieving their 
                                                                    
47  Guest R and MacDonald I, 'Superannuation, Population Ageing and Living Standards in 
Australia' (2002) 32(1) Economic Analysis and Policy 19, 30. However, note that this 
estimate is not based on empirical evidence. 
48  See Evers M, De Mooij R and Vuuren D, ‘The Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Estimates’ (2008) 156 De Economist 25, where a meta-analysis of a 
wide range of data shows that lower taxes do provide an incentive to work, though this 
incentive effect is much stronger for women than men. 
49  The estimated wage elasticity of labour supply of mature workers is substantially higher 
in French, above n 45, as compared to the elasticity of labour supply of mature workers in 
response to higher retirement benefits in Brown, above n 36.  
50  Superannuation tax concessions have a net fiscal cost because the tax expenditure from 
the current superannuation tax concessions outweighs future pension savings: Institute of 
Actuaries of Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System Draft Submission from the Institute of 
Actuaries of Australia Retirement Income Consultation Paper (2009) 13 
<http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/submissions/retirement/Institute_of_Act
uaries_of_Australia_20090312.pdf> at 11 December 2012; see also Report on Strategic 
Issues, above n 41, where it is projected that an increase in the superannuation levy will 
lead to a net fiscal cost in the long-term. It is logical that any increase in superannuation 
tax concessions would lead to an increase in net fiscal cost.  
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retirement goals.51 On the other hand, the fact that lower taxes on salary income have 
a comparatively greater incentive effect as compared to lower superannuation taxes 
means that less of a salary tax cut would be required for a similar incentive effect. For 
instance, using hypothetical figures that do not necessarily accurately reflect the 
precise difference in incentive effects, a $100 a week salary tax cut might give a 
similar incentive effect to a $150 a week superannuation tax cut. This means that the 
net fiscal cost of a salary tax cut might end up being smaller than the fiscal cost of a 
superannuation tax cut for a given increase in mature workforce participation, 
though this is an area that would benefit from further research.   
Overall, there does appear to competing cases regarding the comparative merits of a 
superannuation or salary tax cut for older workers. Importantly, if the latter option is 
chosen, such a policy would have to be formulated correctly to have the desired 
effect. Specifically, such a policy would have to be implemented in a manner that has 
substantive differences to the Mature Age Worker Tax Offset. The Mature Age 
Worker Tax Offset is a means tested rebate that applies to workers who are at least 55 
years of age and gives them a rebate of up to $500 a year.52 However, this offset is 
now being phased out, and, as of 1 July 2012, is only potentially available to 
taxpayers born on or before 30 June 1957. 53  Although the 2012 Budget and the 
relevant Explanatory Memorandum did not state the precise reason for its gradual 
withdrawal,54 the 2010 Henry Review did recommend its abolition on the basis that it 
was uncertain whether it increased participation rates, and that higher tax-free 
thresholds for all are a superior method of encouraging workforce participation.55 
Relevant interest groups have stated that when in force, it provided almost no 
                                                                    
51  To the extent a worker is nearing retirement, if they feel their retirement savings are 
insufficient, extra salary income is more likely to find its way to their retirement savings, 
whether this be through extra superannuation contributions or savings outside of 
superannuation. Conversely, for a worker that is close to retirement who feels that their 
retirement savings are roughly adequate, an increase in the net amount added to their 
retirement savings is more likely to lead to less voluntary contributions to their 
retirement savings or less paying off of personal debt. 
52  ITAA subdiv 61-K. 
53  ITAA s 61-560. 
54  Paragraph 2.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum of Laws Amendment (2012 Measures 
No. 5) Bill 2012 describes this as a ‘high cost’ method of keeping mature workers in the 
workforce though does not elaborate on this comment. Australian Government, Budget 
2012–13: Budget Paper No. 2 (2012) 37 <http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/ bp2/ 
download/bp2_consolidated.pdf> at 10 December 2012 also does not explain why it was 
abolished, though does state the saved funds will be redirected to other programs aimed 
at assisting mature workers. 
55  Australia’s Future Tax System, above n 46, 35, 87. 
13
Hanegbi: The Transition to Retirement Provisions
Published by ePublications@bond, 2013
incentive for mature workers to stay in the workforce.56 Specifically, these groups 
expressed the belief that its ineffectiveness was a result of its relatively small size, 
together with the fact that it was paid in the form of a rebate that was only claimable 
at the end of a financial year.57 Subsequently, any income tax concessions aimed at 
increasing mature worker participation should result in them receiving a larger 
regular take home pay, and should be of sufficient size to give them a material extra 
work incentive. 
TTR Provisions To Allow Older Workers to Build up Their Superannuation 
Opportunities for mature workers to build up their superannuation balances are 
typically limited due to their proximity to retirement. Consequently, it has been 
argued that the availability of the TTR provisions to full-time workers is a taxpayer-
funded way of assisting them to build up their superannuation balances.58  This 
argument is bolstered by the fact that compulsory superannuation only began in 
1992, with an initial compulsory contributions rate set at a modest 3%, meaning that 
older workers have had limited opportunities to benefit from a mature 
superannuation system than younger cohorts of workers.59  
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether government policy 
should encourage higher superannuation balances amongst mature workers,60 if it is 
assumed that this is a desirable outcome, there are preferable policy options to 
achieve this goal as compared to allowing the TTR provisions to be used by full-time 
workers. A major negative of allowing the TTR provisions to be used for encouraging 
higher superannuation balances arises from the fact that, as discussed earlier in this 
paper, the provisions are, generally, more likely to be used by those who have larger 
superannuation balances to begin with. Consequently, full-time mature workers who 
                                                                    
56  Australian Law Reform Commission, Age Barriers to Work — Discussion Paper (2012) 155 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/whole_78_0.pdf> at 9 
August 2013. 
57  Ibid. 
58  See Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, AIST Submission, ALRC – Grey Areas 
– Age Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws (2012) 8 <http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 
sites/default/files/pdfs/47._australian_institute_of_superannuation_trusteesalrc_grey_are
as_barrier_to_work_jun_2012_final.pdf> at 14 January 2013. 
59  For a history of the superannuation system, see APRA, A Recent History of Superannuation 
in Australia (2007) <http://www.apra.gov.au/Insight/documents/History-of-
superannuation.pdf> at 10 December 2012. 
60  Although all things constant, higher superannuation balances are advantageous, policies 
that encourage higher balances will invariably have some down sides, such as a net loss 
of government revenue. 
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benefit from an increase in their superannuation balances through using the TTR 
provisions are, in many cases, those who least require it. In comparison, 
implementing the abovementioned policy of comparatively lower tax on 
superannuation for all mature workers would be a preferable policy approach, as it 
would encourage higher superannuation balances in a more widespread and 
equitable manner. Such a policy would be more likely to moderate the perception 
held by many workers of a lower socio-economic status that they have been unfairly 
treated due to the comparatively recent maturity of the superannuation system.61 
While such a policy would be utilised by more workers and so have a higher fiscal 
cost, if it is assumed that use of the TTR provisions by full time workers brings a net 
benefit per worker that attains a higher superannuation balance, then the overall 
result from a more widely available mature worker superannuation tax concession 
would be of a larger net benefit.  
However, an even more preferable way of encouraging higher mature worker 
superannuation balances is by increasing the concessional contribution caps for such 
workers. Prior to 1 July 2012, the concessional contribution cap was $50,000 for 
taxpayers of at least 50 years of age, and $25,000 for younger taxpayers, but, from 1 
July 2012, it was set at $25,000 for all eligible age groups. 62  It was originally 
government policy that, from 1 July 2012, the higher $50,000 cap for taxpayers of at 
least 50 years of age would continue, subject to the new condition of their having a 
superannuation account balance of less than $500,000.63 However, the government 
later announced that this policy would be deferred until 1 July 2014 and that from 1 
July 2012 till then the $25,000 cap would apply to all age groups.64 The government 
then once again changed its mind by announcing that from 1 July 2013, there would 
be an increased cap of $35,000 for those at least 60 years of age, and that the $35,000 
                                                                    
61  Quine S, Bernard D and Kendig H, ‘Understanding Baby Boomers’ Expectations and 
Plans for their Retirement: Findings from a Qualitative Study’ (2006) 25(3) Australasian 
Journal on Ageing 145, 148. 
62  ITAA subdiv 292-B, repealed by Tax Laws Amendment (Fairer Taxation of Excess 
Concessional Contributions) Act 2013. 
63  Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet: Superannuation – Concessional Contributions Caps 
(2011) 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=FactSheets/concessional_contri
butions_caps.htm > at 10 December 2012. 
64  Australian Government, Budget 2012–13: Budget Paper No. 2 (2012) 40 
<http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/bp2/download/bp2_consolidated.pdf> at 10 
December 2012. 
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cap would, from 1 July 2014, also apply to those who are at least 50 years old.65 
Although the announcement did not explicitly refer to the previous plan to increase 
the cap to $50,000, it was clear that the increase to $35,000 was in substitute of this 
previous proposal.66 Furthermore, it was announced that this new higher cap was not 
to be subject to taxpayers having a superannuation balance of less than $500,000, as 
the government was persuaded by feedback from the superannuation industry that 
such a requirement would be difficult to administer.67 This new policy has now been 
legislated.68  
As the current cohort of mature workers have substantially smaller median 
superannuation balances when compared to the projected balances of future 
generations of such workers,69 further increasing the concessional contributions cap 
for mature workers beyond $35,000 would give them an increased opportunity to 
play catch-up and make higher superannuation contributions. Objections against 
higher caps for older workers are generally based on them being disproportionately 
used by higher income earners.70 However, their eligibility being dependent on a 
maximum superannuation balance would, to some extent, alleviate such concerns. 
And while giving superannuation funds the responsibility of limiting a higher cap to 
taxpayers that have a superannuation balance below a certain size would likely cause 
them administrative difficulties, this problem could be avoided if the onus of 
complying with such a test was instead placed on the individual taxpayer. The 
argument that the responsibility of complying with such a test should lie with the 
individual is strengthened by the fact that as of 1 July 2013, taxpayers that mistakenly 
breach the concessional contribution cap for any reason are not subject to a harsh 
penalty, but rather allowed to be put in the same position as if they had not made 
excessive contributions.71  
An increased concessional contribution cap for mature workers would certainly be a 
fairer and more targeted way of encouraging higher balances than approaches that 
directly or indirectly grant mature workers a lower tax rate than the rest of the 
                                                                    
65  Bill Shorten, Reforms to Make the Superannuation System Fairer 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2013/020.htm&pag
eID=003&min=brs&Year=&DocType> at 8 August 2013. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 s 291-20. 
69  Australian Government, Budget 2012–13: Budget Paper No. 1, Statement 4 (2012) 4-8. 
<http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/bp1/download/bp1.pdf> at 10 August 2013.  
70  Ibid 178-9. 
71  ITAA subdiv 291-B, Taxation Administration Act 1953 sch 1subdiv 96-A and Superannuation 
(Excess Concessional Contributions Charge) Act 2013. 
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population. Specifically, while increasing the concessional contribution cap, which is 
there for the purpose of limiting superannuation being used for the purpose of tax-
minimisation scheme,72 would have some fiscal cost, a higher contribution cap would 
have a lower fiscal cost for a given increase in superannuation balances compared to 
policies that directly or effectively lower tax on mature workers’ superannuation. 
This is because a lower mature worker superannuation tax rate results in much of the 
burden of the higher balance being left to the taxpaying public, whereas a higher 
concessional cap would distribute the burden more equally between the taxpaying 
community and the mature worker. Further, it would share the tax burden in a 
manner that resembles what would have occurred had the older workers spent a 
greater part of their working lives under a mature superannuation system. 
SHOULD THE TTR PROVISIONS BE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY PART-
TIME WORKERS? 
While the case for the TTR provisions to be available for full-time workers lacks force, 
it is worthwhile considering whether the provisions should be usable by part-time 
mature workers. As discussed, such use would be consistent with their original 
intention of enabling more workers to transition to retirement through working part-
time and using their superannuation to top up their lower incomes. 
There is international evidence that a sizeable proportion of workers would 
appreciate the opportunity to work part-time prior to entering full retirement.73 There 
are several advantages to workers transitioning to retirement. From society’s point of 
view there will be economic gains to the extent that the working lives of a material 
number of workers are increased due to the availability to transition to retirement. It 
has been argued that this is particularly important in the context of an ageing 
population.74 Further, to the extent that workers are extending their working lives 
and utilising the TTR provisions, they will individually benefit by having more 
money in retirement. This is because although a part-time worker utilising a TTR 
                                                                    
72  ALRC, Age Barriers to Work — Discussion Paper, above n 56, 177. 
73  AARP, Profit from Experience Perspectives of Employers, Workers and Policymakers in the G7 
Countries on Demographic Realities (2007) 74 
<http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/intl_older_worker.pdf> at 12 December 2012 shows 
the findings of an international on-line survey, where a substantial percentage of workers 
expressed their preference to work part-time for their current or other employer as a way 
of transitioning to retirement. 
74  Commonwealth of Australia, Intergenerational Report 2010 (2010) 26-30, 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/igr/igr2010/report/pdf/IGR_2010.pdf> at 12 December 
2012. 
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arrangement would deplete their superannuation balance, they would not do so to 
the extent of someone in full retirement, since they are still earning a salary, and also 
because they are mandated to have their superannuation benefits paid in the form of 
an income stream. It has also been argued that the advantages of a staggered 
transition to retirement go beyond the purely financial. Specifically, it has been 
claimed that going part-time before ceasing work helps people avoid the emotional 
and life-style shock that potentially occurs when abruptly changing from full-time 
work to retirement.75 This is related to the Atchely step-based model of retirement, a 
model that has some evidentiary support.76 Under this model, retirement begins with 
the honeymoon stage, followed by disappointment in the disenchantment stage, then 
followed by adaptation to retirement in the reorientation stage, which then leads to 
the stability stage, where people have adjusted to their retirement, lastly followed by 
declining health leading to loss of independence, which is known as the termination 
stage.77 In theory, a staggered retirement might help abate the unpleasantness of 
transitioning through some of these stages. Research has shown that there is some 
merit in this view, with a finding that health is positively correlated with a 
transitional as opposed to a sudden retirement. 78  However, the same research 
indicated that transitional retirement did not directly affect other measures of well-
being, those measures being changes in life satisfaction, marital cohesion and self-
image.79 Importantly this research did also find that control over the manner in which 
someone retires does affect his or her retirement well-being. 80  In summary, a 
transitional retirement is associated with positive health outcomes, and the ability to 
choose how one transitions to retirement is associated with a broader range of 
measures of well-being. On a related note, there is separate research indicating that 
                                                                    
75  NSW Ministerial Advisory Committee on Ageing, Work and Older People Roundtable 
Discussion Report (2009) 7 
<http://www.nsw.ipaa.org.au/content/docs/Work%20and%20Older%20People%20Report
_Low%20res.pdf> at 7 December 2012. 
76  Reitzes DC and Mutran EJ, ‘The Transition to Retirement: Stages and Factors that 
Influence Retirement Adjustment’ (2004) 59(1) International Journal of Aging and Human 
Development 63. 
77  Ibid 65.  
78  De Vaus D, Wells Y, Kendig H and Quine S, ‘Does Gradual Retirement Have Better 
Outcomes Than Abrupt Retirement? Results from an Australian Panel Study’ (2007) 27(5) 
Ageing and Society 667. 
79  Ibid 674. Although those who had retired gradually had shown less satisfaction with 
their retirement than those who had retired abruptly, this effect did not persist for long. 
80  Ibid 675. 
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part-time older workers enjoyed their work substantially more than full-time older 
workers.81  
In reality, however, there are limits to the benefits provided through the availability 
of the TTR provisions by mature part-time workers. First, it would appear that the 
opportunity for workers to work part-time for the latter part of their working lives is 
scarcer than would ideally be the case.82 However, this in itself should not preclude 
the use of the provisions by those who do have such an opportunity. Secondly, to the 
extent that workers are able to transition by going part-time, there is some equivocal 
evidence that this is more likely to turn their full-time work to part-time work rather 
than extend their working lives.83 To the extent that this is true, this means that the 
TTR provisions, by enabling mature workers to work part-time, actually decrease the 
total number of hours worked by older workers, meaning that their net economic 
effect would be negative. On the other hand, this in itself does not lead to the 
conclusion that the provisions should be unavailable for mature part-time workers, 
given the non-financial benefits that being able to choose to transition to retirement 
can bring. 
Overall, while it is unclear as to what extent, if any, the TTR provisions being 
available to mature part-time workers influences participation rates, there is a strong 
case for their availability for such workers, given the positive impact that the ability 
to transition to retirement can have on their well-being. Further, use of the TTR 
provisions for such workers is justified as being consistent with the aims of the 
superannuation regime, as one of the major aims of retirement saving regimes, such 
as superannuation, is to smooth one’s income over one’s lifetime.84 It follows that the 
ability of a mature worker to dip into their superannuation upon reaching a stage in 
life where they wish to work less is consistent with such aims. 
REFORM SUGGESTIONS 
There are convincing reasons why the TTR provisions should not be available for 
full-time mature workers. In contrast, there is good reason to allow part-time mature 
                                                                    
81  Quine et al., above n 61, 147. 
82  Advisory Committee on Ageing, above n 75, 25. 
83  Walter et al., above n 42, 300. Headey et al., above n 34, 84 discusses findings indicating 
that the TTR provisions have not increased mature worker participation, though as 
discussed earlier, this research is subject to significant limitations.  
84  Holzmann R, Hinz RP and Dorfman M, Pension Systems and Reform Conceptual Framework 
(2008) 7 World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0824 < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Pensions-DP/0824.pdf > at 28 December 2012. 
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workers to utilise them. Consequently, there is a strong argument for policy reform 
that limits their use. In addition, the alternative policies discussed in this paper 
should be given consideration if the government wishes to increase mature worker 
participation through tax incentives and if it wants to encourage higher 
superannuation balances for mature workers. 
One way for the government to stop the TTR provisions being used in a manner that 
is contrary to their original intention would be to start attacking use of the TTR 
provisions by full-time workers under Part IVA, the general anti-avoidance provision 
of the income tax legislation.85 However, given that the government has announced 
that it will not utilise Part IVA in such a way,86 such an about face in policy would 
require clear communication and ample time for taxpayers to change their current 
arrangements. Additionally, given the vagueness of Part IVA, and the fact that it is 
ultimately up to the courts if and when it applies, there is no guarantee that it would 
be effective in stopping use of the TTR provisions by full-time workers. 
On the other hand, suitable legislative amendments could restrict the availability of 
the TTR provisions to part-time workers. Such amendments could achieve this end in 
a more certain and consistent manner compared to the attempted use of the Part IVA 
provisions. 
The most obvious form for such legislative amendments would be to make the use of 
TTR provisions subject to a work test so that only taxpayers who are working part-
time can use them. As discussed, this option was initially floated when the TTR 
provisions were being implemented but was eventually rejected. One of the reasons 
for the rejection was due to a view that such a test would place an unfair compliance 
burden on superannuation income stream providers. 87  However, in reality, the 
legislative provisions introducing a TTR work test could place the burden of 
compliance on the mature workers seeking to use the TTR provisions. This is 
consistent with the self-assessment nature of much of the Australian income tax 
regime. Furthermore, in the field of superannuation, the burden of compliance of 
some of the existing relevant tests falls with the taxpayer. For instance, it is up to 
taxpayers to ensure that they have not breached their contribution caps.88 It could, 
                                                                    
85  Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Part IVA. 
86  ATO, Guidance on transition to retirement pensions, Media Release Nat – 2005/66 (2005). 
87  Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument 2005 No. 56, Retirement Savings 
Accounts Act 1997, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, 6. 
88  ITAA subdiv291-B, 292-C and Superannuation (Excess Concessional Contributions Charge) 
Act 2013. Admittedly, there is a difference regarding the Australian Taxation Office 
finding out about breaches of the contributions caps and breaches of a work test of this 
nature, given that it would be easier to obtain information regarding contribution 
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however, be argued that in practice, the burden of compliance with any TTR work 
test should rest with the superannuation funds, because they are concerned with the 
release of superannuation money, a very important responsibility whose non-
compliance could betray the goals of the superannuation system. However, 
legislative penalties aside, the negative consequences of the release of funds through 
improper use of the TTR provisions are of a limited nature because the amount of 
funds being withdrawn is subject to an annual cap of 10% of the fund’s balance.89 
Another of the justifications for not making the TTR provisions dependent on a work 
test was that it would be unfair on workers who wish to legitimately use the TTR 
provisions through taking on work activities that have less responsibility and pay, 
rather than through lower hours.90 While, in theory, a work test would preclude such 
taxpayers from using the TTR provisions, the evidence indicates that seeking to use 
the TTR provisions in such a manner is uncommon.91 Consequently, while the TTR 
provisions being subject to a part-time work test could lead to a small number of 
mature workers who would like to continue to work full-time in a lower-paid role 
being unable to do so, the rare instances where this potentially occurs are 
outweighed by the substantial policy justifications of having such a work test. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the TTR provisions by full-time workers to reduce tax is inconsistent with 
their original intention. While it is claimed that such use of these provisions is 
justified because they assist the fulfilment of certain policy goals, it is unclear 
whether they fulfil such goals in a meaningful way. Further, there are alternative 
policies that are more suitable in fulfilling these goals. Specifically, to the extent that 
policy makers wish to attempt to increase participation rates through a tax break for 
mature workers, consideration should be given to lowering the tax rate applicable to 
the superannuation or wages of such workers. Further, if higher mature worker 
superannuation balances are seen as desirable, then thought should be given to 
increasing the concessional contribution cap of mature workers. Clearly, the potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
amounts from superannuation funds as compared to information regarding working 
hours from employers.  
89  Reg 6.01(2) and Sch 1 to the Sis Regs. 
90  Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument 2005 No. 56, Retirement Savings 
Accounts Act 1997, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, 5. 
91  AARP, above n 73, 74 shows that, internationally, a much greater proportion of mature 
workers intend to work part-time as a transition to retirement then continue in a different 
full-time role. 
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positive outcomes of these policies need to be balanced against their fiscal cost, 
though this cost could be abated by means testing their availability.   
In contrast, there is good policy reason to allow the TTR provisions to be used by 
mature part-time workers who need access to their superannuation funds for day-to-
day living costs. This is the case even if allowing such a use does not increase 
participation rates. Consequently, serious consideration should be given to enacting 
legislation that makes the TTR provisions subject to a work test so that their use is 
restricted to part-time workers. Such a test would help ensure that taxpayers that use 
these provisions are from a policy perspective justified in doing so.  
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Article 2 includes some limited discussion of the issue of longevity insurance in 
retirement. This article discusses the issue of life annuities in detail. These, by their 
nature, provide longevity insurance. Purchasers of life annuities are entitled to regular 
payments for life, meaning that retirees who use at least part of their retirement savings 
to buy a life annuity will have an income stream free from investment and longevity risk. 
The article suggests policy responses to increase the popularity of life annuities. 
The significance of this paper lies in the fact that there is a lack of international research 
examining, in practical terms, ways to increase the uptake of life annuities. This is 
surprising, for two related reasons. First, life annuities can provide retirees with an 
income stream that is free of investment and longevity risk, and in some cases inflation 
risk as well. This potentially provides retirees with a sense of security at a time in their 
lives when their labour earnings potential is often limited. Second, as discussed in this 
paper, annuitisation rates are very low in most jurisdictions, and so a large number of 
people do not benefit from the security offered by such annuities. Although there has 
been international research examining various reasons for low annuitisation rates, for the 
most part, each of the pieces of research focuses on a limited number of reasons for 
those rates. On the other hand, Article 4 holistically looks at such research and 
consequently discusses many of the reasons for low annuitisation rates, examines the 
characteristics of markets with high annuitisation rates, and makes recommendations on 
policies that aim to non-coercively increase annuitisation rates for mainstream markets.  
The other significant feature of this article is that domestically, there is very limited 
research relating to policy recommendations for the retirement phase of superannuation. 
Unlike the superannuation accumulations phase, this phase is still undeveloped as a policy 
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area. Since the publication of Article 4, the Financial System Inquiry Report (the relevant 
portions of which are discussed in this chapter) has contributed some policy analysis for 
the retirement phase of superannuation. However, given its broad coverage of a wide 
number of issues extending beyond retirement and superannuation, its discussion of this 
particular topic is of limited breadth. 
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Part II of Article 4 gives a background to the history and operation of life annuities. It 
also discussed the ‘annuity puzzle’ – the worldwide phenomenon of low annuity rates, 
despite their inherent usefulness. Part III then examines the available research to 
ascertain the reasons why annuitisation rates are generally very low. The article divides 
the operative factors into those which could be abated or eliminated by policy responses, 
and those which are an inherent feature of annuities, and thus in essence unchangeable. 
Part IV of Article 4 then takes the next step of examining the few non-compulsory 
annuity markets with high annuitisation rates, and ascertains the salient characteristics 
that distinguished these high-annuity markets from others. These factors are discussed in 
the context of the ‘changeable’ factors, determined in Part III of the article, that cause 
annuities to be unpopular in most market. 
Part V, utilising the information in Part IV, proposes policies that would in effect mimic 
the relevant attributes of high-annuity markets. Specifically, it argues that retirees should 
be able to purchase annuities directly from their retirement plans, that there should be a 
comprehensive guarantee for annuity payments, and that annuity entitlements should be 
included in retirement plan benefit statements. It also discusses other policies, including 
tax incentives or subsidies on annuities, which might in some situations play a limited 
policy role. It argues that policy innovations such as these are preferable to mandating the 
purchase of annuities in some compulsory system. This is because such a mandatory 
approach will be to the detriment of some people, and upon the available evidence the 
benefits do not justify abrogating people’s freedom of choice. The article also discusses, 
as an alternative, establishing annuitisation as the default choice for retirees; ultimately it 
concludes against this course as well, since it is effectively a milder form of compulsion 
 31
due to it relying on people’s inertia, and so carries some of the disadvantages of 
mandatory annuitisation. This part of the article concludes with a discussion of ways in 
which appropriate marketing and innovation strategies for different life annuity products 
could supplement annuity-maximising policies and further improve annuitisation rates. 
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Although Article 4 was published in a US journal, the overwhelming majority of the 
analysis is applicable to other jurisdictions with voluntary annuity markets, including 
Australia. While the part of the article recommending policy changes did in some parts 
specifically address US law, these suggestions are relevant and transferrable to Australia. 
The specific policy suggestions made, and the ways in which they could be applied in 
Australia, as well as any relevant Australian developments, are described below. 
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Part V.A of Article 4 suggests that American Defined Contribution plans be encouraged 
or mandated to offer life annuities. As explained in Part IV.B.2, one of the characteristics 
of ‘high annuity’ markets is that retirees commonly purchase their annuities from their 
retirement funds. The article argues that this encourages higher annuitisation rates, firstly 
because people are more likely to engage with parties with whom they have had long-
term positive dealings, and also because people are more likely to view annuities 
purchased from their retirement fund as a collective agreement between themselves and 
other ex-workers, rather than a bet with an insurance company; consequently, they are 
more likely to see annuitisation as a ‘win–win’ outcome. 
In Australia, the equivalent approach would be for superannuation funds to offer life 
annuities to their members. This is consistent with the reasoning that people prefer to 
contract with they have long-term positive dealings with. Further, if the superannuation 
funds are industry funds, given their non-profit nature,/42 it is logical to think that people 
 
164 HWL Hebsworth Lawyers, Rules of the Industry Funds Forum (21 July 2011) Industry Funds 
Forum, Rule 3.1 
<http://www.industryfunds.org.au/Files/Uploads/File/About/RULES%20(21%20July
%202011).pdf>. 
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would be more likely to see an annuity issued by them as a collective agreement between 
former workers and themselves, rather than an unfair bet with a profit-making 
organisation. 
This part of article makes the point that to facilitate US annuities being widely offered by 
Defined Contribution plans, policy should first be aimed at removing some of the 
legislative barriers to those funds offering annuities. To adapt this to the local context, it 
is important to consider what legislative changes would be required in Australia to 
facilitate superannuation funds extensively offering life annuities. 
Currently, Australian prudential regulations allow only life insurance companies to 
directly offer life annuities./43 However, this in itself should not prevent superannuation 
funds from selling life annuities to their members. Part V.A of Article 4 suggests that 
American Defined Contribution funds purchase group life annuities and offer them to 
their members. Australian superannuation funds could undertake similar action, and 
using their bargaining power, do their best to purchase annuities as cheaply as possible 
from life insurance companies. Furthermore, some superannuation funds directly and 
legally offer instruments which, while similar to life annuities, technically fall short of 
being life annuities and so can be directly offered by bodies other than life insurance 
companies.166 For instance, UniSuper, the superannuation fund for employees of tertiary 
institutions, offers a ‘Commercial Rate Indexed Pension’, which offers a regular income 
stream for life, indexed to inflation./45 However, the Product Disclosure Statement 
makes it clear that there is a risk that there will be inadequate investment returns, 
meaning that the instrument holders might not receive what they have expected./46 
Further, it is plausible that in the future superannuation funds could offer other annuity-
like instruments, such as pooled annuities, where unlike life annuities, the holders of the 
 
165 Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) ss 9, 17, 20, 21. 
166  Ibid. 
167 Unisuper, Your Guide to Pensions Commercial Rate Indexed Pension (21 December 2012) 
Unisuper 
<http://www.unisuper.com.au/~/media/Files/Forms%20and%20Downloads/PDS%20
documents/Pension/UNIS0000109-Your-guide-to-pensions-Commercial-Rate-Indexed-
Pension-PDS.pdf>. 
168 Ibid 15. 
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instruments do bear some systematic longevity risk./47 Specifically, pooled annuities, as 
their name suggests, involves the pooling of funds by participants, with the survivors at 
any point in time receiving a regular income stream.170 
It should be noted that pooled annuities in particular have certain characteristics that 
theoretically make them more attractive than regular life annuities to some people. As 
discussed, people are much more likely to annuitise if they see this as a mutual collective 
agreement with their ex-workers rather than an unfair bet with an insurance company. 
Furthermore, as people are more likely to trust those with whom they have something in 
common,/5/ it should psychologically be easier for people to enter into a pooled annuity 
than a traditional life annuity. Pooled annuities can also lead to comparatively higher 
incomes given their lower costs.172 
However, annuity-type instruments such as these do not benefit from the advantageous 
tax treatment of life annuities, as they do not fall under the definition as a 
‘superannuation income stream’./51 Consequently, instruments such as pooled annuities 
do not benefit from tax-free earnings./52 Widening the legislated definition of 
‘superannuation income stream’ to allow such instruments to fall under it would likely 
increase the popularity of annuity-like instruments offered by superannuation funds.175 
 
169 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of Retirement Income Stream Regulation (21 July 
2014) Treasury, 12 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Co
nsultations/2014/Review%20of%20retirement%20income%20stream%20regulation/Key
%20Documents/PDF/Dicussion-paper.ashx>. 
170  Murray, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, above n 36, 4-27. 
171 Shaun P Hargreaves Heap and Daniel John Zizzo, ‘The Value of Groups’ (2009) 99 
American Economic Review, 295, 295–6. 
172  Murray, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, above n 36, 4-27.  
173 Income Tax Assessment Regulations 1997 (Cth) reg 995-1.01. 
174 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Review of Retirement Income Stream Regulation‘, above n 
169, 12. 
175  Murray, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, above n 36, 4-28. 
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Part V.A of Article 4 also makes the point that one of the legislative barriers preventing 
Defined Contribution funds widely offering life annuities is the existence of the US 
‘Required Minimum Distribution’ rules. Specifically, these rules require legislative 
modification to help facilitate the ability of Defined Contribution plans to offer deferred 
life annuities in a manner that would not be unfairly taxed. In Australia, a similar issue 
presents itself regarding the minimum drawdown rules in the superannuation 
regulations./54 These minimum drawdown rules exist to curtail the extent to which 
superannuation can be used as an estate planning tool by requiring that assets supporting 
an income stream have minimum annual withdrawals./55 However, these same rules 
prevent deferred life annuities from benefitting from the tax-free earnings status from 
which other superannuation income streams benefit. This is because deferred annuities, 
by their nature, cannot comply with the requirements of annual withdrawals for their 
deferment period. While these current laws do not make purchasing a deferred annuity 
impossible, it does mean that they are comparatively highly taxed as compared with 
account based pensions or complying immediate annuities. Consequently, to encourage 
deferred life annuities, there is a solid argument that they should not suffer from a 
comparatively higher tax burden than other superannuation retirement income streams. 
Further, there is no policy reason that they should not be given the same tax benefit as 
other retirement income streams, given that deferred life annuities generate money 
intended for retirement income; they are not an attempt to hoard capital for estate 
planning purposes. A recent government discussion paper has raised the issue of bringing 
deferred life annuities under the tax-free earnings umbrella of other superannuation 
retirement income streams./56 Although the previous ALP government promised that it 
would implement such changes,/57 the current government said it would not 
automatically implement the proposals but would rather consider the process as part of a 
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broader review of retirement income streams./6. To make these changes to legislation 
would be a very useful step in making deferred life annuities more available. The inherent 
attractiveness of deferred life annuities is discussed in Part V.H of Article 4. 
The recent interim Financial Systems Inquiry report discussed the point that that the lack 
of income tax exemption on earnings on deferred life annuities (and pooled annuities) is 
a disincentive as to the market development./6/ Subsequently, the final report to this 
inquiry recommended that the law be changed so that these instruments could benefit 
from the earnings tax exemption./60 
This part of the article also makes the point that policies that enable funds to offer 
various types of annuities, and for retirees to purchase them in a manner which is not 
comparatively disadvantageous from a tax point of view is necessary but not sufficient 
for increasing annuity uptake. Consequently, it is also desirable that there be policy that 
encourages or mandates such funds to offer annuities or annuity-type products. Such a 
policy should be aimed at making annuities a genuinely attractive option, rather than 
having funds reluctantly offer annuities that might perceived as a suboptimal offering. 
The US-related comments made in Article 4 concerning the advantages and 
disadvantages of mandating that such funds offer annuities, as opposed to implementing 
policies that encourage them to offer annuities, are equally applicable regarding 
Australian superannuation funds offering annuities. In Australia, such policies would 
ideally apply not only to annuities that are strictly speaking life annuities, but also to 
similar products such as pooled annuities. 
  "! 
Part V.B of Article 4 suggests that annuitisation be framed as an attractive option by 
having Defined Contribution statements state what the member is entitled to in terms of 
annuity income. It argues that if incentives are given for American retirement plans to 
attain certain annuitisation rates (a policy option originally raised in Part V.A of the 
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article), then it would be in their interests for their statements to detail annuity 
entitlements. On the other hand, if such funds are not given such an incentive, then 
mandating that member statements specify the annuity entitlement could be justified in 
the name of full disclosure, which would assist in raising annuitisation rates. The same 
policy could be applied in Australia. Superannuation balance statements could not only 
contain a member’s lump sum balance, but could state what they would be entitled to if 
they annuitised their money upon retirement. If incentives for superannuation funds to 
achieve certain annuitisation rates were put in place, then at face value this would 
motivate such funds to add such information to benefit statements. On the other hand, if 
such direct incentives were not put in place, then there would be a case for mandating 
superannuation funds to disclose the annuitised equivalent in benefit statements. The 
recent final report of the Financial System Inquiry recommended that superannuation 
funds be mandated to state members’ projected income stream on their statements./61 
However, as the report’s disclosure recommendation was in the context of partial 
annuitisation,/62 a logical interpretation is that it intended that such income stream 
statements would be based on the assumption of partial annuitisation and partially taking 
the income stream as a phased withdrawal product. In support of such an approach, a 
statement describing annuitised benefits under the assumption of partial annutisation is 
more likely to mirror real-life choices, given that, as described in in Part III.A.3 of Article 
4, partial rather than full annuitisation is a realistic option for many. On the other hand, 
research indicating the positive impact of benefit statements disclosing the retiree’s 
hypothetical annuitised entitlements is based on such benefit statements expressing the 
effect of full annuitisation./63 Logically, disclosure based on partial annuitisation should 
have a similar effect on annuitisation rates as compared to a disclosure of the full 
annuitisation equivalent, though there is a possibility that this might not be the real world 
case. It is also logical that it would be more likely to encourage partial rather than full 
annuitisation. Given that, as pointed out in Part III.A.3 of Article 4, many people have a 
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bequest motive, resulting in partial rather than full annuitisation being more appropriate 
for them, there is merit in the Financial System Inquiry’s recommendation.  
The Australian government, in its official response to the Financial System Inquiry, has 
accepted the inquiry’s recommendation on this issue, and stated that member statements 
should state retirement income projections, as long as it is practicable and cost-effective 
to do so./64 However, it did not specifically clear up any ambiguity regarding whether 
such disclosures should be based on the assumption of full or partial annuitisation./65  
#!"! 
The suggestion in Part V.C of Article 4 to provide a government guarantee is also 
applicable to Australia. However, the article addresses the fact that in the USA, there are 
already limited state government guarantees, and it recommends that the US Federal 
Government introduce an over-arching guarantee fund up to an amount of $500,000. In 
Australia, there are no state guarantees, or any pre-existing guarantees for life annuities. 
This is notwithstanding that life annuities, as issued by life insurance companies, have 
strict prudential requirements./66 Consequently, the equivalent Australian 
recommendation would be for the Commonwealth government to introduce a guarantee 
for life annuities, in a similar fashion to its current guarantee of bank deposits under the 
Financial Claims Scheme./67  
%!#  "  
The suggestion in Part V.D of Article 4 that the use of tax incentives or subsidies should 
not be a first-line policy for increasing annuitisation in the USA is equally applicable to 
Australia. This is no way conflicts with the fact that, as discussed above, there is a strong 
argument for making deferred life annuities and other annuity-like instruments subject to 
the same tax concessions as immediate life annuities and other superannuation retirement 
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income streams. Furthermore, as pointed out in this part of Article 4, if implementing the 
abovementioned policies proves insufficient to create a virtuous cycle leading to 
materially increased annuitisation rates, then there is a stronger argument for the 
government to step in and offer a tax subsidy for life annuities. In Australia, alternatively, 
such an incentive could be in the form of a partial exemption from age pension means 
testing. Previously, life annuities were given a full exemption for the age pension asset 
test; in 2004 this was reduced to a 50 per cent exemption, and then in 2007 the 
exemption was fully removed./7. While annutisation levels were low before these 
changes, they fell substantially after each reduction,/7/ suggesting that such measures can 
have a material effect on annuity demand. The final report of the Financial System 
Inquiry considered whether tax and other policy incentives (such as favourable age 
pension means test treatment) should be used to encourage annuitisation./70 However, 
the report did not give its recommendation for such a policy, and noted that while the 
policy would increase annuitisation, there would be a fiscal cost to taxpayers./71 

!& "  !" 
Parts V.E and V.F of Article 4 considers either mandating life annuities or using ‘soft 
compulsion’ to increase annuitisation levels. As explained in Part V.F, soft compulsion is 
a reference to techniques such as setting annuitisation as the default option for retirement 
funds. At one level soft compulsion does leave the choice up to the retiree, but at another 
level it uses behavioural biases to influence the retiree to act in a certain manner. Article 4 
concludes that mandating annuities or using soft compulsion is not justified, because the 
loss of freedom is not balanced by the benefits. This is in general just as true for Australia 
as it is for the USA. However, one marked difference between the jurisdictions is that in 
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Australia, the age pension is means tested against most forms of income, whereas in the 
USA, Social Security benefits, which are funded by ongoing Social Security taxes, are in 
general not tested against investment income./72 Logically, this is likely due to the USA 
Social Security regime being one where people ‘earn’ their eligibility by paying sufficient 
Social Security taxes.195And while the USA has a Supplemental Security Income program 
that is means tested against all income and benefits those that are ineligible for Social 
Security due to not having made adequate Social Security contributions, this scheme is 
generally inapplicable to most retirees.196  
Consequently, there might appear to be a slightly stronger argument in Australia for 
mandating annuitisation of retirement benefits, given that it would save future 
government spending. And although saving net government spending is not a realistic 
aim of the superannuation system (as mentioned in Part 3.1 of Article 1), this does not 
mean that the cost should within reason be minimised. However, as pointed out in Part 
5.1 of Article 2, the evidence on balance does not indicate that Australians are in the 
aggregate squandering their superannuation. Consequently, the fact that the Australian 
pension is means tested does not justify coercing annuitisation. Further, as also pointed 
out in Part 5.1 of the Article 2, even assuming that income streams should be mandated, 
it does not automatically follow that annuitisation should be made compulsory. Rather 
than mandate annuitisation, an alternative would be to allow people to use phased 
retirement products, though this would need to be accompanied by maximum withdrawal 
regulations. 
The final Financial System Inquiry Report considered whether annutisation should be 
mandatory, but recommended against it, stating that it would remove flexibility and result 
in poor outcomes for some individuals./75 However, it did recommend a form of soft 
compulsion./76 Specifically, it recommended that superannuation fund trustees preselect 
 
194 Jonathan Barry Forman and Gordon Mackenzie, ‘Optimal Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension Systems?’ 
(2013) 66 Tax Lawyer 613, 617-19, 623-24. 
195  Ibid 617-18. 
196  Ibid 619. 
197 Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 39, 126. 
198 Ibid 117. 
 40
a ‘comprehensive income product for retirement’ (CIPR) for each member prior to their 
retirement./77 For instance, this CIPR might have a combination of phased withdrawal 
products and annuities, as well as annuity-like products such as pooled annuities.0.. The 
report argued that this would balance the flexibility of phased withdrawal products and 
the longevity and investment risk protection that annuities and annuity-type products 
have.0./ The annuity and annuity-type products could be immediate, deferred, or a 
combination of the two.0.0 Upon retirement, the members could then either confirm that 
they wished to have their superannuation benefits in a form consistent with their 
preselected CIPR, or in the alternative, could have their benefits taken in another form 
that they choose.0.1 Importantly, retirees would have to make an active choice upon 
retirement when choosing the CIPR, making this a ‘softer’ form of compulsion than 
would otherwise be the case if the CIPR was the default option for a retiree who made 
no election.0.2 Notwithstanding the merits of this recommendation, as discussed in this 
part of the article, the reality is that both the precise importance of the different reasons 
leading to low annuitisation levels, and the amount of annuitisation that is ideal for each 
person, are relative unknowns. This means that even with this recommended softer form 
of compulsion, the loss of freedom is still not justified as against the benefits. The 
Productivity Commission in a 2015 report also expressed reservations against the 
implementation of such a system, stating that there was a lack of evidence that people 
cannot make sound retirement decisions, and that it would be difficult to implement 
given the heterogeneous needs of individual retirees.205 Other local research has also 
independently arrived at a similar conclusion.206 
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The government in its response to the Financial System Inquiry Report stated that it 
agrees to support the development of this regime of preselection of retirement income 
streams.0.5 However, it made it clear that this policy was not ready to be implemented 
into legislation, and that when such a policy is implemented, it will take into account 
future findings of two current government inquiries.0.6 The response also stated that the 
government will continue to attempt to remove barriers to the development of 
retirement income products.0.7 
#!#!& 
Part V.G of Article 4 considers whether issuing government longevity bonds is desirable, 
and concludes that on balance it is not, because it exposes the government to further 
longevity risk when it is already exposed to such risks through health care and social 
security expenditure. As discussed in Part 5.2.1 of Article 2, these risks are also applicable 
to Australia, meaning that the relatively minor benefit of the government issuing such 
bonds is outweighed by the risk of exposing the government to further systematic 
longevity risk.  
!!& "! 
The final suggestion in Part V.H of Article 4 is that the availability of some different 
types of life annuities might increase their popularity. The article explains why deferred 
annuities might be more popular than immediate ones. Specifically, this is first because 
they have a lower loading in dollar terms (meaning that their cost exceeds the expected 
present value of their payments by a smaller amount), and second, certain behavioural 
biases make them appear comparatively more attractive. As discussed above, in Australia, 
as in the USA, there is a strong argument for modifying the tax laws so that earnings 
supporting deferred annuities are tax-free, placing them on an equal footing with most 
other superannuation income streams. This would make such annuities cheaper in net 
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terms, and so would help generate a virtuous cycle of greater annuitisation and less of an 
‘adverse selection’ effect (this virtuous circle is described in Part V.D of Article 4).  
This part of the article also makes the point that annuities that retain some liquidity 
would appeal to a number of people who might otherwise not annuitise their retirement 
savings. 
Since the publication of Article 4, Challenger Limited has expanded its offering of life 
annuities in Australia with some success.0/. Their main product, a Guaranteed Annuity 
(Liquid Lifetime), has characteristics that are consistent with this part of the article’s 
suggestions that annuities with certain traits could prove to be relatively popular. First, 
this product allows the annuity holder to obtain a refund for all or part of the annuity 
purchase price during the first 15 years of the holding.0// The younger the age at which 
the annuity holder purchases the annuity, the larger the refund amount; those who 
purchased such an annuity before age 71 are able to get a full refund.0/0 Similarly, the heir 
of the holder will receive a full or partial refund if the holder dies within the first 15 years 
of holding the annuity.0/1 The refund feature in this life annuity is consistent with the 
suggestions in this part of Article 4 that refundable annuities could partially alleviate 
liquidity concerns. Second, this annuity does utilise certain behavioural biases to make it 
more attractive. Specifically, as mentioned in this part of the article, there is a behavioural 
bias whereby people underweigh large risks and overweigh small risks. The article makes 
the point that this bias makes people overestimate the risk of dying early, and 
underestimate the risk of dying before reaching a very old age. This bias makes the 
Challenger annuity relatively attractive, because the overweighing of the small risk of early 
death and the subsequent loss of the annuity purchase price is less relevant – with this 
type of annuity, there will be at least some refunding of the purchase price if death occurs 
in the first 15 years of holding it. On the other hand, this annuity, like others, still benefits 
from the bias of underestimating the risk of dying before a very late age, which increases 
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the attractiveness of the annuity. Specifically, as explained in this part of Article 4, this 
bias is due to people imagining that there is a reasonable chance they will live to be very 
old and will accordingly receive payments till that point, whereas in reality, the 
overwhelming majority will die beforehand. 
  
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SECURITY IN UNCERTAIN TIMES: POLICIES FOR INCREASING
THE POPULARITY OF LIFE ANNUITIES AMONG RETIREES
Rami Hanegbi
ABSTRACT
Life annuities offer retirees an assured income stream for as long as 
they live. This makes it surprising that they are unpopular in most 
markets where their purchase is not compelled by government policy. 
With the numbers of retirees in the population set to increase 
dramatically, this low take-up rate of life annuities could exacerbate
financial insecurity. Consequently, it is in society’s interest to implement 
non-coercive policies that increase annuitization levels. Although there 
is research that has focused on the possible causes of low annuitization 
rates, much of this research falls short of suggesting comprehensive 
strategies for persuading retirees to annuitize their savings.
This article discusses what mix of policies would increase the 
attractiveness of life annuities. It does this by determining the salient 
characteristics of the few markets where life annuities are popular. It 
then suggests how the correct policy settings could make such 
characteristics a feature of the mainstream annuity market. It also 
discusses other policies, including limited tax incentives or subsidies on 
annuities that might play an important role. It is argued that policy 
innovations such as these are preferable to making the purchase of 
annuities compulsory. This is because the one-size-fits-all approach will 
not be ideal for everyone, and it interferes with freedom of choice, an 
important right in a capitalist society. An alternative is to make annuity
purchases a default choice. But this is effectively compulsion by stealth 
as it relies on inertia and, therefore, carries some of the disadvantages of 
mandatory annuitization. The article concludes with a discussion of how 
the appropriate marketing and innovation of different life annuity 
products could supplement annuity-maximizing policies and further 
improve annuitization rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Each of life’s phases has advantages and disadvantages. Retirement 
gives people an opportunity to enjoy comparatively generous amounts of 
spare time and freedom. On the downside, retirement is typically 
characterized by a restricted ability to increase wealth. Consequently, 
how retirees invest and consume their retirement savings can have a 
major impact on their well-being. The aging of the population means that 
increasing numbers of people will soon face decisions regarding their
retirement savings. Furthermore, such decisions will become 
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increasingly important if the possibility of Social Security benefits 
becoming less generous eventuates.1
An option available to retirees and those facing retirement is to 
convert part or all of their savings into a life annuity. A life annuity is a 
very old instrument,2 which offers a regular income stream to retirees
until death. This provides retirees with a life income that is not 
dependent on the performance of financial markets. Despite the inherent 
security of annuities, in most markets, including the mainstream U.S. 
market, very few retirees choose to annuitize any of their wealth. The 
lack of annuitization in a world of potentially weak investment markets 
and uncertain Social Security entitlements will likely contribute to 
financial insecurity for many retirees.
However, there are some markets where life annuities have a high
take-up rate. This article examines these markets and what we can learn 
from them to improve annuitization rates in the mainstream U.S. market. 
This article also evaluates the suitability of other policies aimed at 
increasing mainstream annuitization levels. Specifically, Section II of the 
article discusses research, which concludes that annuitization rates 
should be high and compares this to the very different present reality. 
The disparity between the two is known as the “annuity puzzle.”3
Section III examines the various reasons for widespread low 
annuitization rates. Some of these reasons are due to inherent 
characteristics of life annuities and the environment that they operate in 
and so have limited scope for change. Other factors leading to low 
annuitization, though, could be mitigated through appropriate policy 
responses. Section IV examines certain markets that are characterized by 
high annuitization rates and discusses which characteristics of those 
markets have led to the high uptake. Section V then makes policy 
1 Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social Security Reform: Does Privatization Still Make 
Sense?, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 192–93 (2013) (discussing how possible 
Social Security cuts are much more likely to affect future generations of retirees 
rather than the present one); SHARON PARROTT ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND 
POL’Y PRIORITIES, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S DEFICIT-REDUCTION PACKAGE AND 
OTHER PROPOSALS IN THE 2014 BUDGET 4–6 (2013), available at
http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CBPP-Pres-Budget-4-11-
13bud.pdf (discussing current proposals to use a lower index for Social Security 
cost-of living adjustments). However the amount of money saved under this 
proposal is small given the large size of the Social Security shortfall described 
in Gokhale, supra, at 174–76.
2 See GEOFFREY POITRAS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS,
1478–1776: FROM COMMERCIAL ARITHMETIC TO LIFE ANNUITIES AND JOINT 
STOCKS 187 (2000); Edwin William Kopf, The Early History of the Annuity, 13 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y 225, 231–37 (1927).
3 Jeffrey R. Brown, Who Values the Social Security Annuity? New Evidence on 
the Annuity Puzzle 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13800, 2008) [hereinafter Brown, New Evidence].
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suggestions for increasing annuitization rates. It does this by proposing 
policies aimed at replicating important characteristics of high-annuity 
markets in the mainstream U.S. annuity market. It also critically 
evaluates the introduction of other policies aimed at increasing 
community-wide annuitization rates, including the use of limited tax 
incentives or subsidies. Section VI concludes.
II. LIFE ANNUITIES AND THE ANNUITY PUZZLE
In the simplest sense, life annuities are an entitlement to receive a 
regular payment for the remainder of one’s life. Some life annuities 
commence almost instantly after the annuity contract is entered into. 
Others are deferred, and the annuity payments only commence upon the 
annuity holder reaching a specified age. Each payment received by the 
holder of a life annuity is usually a set amount; though, sometimes
payments are indexed to inflation or some other figure.4 As an example 
of a deferred, non-indexed life annuity consider Bob, who is currently 
sixty-three. Bob pays $100,000 today in exchange for an annuity 
provider making regular payments amounting to $10,000 a year 
beginning when Bob turns seventy. Such payments continue for the rest 
of Bob’s life. The annuity provider pools and invests Bob’s and other 
annuity holders’ funds and slowly withdraws as payments become due. 
There are other types of annuities as well. Some life annuities offer a 
spousal survivor benefit, and some include a minimum payment period
so that if the annuity holder dies within that time frame, his heirs will 
receive annuity payments for that period.5 Other annuities, called 
variable annuities, have payments based on investment returns.6
Although government Social Security entitlements can be considered 
one form of a life annuity, this paper focuses on life annuities that are 
voluntarily purchased. Furthermore, the focus will be on traditional 
annuities that offer stable returns rather than on variable annuities;
though, the issue of variable annuities will be briefly discussed in the 
context of policies aimed at increasing annuitization rates.
Traditional life annuities offer a secure retirement income that few 
instruments can match. Their returns are free from investment risk and 
4 Since the 1990s, life annuities that are inflation-indexed have also been 
available in the United States. See Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Role of Real 
Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an Individual Accounts Retirement Program 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7005, 1999) [hereinafter 
Brown, Role of Real Annuities].
5 Annuities with a minimum payment period are, essentially, a combination of 
term and deferred life annuities.
6 Some variable annuities also have minimum payment or asset value 
guarantees; though, ultimately, these come at a cost to the annuity holder. See
Shi-jie Jiang & Matthew C. Chang, Variable Annuity with Guarantees: 
Valuation and Simulation, 14 J. MONEY, INV. & BANKING 74 (2010).
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longevity risk.7 Moreover, if they are indexed, they are also free from
inflation risk. Previous modeling has found that, in the absence of a 
bequest motive, it is logical for retirees to fully annuitize their wealth if 
annuities are available at an actuarially fair price.8 The reasoning behind 
this rests on the superior consumption one can achieve with a life 
annuity compared to other wealth decumulation schemes. Without a life 
annuity, a retiree could consume his retirement savings under the 
assumption that he will have average longevity. This would allow him to 
enjoy the same retirement income as if he had purchased an actuarially 
fair life annuity for as long as he does not outlive his assumed longevity.
However, it will also mean that if he does outlive his expected longevity, 
he will run out of retirement savings.9 On the other hand, if such a retiree 
wanted to self-insure (without a life annuity) against the risk of outliving
his expected lifespan, he could use up his wealth under the assumption 
he will live to an age that he is statistically unlikely to reach, such as one 
hundred years.10 Although this will almost ensure that he does not run 
out of wealth, it will lead to a substantially lower annual income than the 
actuarially fair life annuity would have provided him.11 In other words, 
the benefit of an actuarially fair annuity is that it allows the purchaser, 
irrespective of actual lifespan, to have the same annual income that he 
would have had if he had consumed his wealth by the end of his 
actuarially expected life.
Even when annuities are sold at a price above their actuarially fair 
value, modeling has indicated that retirees without a bequest motive will 
generally benefit from annuitizing their wealth.12 This is because life 
annuities with a realistic price premium still offer a return superior to 
7 Investment risk is the risk of investments falling in value; whereas, longevity 
risk is the risk of outliving one’s savings. See JANEMARIE MULVEY & PATRICK 
PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40008, Converting Retirement Savings into 
Income: Annuities and Periodic Withdrawals 2–4 (2008).
8 Menachem E. Yaari, Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the 
Consumer, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 137 (1965). A recent study compared a life 
annuity to a range of phased withdrawal products and found that a life annuity 
can offer a comparatively better low-risk income for life. See Ivica Dus et al., 
Betting on Death and Capital Markets in Retirement: A Shortfall Risk Analysis 
of Life Annuities Versus Phased Withdrawal Plans, 14 FIN. SER. REV. 169 
(2005).
9 Jeffrey R. Brown, Rational and Behavioral Perspectives on the Role of 
Annuities in Retirement 4–6, 35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13537, 2007) [hereinafter Brown, Rational and Behavioral 
Perspectives].
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual 
Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1315 (1999).
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other low-risk investments,13 given that a non-annuitizing taxpayer will 
typically decumulate his wealth in a way that accounts for the risk of 
living longer than the average life expectancy. Furthermore, according to 
certain modeling, even the desire to undertake uneven consumption 
patterns in retirement would still result in retirees benefiting from 
annuitizing a large portion of their wealth.14
Despite such modeling and data, there is a widespread annuity 
puzzle, in that life annuities have generally been unpopular in most 
markets where their purchase is not mandated.15 An example is the low 
uptake of annuities by those receiving distributions from U.S. defined 
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, where those plans feature an 
annuity option.16 The fact that annuitized money cannot be bequeathed 
might intuitively appear to account for low annuitization rates. However, 
a bequest motive does not explain why the vast majority of people do not 
at least partially annuitize their funds, given that most people balance a 
bequest motive with a desire to maintain a certain standard of living. The 
next section will discuss this in detail and examine other possible 
explanations for the existence of the annuity puzzle.
13 Thomas Davidoff et al., Annuities and Individual Welfare, 95 AM. ECON. REV.
1573, 1576 (2005).
14 Id. at 1587-88.
15 See Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, 25 J. Econ. Persp. no. 4, 
2011 at 143, 149–50 (discussing the very small size of the individual immediate 
fixed life annuity market in the United States where annuities are purchased 
directly from life insurance companies); Jeffrey R. Brown, Financial Education 
and Annuities, OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS, no. 3, 2008 at 181–82
(discussing research that shows low annuitization rates are a feature of many 
countries); Joachim Inkmann et al., How Deep is the Annuity Market 
Participation Puzzle? 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 279, 285 (2011) (finding that 5.9% of 
people in England voluntarily purchase life annuities); James Poterba et al.,
Utility Evaluation of Risk in Retirement Saving Accounts 31 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9892, 2003).
16 See JOHN J. TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, R40707, 401(k) Plans and 
Retirement Savings: Issues for Congress 25 (2011) (citing Hewitt Associates 
surveys that state that typically less than 10% of 401(k) fund members offered a 
choice to annuitize will elect to do so); Stacy L. Schaus, Annuities Make a 
Comeback, 12 J. PENSION BENEFITS, no. 4, 2005 at 34, 35 (finding that in 2005 
only 6% of 401(k) members offered an annuity chose to undertake such an 
option). Other research indicates that in the case of defined contribution plans 
that offer annuities, approximately 48% of working members declare an 
intention to annuitize. See Jeffrey R. Brown & Mark J. Warshawsky, Longevity-
Insured Retirement Distributions from Pension Plans: Market and Regulatory
Issues 35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8064, 2001).
When these participants were contacted again between the ages of fifty-nine and 
sixty-nine, few had actually followed through with their intention. See Irena 
Dushi & Anthony Webb, Household Annuitization Decisions: Simulations and 
Empirical Analyses, 3 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 109, 129 (2004).
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III. EXPLANATIONS FOR LOW ANNUITY UPTAKE
There are several possible explanations for low annuitization rates. 
Broadly speaking, they can be split into two categories. First are 
explanations attributing low demand to the fixed or unchanging 
characteristics of life annuities and to the environment in which they 
operate.17 Second are explanations attributing low demand to the 
variable characteristics of annuities. In general, there is little that can be 
changed about the first category. Individuals, for example, desiring to 
bequest their wealth or pool risk themselves through a domestic 
partnership will find that the very nature of annuities inhibits their goals. 
On the other hand, investors worried about high annuity prices or default
by the servicer would reconsider annuity investments if price and default 
risk were reduced. Below is a more detailed examination of the fixed and 
unfixed characteristics that influence annuity uptake.
A. EXPLANATIONS RELATED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF 
TRADITIONAL LIFE ANNUITIES
1. Pooling of Longevity Risk Through Domestic Partnerships
Marriage and other partnerships result in a pooling of longevity risk. 
Just as a purchased life annuity can be considered the pooling of 
longevity risk among the annuity purchasers, marriage and similar 
partnerships provide a smaller, in-house form of such pooling.18 As a 
result, the purchase of annuities by married couples should be less 
common than among single people. There is conflicting evidence,
however, regarding the extent to which this plays a role in reducing the 
amount of annuitized retirement wealth. Empirical studies have found 
that being married makes annuitization less likely;19 though this might,
to some degree, be due to other reasons such as marriage making a 
bequest motive more likely. In contrast, a separate study using survey 
17 Inflation-indexed life annuities can be considered to fit into this category, 
despite their income being fixed in after-inflation rather than nominal terms. 
Such annuities not only insure against investment and longevity risk, but also 
inflation risk.
18 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown & James M. Poterba, Joint Life Annuities and 
Annuity Demand by Married Couples, 67 J. RISK AND INS. 527,542–545 (2000)
(using modelling, found that annuitization is less beneficial for a couple 
purchasing a joint life annuity than it is for a single person purchasing a single 
life annuity); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, The Family as an 
Incomplete Annuities Market, 89 J. POL. ECON. 372, 375–85 (1981) (using 
modeling, found that the sharing of risk in marriage substantially acts as a 
substitute for annuitization).
19 See Jeffrey R. Brown, Private Pensions, Mortality Risk, and the Decision to 
Annuitize, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 29, 59–60 (2001) [hereinafter Brown, Decision to 
Annuitize] (finding this to be the case in the United States); see also, Inkmann et 
al., supra note 15, at 282 (finding this to be the case in the United Kingdom).
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data found that married people were no less likely than single persons to 
convert part of their Social Security entitlements to a lump sum when 
hypothetically presented with the opportunity to do so.20 In addition, the 
fact that we do not see much annuitization upon the death of one spouse 
indicates that the pooling of risk among married people might not be a 
major factor in the lack of voluntary annuitization.21
2. Pre-Existing Annuitization
Modeling has indicated that the presence of a pre-existing 
annuitization in the form of Social Security entitlements, as well as 
entitlements to defined benefit pensions, discourage further annuitization 
of retirement wealth.22 The existence of pre-annuitized wealth is a real 
part of the landscape in which the annuity market operates.23
It is unclear to what extent pre-existing annuities act as a deterrent to 
the voluntary annuitization of retirement wealth. One study found that a 
substantial percentage of people were willing to give up half of their 
Social Security benefits in exchange for a lump sum. The fact that so 
many were willing to give up a portion of their Social Security 
entitlements might indicate that current Social Security entitlements are
not the main reason for limited annuity demand.24
20 Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 10.
21 Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Why Don't People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A 
Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 304, 304 (2008) [hereinafter Brown, Framing].
22 See Dushi & Webb, supra note 16, at 131–34.
23 Although it could be argued that this could to some extent be changed, for
instance, by abolishing Social Security, the practical reality is that the presence 
of pre-annuitized wealth is an inherent feature of the environment in which 
voluntary annuities exist. Similarly, the existence of bequests and domestic 
partnerships are factors that can be regarded as relating to the given 
environment that annuities operate in, even though in theory there is the 
unlikely possibility that government policy could discourage these. For instance, 
the government could dissuade bequest motives through high and broad estate 
taxes. 
24 Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 7; see also Inkmann et al., supra note 
15, at 9–10 (finding that in the United Kingdom, the presence of a larger private 
pension—typically the result of mandatory annuitization laws—was correlated 
with greater voluntary annuitization). However, the authors noted that this does 
not necessarily mean that the presence of pre-annuitized wealth does not crowd 
out voluntary annuitization, as both could be correlated to other factors such as 
financial wealth. Inkmann et al., supra note 15, at 9–10.
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3. Bequest Motive
A traditional life annuity involves the taxpayer giving up the option 
of bequeathing his annuitized wealth.25 This is because annuities are 
designed to exhaust one’s wealth entirely by the time of death. However, 
to some degree, a joint life and survivorship annuity achieves some of 
the aims of bequeathing wealth to a spouse.
While people generally wish to bequeath a portion of their wealth, it
does not mean they wish to bequeath all their wealth; if they did, they 
would choose to live a life of poverty so as to accumulate as much 
wealth as possible for their heirs. Thus, partially annuitizing one’s 
retirement wealth does not conflict with a bequest motive.26
Although the data is not determinative, there is evidence that a 
bequest motive does not play a major role in people choosing not to 
annuitize. One study, based on surveys of people faced with the option of 
annuitizing their retirement wealth, found that the value people placed 
on bequeathing their assets was not a major determinant of their 
proposed annuitization decisions.27 Another study based on survey data
showed similar findings, where those with a will or testamentary trust 
were not found to be comparatively more likely to prefer a lump sum 
over an annuity.28 These studies, as well as another based on actual 
annuitization decisions, found that the presence of children did not affect 
the likelihood of annuitizing retirement savings.29 Although these two 
studies did find that being married was correlated with a lower 
willingness to annuitize,30 this could be explained by the fact that 
marriage results in the pooling of longevity risks. In contrast, an internet 
survey found that people were approximately ten percentage points more 
likely to choose a life annuity option if premature death hypothetically 
led to the proceeds being left to children rather than a charity.31 While 
25 Some life annuities have features such as a guaranteed minimum payment 
period, which, in the event of the annuity holder dying in that period, will pay 
the annuity payments for the remainder of that period to the annuity holder’s 
heir. However, as stated earlier in this article, such annuities are not strictly 
speaking pure life annuities; rather, they are a combination of term annuities and 
deferred life annuities.
26 See Davidoff et al., supra note 13, at 1583.
27 Brown, Decision to Annuitize, supra note 19, at 56–58.
28 Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 11. This study was based on surveys 
asking people whether they would give up part of their social security 
entitlements in exchange for a lump sum.
29 Id. at 17; Brown, Decision to Annuitize, supra note 19, at 56–58; Inkmann et 
al., supra note 15, at 292–93.
30 Brown, Decision to Annuitize, supra note 19, at 58–59; Inkmann et al., supra
note 15, at 292–93. But see Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 16, finding
no correlation between marital status and willingness to prefer an annuity.
31 Brown, Framing, supra note 21, at 13.
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this suggests bequest motives may have some influence on the decision
to annuitize, on the whole they have not proven to be a primary factor.
4. Superior Investment Opportunities
Since life annuities are one of several possible uses of retirement 
funds, their low uptake might be due to the availability of superior 
investment opportunities. Specifically, some modeling has indicated that 
most retirees are better off investing the bulk of their funds in equities 
and only purchasing traditional life annuities a few decades after 
retirement.32 This modeling is based on the fact that equities offer better 
potential returns than the underlying instruments in which annuity 
providers invest annuity capital.33 In other words, while life annuities 
offer a superior way to consume one’s income, equity investments can 
often generate more retirement income.34 The less actuarially fair the 
annuity, the more likely this is to be the case.35
However, it is possible to challenge the modeling on which this 
argument is based. First, the extent to which retirees should 
comparatively prefer equity investments over life annuities is highly 
dependent on the size of the equity premium.36 For instance, there is 
modeling indicating that 80% of most retirees’ wealth should be 
annuitized when the equity premium is at 2%; whereas only about half 
the amount should be annuitized when the equity premium is at 7%.37
Given that historically there is considerable deviation in the size of the 
equity premium in different decades,38 the equity premium for future 
years cannot be predicted. Indeed, the last few years of market 
performance clearly illustrate that retirement savings heavily invested in 
shares can suffer a substantial fall in value.39
32 Moshe A. Milevsky, Optimal Annuitization Policies: Analysis of the Options,
5 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J., no. 1, 2001 at 57, 65–66.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 61.
36 The equity premium is the extent by which equities outperform relatively less 
risky T-bills. See Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A 
Puzzle, 15 J. Monetary ECON. 145, 145–46 (1985).
37 David F. Babbel & Craig B. Merrill, Rational Decumulation 20 (Wharton Fin. 
Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 05-22, 2007).
38 KEN FISHER, DEBUNKERY: LEARN IT, DO IT, AND PROFIT FROM IT—SEEING 
THROUGH WALL STREET'S MONEY-KILLING MYTHS 82 (2011).
39 Unsurprisingly, much of the modeling that advocates equity investing for 
retirees was typically written prior to the Global Financial Crisis. See Milevsky, 
supra note 32; J. Michael Orszag, Presentation at NAPF Annual Conference: 
Annuities: The Problems (May 11 12, 2000), available at http://www.watsonwy
att.com/images/database_uploads/eu80/annuities_napf.pdf.
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Furthermore, the modeling that argues that retirees are better off 
purchasing shares over annuities for their initial retirement period 
generally assumes that equity returns follow a normal distribution 
pattern.40 However, this assumption has been challenged,41 meaning that 
such modeling might be vastly understating the risk that equity 
investment entails. Thus retirees, who by nature have limited future 
earning ability and are more likely to be risk averse42 might be better off 
purchasing annuities instead of equity.
The available empirical evidence indicates that equity investment 
opportunities probably don’t play a major role in low annuitization rates. 
On the one hand, evidence of higher annuitization rates following poor 
share market performance suggests that equity investment, to some 
extent, does crowd out annuitization.43 But in absolute terms, 
annuitization rates typically remain very low during periods of poor
share market performance, suggesting that any such crowding-out effect 
is limited.44 Furthermore, the fact that annuitization rates are generally 
low at all times in most markets indicates that the vast majority of people 
do not follow the abovementioned pro-equity modeling that advocates 
initially investing in shares and following up by annuitizing later in 
retirement.45 If equity investment opportunities were crowding out 
annuitization, we might also expect variable annuities, which base their 
returns in part on equity investment performance, to be quite popular, but 
they are not.46 However, such variable annuities typically have very large 
fees, which might be a partial explanation for their unpopularity.47
5. Need to Maintain Cash Reserves
The choice to annuitize, by its nature, leads to a loss of liquidity for
the annuity holder. Some retirees perceive liquidity as necessary in case 
certain risks eventuate, such as medical bills or nursing home fees.
40 See Milevsky, supra note 32.
41 NASSIM N. TALEB, THE Black Swan: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
287–88 (2d ed. 2010).
42 See Dushi & Webb, supra note 16, at 120 (pointing out that modeling that 
advocates equity investment over annuitization does not take into account what 
level of failure risk is acceptable for different levels of risk-aversion).
43 See John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, How Do Retirees Value Life 
Annuities? Evidence from Public Employees, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2601, 2620 
(2012).
44 See Inkmann et al., supra note 15, finding low annuitization rates in the 
United Kingdom for a very limited sample period which included a year of poor 
sharemarket performance (2002).
45 See Davidoff et al., supra note 13, at 1582.
46 See Brown, Framing, supra note 21, at 1.
47 FISHER, supra note 38, at 60–65.
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Consequently, it is logical that the lack of liquidity offered by annuities
acts as a disincentive to annuitize in some cases.48  
There is limited empirical data regarding the extent to which
liquidity concerns deter people from annuitization. One U.K. survey 
found that the main reason for not annuitizing was the lack of flexibility 
that comes with an annuity.49 Data from an extensive U.S. survey found 
that those who ranked their health poorly were less willing to annuitize 
than others.50 While this may indicate that those with poor health prefer 
to keep cash reserves in order to have funds available for medical fees, it 
may also reflect that they perceive themselves as having a comparatively 
lower longevity, which means that purchasing a life annuity represents 
poor value. Despite these findings, the presence of markets with high 
annuitization rates indicates that liquidity concerns are in many cases not 
a deterrent for retirees annuitizing a substantial portion of their wealth.51
Still, liquidity concerns stem from the fundamental nature of annuities 
and will, therefore, be difficult to address through policy reform alone.
B. FACTORS WHOSE IMPACT CAN BE LESSENED BY POLICY CHANGE
While annuities will always have some unchanging characteristics, 
such as illiquidity, other factors deterring annuitization can be 
significantly mitigated with policy reform. For example, high annuity 
prices and public perception of annuities are manageable concerns if 
addressed properly. The following subsections discuss these and similar 
factors in detail. 
1. High Annuity Prices
Annuities are usually not actuarially fair in that the annuity’s 
purchase price exceeds the present value of its expected future cash 
flow.52 One reason for this is that annuity providers have to cover their 
48 See generally Sid Browne et al., Asset Allocation and the Liquidity Premium 
for Illiquid Annuities, 70 J. RISK & INS. 509 (2003); SVEN H. SINCLAIR & KENT 
A. SMETTERS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 2004-9, HEALTH SHOCKS AND THE 
DEMAND FOR ANNUITIES (2004) (modeling the effect of the loss of liquidity on 
annuity demand).
49 Jonathan Gardner & Mike Wadsworth, Who Would Buy an Annuity? An 
Empirical Investigation 7 (Watson-Wyatt Technical Papers Series, Working 
Paper No. 12, 2004).
50 Brown, Decision to Annuitize, supra note 19, at 53–55.
51 See discussion of markets with high annuitization rates infra Part IV.A.
52 See, e.g., Brown, Role of Real Annuities, supra note 4, at 58; Amy Finkelstein 
& James Poterba, Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities 
Market, 112 ECON. J. 28, 46 (2002) [hereinafter Finkelstein & Poterba, 
Selection Effects] (finding that this was the case when the expected present 
value of annuity payments received by an annuitant who is a member of the 
general population was compared to the purchase price of annuities). However, 
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administrative costs, and commercial annuity providers will seek to 
make a profit margin. Another factor contributing to the actuarial 
unfairness of annuities is the annuity providers’ need to hedge against 
certain risks, most notably systematic longevity risk.53 By charging 
actuarially unfair prices, annuity providers build a reserve of capital in 
case such risks eventuate.54
Adverse selection also plays a role in inflating the price of life 
annuities. This is a phenomenon in which asymmetric information leads 
to suboptimal outcomes.55 For example, in the life annuity market, those 
who perceive themselves as having above-average longevity are more 
likely to purchase annuities.56 This drives up prices, which further deters 
those who perceive themselves as having inadequate longevity from 
purchasing life annuities. The result spirals into even higher prices and 
purchasers with above-average longevity disproportionately populate the 
market.57 A major study empirically examining the life annuity market in 
the United Kingdom found evidence of adverse selection.58 It has been 
some modeling has found that annuities are relatively good value when the 
expected present value of annuity payment calculation takes into account the 
relatively high lifespan of the typical annuity purchaser. Babbel & Merrill, 
supra note 37.
53 See, e.g., David Blake et al., Living with Mortality: Longevity Bonds and 
Other Mortality-Linked Securities, 12 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 153, 154–56 (2006);
Michael Sherris & John Evans, LONGEVITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES FOR 
AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE TAX SYSTEM 11 13 (2009), available at http://www.taxre
view.treasury.gov.au/content/html/commissioned_work/downloads/Longevity_
Management_Issues.pdf. Systematic longevity risk is the risk of community 
wide longevity rising more than anticipated. It is distinct from individual 
longevity risk, which is the risk of any given individual outliving their savings. 
54 Sherris & Evans, supra note 53, at 14.
55 George A. Akerlof et al., The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). This was a pioneering article 
that discussed the potentially negative effects of asymmetrical information. 
56 Finkelstein & Poterba, Selection Effects, supra note 52, at 29–30.
57 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An 
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1258 (2004) (stating that in some 
markets such an effect will end up with a ‘death spiral’ that destroys the whole 
market). However, the author acknowledges that death spirals are unusual rather 
than common occurrences. Id.
58 Finkelstein & Poterba, Selection Effects, supra note 52; see also Amy 
Finkelstein & James Poterba, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: 
Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market, 112 J. POL. ECON. 183 
(2004) (finding the presence of adverse selection amongst different annuity 
markets. Specifically, this study found that annuities that were more 
advantageous to those with greater longevity were more likely to be purchased 
by long-living individuals and, conversely, annuities that gave payments to an 
estate upon the holder’s early death were more likely to be bought by those with 
lower longevity. However, the authors did acknowledge there was some 
possibility this was due to reasons other than adverse selection. Specifically, 
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estimated that adverse selection is responsible for about half the amount 
that the price of annuities exceeds the expected present value of their 
payments.59
While life-cycling economic modes have shown that, under some 
assumptions, annuities represent good value despite being actuarially 
unfair,60 there is also clear evidence that the demand for annuities shows 
some direct price sensitivity.61 Section IV of this article will discuss how 
higher annuity prices might deter annuitization through more indirect 
means.
2. Default Risk
Beyond the deterrence of high prices, annuity holders are, short of a 
government guarantee, at risk of the provider defaulting on the annuity 
payments. While all states offer some level of guarantee for annuity 
payments, each state has its own coverage limits, the minimum being 
$100,000.62
Although there is a lack of extensive research on this issue, certain
modeling indicates that the presence of a default risk leads to a 
substantial reduction in life annuity demand.63 However, this modeling 
also found that the presence of a $100,000 guarantee (which would 
provide full protection for some annuity recipients, but only partial 
protections to those whose annuity receipts have an expected value of 
more than that amount) results in the default risk generally leading to 
only a relatively mild drop in default rates.64
While there is a lack of empirical data regarding the extent to which 
default risk deters annuitization, the human tendency towards loss-
aversion65 as well as the tendency to overweigh small risks66 might mean 
that default risk is a greater deterrent to annuitization than the 
abovementioned modeling suggests.
they raised the possibility that the findings were due to a moral hazard; in other 
words, it was possible that those that purchased life annuity contracts 
subsequently proceeded to take greater care to ensure that they should live 
longer. Ultimately, the authors did acknowledge that adverse selection was the 
most likely reasonable explanation for its findings).
59 Mitchell et al., supra note 12, at 1310 (using 1995 data).
60 Id.
61 Section IV of this article will discuss the evidence relating to the price 
elasticity of annuity demand.
62 For a table that lists the coverage limit of each state, consult Babbel & 
Merrill, supra note 37, at 31.
63 Id. at 32.
64 Id. at 21–22.
65 See infra Part III.B.3.
66 See infra Part III.B.4.
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3. Loss Aversion
Next, people generally have a tendency towards loss aversion, 
meaning they care more about not losing their wealth than they do about 
increasing it.67 By not taking loss aversion into account, expected utility 
models, which traditionally predict high annuitization rates, might be 
neglecting an important variable.68 In other words, even though annuities 
present an opportunity to increase wealth, the fact that premature death 
could cause a loss might be what is actually deterring annuity purchases.
Specifically, annuitization does offer potential gains to the retiree, 
and the longer the lifespan of an annuity holder, the more he will 
financially benefit from his decision to annuitize. On the other hand, 
holding a life annuity presents potential losses. One is the risk of dying
early. The result is reduced retirement consumption and fewer assets
being willed to heirs than might otherwise have been. Furthermore, there 
is another similar but subtly different potential loss: the risk that after 
annuitization the annuity holder will prematurely suffer from a terminal 
disease and consciously regret the purchase of the annuity.69
Another potential loss associated with annuitization is that, as 
discussed earlier, annuity providers might default on their payments. 
Even if this risk is small, it could dissuade a retiree who has little or no 
earning potential from annuitizing.
Moreover, another potential negative outcome is a health shock or 
similar event that necessitates payment from liquid cash reserves. While 
such an event would not lead to a loss of annuity income, if the retiree 
regrets locking his money in an annuity it could still be considered a loss 
in the wider sense of the word.
Modeling that takes into account retirees’ loss-aversion tendencies 
regarding some of these risks has found that, from a behavioral 
perspective, annuities can represent poor value.70
67 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979).
68 Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity Market, 63
FIN. ANALYSTS J., no. 6, 2007, at 71, 76. Expected utility models have been used 
in works that find that high levels of annuitization maximize utility. See, e.g.,
Yaari, supra note 8. Some research suggests that the reason why such modeling 
deviates from real world annuitization rates is due to such modeling not taking 
behavioral considerations into account. Davidoff et al., supra note 13, at 1589.
69 Brown, Rational and Behavioral Perspectives, supra note 9, at 24–25.
70 See Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 76. This modeling takes into account the 
potential losses from an early death but not the potential of other losses such as 
default.
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4. Subjective Perception of Risk 
In addition to the human tendency to be loss-averse, there is a 
tendency to weigh risks disproportionally to the size of those risks. 
Specifically, people will often overweigh smaller risks and underweigh
larger risks.71 In the context of life annuities, this means that people tend 
to over-emphasize some relatively small risks. These would include the 
above-stated relatively minor risks of premature death and annuity 
provider default.72 Fear of default in particular would be exacerbated by 
the global financial crisis and waning trust that the public has in financial 
institutions.73 Paradoxically, this tendency to weigh risks 
disproportionately also means that in limited instances, people might 
overvalue deferred annuities because they underweigh the substantial 
risk of dying before reaching a comparatively old age.74
Modeling has indicated that the tendency to overweigh relatively 
minor risks exacerbates loss aversion and makes immediate life annuities 
poor value for most people.75 On a related note, the tendency of people 
to prefer precise over ambiguous risks76 might also play a role in the low 
popularity of annuities. This is because people’s predictions about their 
mortality are not usually predictions they feel can be based on precise 
probabilities. Similarly, the tendency of people to overweigh the 
probability of an event that might occur from a wide variety of causes 
might also be partly responsible for low annuitization rates. For example,
people can imagine dying in many more ways than they can imagine 
living longer and, therefore, perceive death to be a greater risk than it 
71 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 67, at 280–84; Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 312–13 (1992).
72 Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 76 (discussing the overweighing of the risk of 
an early death). In addition to the general overweighing of small risks, there is 
also a human tendency to be more influenced by the difference between
outcomes that are 100% certain and those that are 98% certain, as compared to 
the difference between those that do not involve complete certainties. This 
principle is relevant when evaluating the difference in desirability between 
annuities that are covered by a 100% guarantee and those that are not. See 
Maurice Allais, Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: 
Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'École Américaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA
503, 529 (1953).
73 See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Trust in Public Institutions 
over the Business Cycle, 101 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 281 (2011).
74 Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 76.
75 Id. This modeling takes into account the potential of early death but not the 
potential of other losses such as the annuity provider defaulting on their 
payments.
76 See generally Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.
J. ECON. 643 (1961).
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actually is.77 The fact that pre-retirees seem particularly risk-averse 
would reinforce these tendencies.78
5. Framing
Ancient Greek philosopher Epictetus once noted that “[m]en are 
disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things.”79 It
is likely that the way one views a life annuity influences the extent to 
which one annuitizes wealth. If a life annuity is viewed as an investment, 
it is understandable that many will find annuitization unattractive, 
especially in light of the inherent risks and actuarially unfair returns that 
annuities typically bear.80
On the other hand, if annuitization is viewed as a way of maximizing 
consumption, it is much easier to see it as an attractive option. This is 
because without an annuity people’s limited resources combined with 
uncertain longevity leave only sub-optimal consumption choices. 
Specifically, these choices would involve a trade-off between (1) under-
consuming one’s retirement assets so as to self-insure against the risk of 
high longevity, and (2) consuming one’s assets while assuming average 
longevity, but risking wealth depletion if death comes later than 
expected.81
Although research in this area is limited, there is some evidence that 
the way an annuity is viewed has a powerful bearing on people’s 
decisions to annuitize. One online survey, which presented annuities as 
either a potential investment or a consumption retirement vehicle, found 
that respondents indicated a dramatically stronger preference for 
annuitizing when the annuity was framed as a consumption vehicle.82
The framing effect can also apply to dichotomies other than the 
investment-versus-consumption tradeoff. For instance, annuities can be 
viewed as a way of maximizing retirement income by pooling risk 
among annuity holders for their collective benefit, or annuities can be 
77 Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 78 (relating low annuitization rates to the 
conjunction fallacy); see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability 
Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983).
78 Michael Drew et al., Sustainable Retirement: A Look at Consumer Desires 18
(U. Queensl. Sch. of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 330, 2003).
79 EPICTETUS, The Enchiridion, in THE WORKS OF EPICTETUS. CONSISTING OF 
HIS DISCOURSES, IN FOUR BOOKS, THE ENCHIRIDION, AND FRAGMENTS 377
(Thomas Wentworth Higginson, trans., Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1866).
80 Brown, Framing, supra note 21, at 3–4.
81 Brown, Rational and Behavioral Perspectives, supra note 9, at 4–6, 35.
82 Brown, Framing, supra note 21, at 7–9.
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viewed as an unfair gamble sold by insurance companies.83 The former 
is likely to lead to a higher uptake than the latter.84
Another way in which the framing effect can influence annuitization 
decisions rests on how regular member benefit statements are presented. 
Specifically, a retirement savings plan that offers the choice of both 
annuities and a lump sum could issue statements that express the benefits 
in terms of a lump sum, expected annuity entitlement, or both.85 If the 
statement communicates the entitlement in terms of both, then more 
emphasis might be placed on one over the other.86 It makes sense that
potential benefits presented in the form of an annuity, or with greater 
emphasis placed on the annuity rather than the lump sum, make it more 
likely that annuitization will be seen as the natural retirement choice.87 A
study found that a sample of defined benefit plans, which present 
benefits in terms of income stream entitlements, have annuitization rates 
of seventeen percentage points higher than a sample of hybrid plans, 
which have benefits presented in the form of account balances but 
otherwise share many attributes with defined benefit plans.88
83 WILLIAM GENTRY & CASEY ROTHSCHILD, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP.
FORMATION, LIFETIME ANNUITIES FOR US: EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF 
POLICY INTERVENTIONS IN LIFE ANNUITY MARKETS 63 (2006), available at
http://www.accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/lifetimeAnnuities.pdf.
84 Recently, an Australian retirement plan that caters for tertiary staff has 
discussed introducing a life annuity-like product, and framing it as an 
opportunity to pool risk with other participants, rather than as a financial
product. See PAUL MURPHY, UNISUPER, LONGEVITY RISK POOLING—A
PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE IN AN ACCOUNT-BASED PENSION ENVIRONMENT
(2007), available at http://www.asb.unsw.edu.au/research/cps/Documents/
P.%20Murphy%20-%20Longevity%20risk%20pooling%20%E2%80%93%20
a%20practical%20alternative%20in%20an%20account-based%20pension%
20environment%20.pdf.
85 See Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 155 (noting that defined benefit plans 
have statements in terms of income entitlements).
86 Monika Bütler et al., The Role of the Annuity's Value on the Decision (Not) to 
Annuitize: Evidence from a Large Policy Change 8 (Centre for Econ. Pol’y Res., 
Discussion Paper No. DP6930, 2008) (explaining that most Swiss Pension funds
show both lump sum and expected annuity entitlements on annual statements, 
but devote more space to the expected annuity entitlements).
87 Some authors have stated that benefits presented in terms of expected income 
streams are likely to promote a consumptions frame, and that benefits presented 
in terms of lump sum entitlements are likely to promote an investment frame;
however, they not provide empirical evidence indicating that how benefits are 
presented is correlated with whether members are more likely to view 
annuitization from a consumption or investment frame. See, e.g., id; Benartzi et 
al., supra note 15, at 155–56.
88 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 155–56. One important similarity between 
the two types of plans is that the investment risk is borne by the employer. Id. at 
155.
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Interestingly, there is some limited evidence that although women 
are more likely to annuitize than men, women are also less likely to be 
influenced by certain measures that frame an annuity in an attractive 
manner.89
6. Other Reasons
There are other reasons that contribute to low annuity demand. For 
instance, low financial holdings among those of retirement age90 likely 
factor into low annuitization rates.91 However, as average retirement 
account balances are forecasted to increase dramatically in the future,92
this factor will become less of an impediment to annuitization.
A lack of formal school and college education can also deter 
annuitization.93 However, there is conflicting evidence on the effect that 
financial knowledge has on the choice to annuitize.94
C. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLANATIONS FOR LOW ANNUITY DEMAND
The precise extent to which many of the abovementioned 
explanations cause low annuitization rates is mostly unknown. In reality, 
it is likely that many of the reasons operate inter-connectedly. While 
research has attempted to shed light on the issue, there is often a gap 
between the findings of such research and real-world observations. For 
instance, one study that utilized modeling found that a combination of 
high annuity prices, pooling of risks through marriage, and the existence 
of pre-annuitized wealth result in annuitization being a worse choice for 
89 Julie R. Agnew et al., Who Chooses Annuities? An Experimental Investigation 
of the Role of Gender, Framing, and Defaults, 98 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 418, 421 (2008).
90 See James Poterba et al., The Composition and Drawdown of Wealth in 
Retirement, 25 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 4, 2011, at 95, 96 (finding that half of 65 to 
69 years olds in 2008 had average financial balances of less than $52,000).
91 See Monika Bütler & Federica Teppa, Should You Take a Lump-Sum or 
Annuitize? Results from Swiss Pension Funds 18 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res., 
Discussion Paper No. 2005-20, 2005) [hereinafter Bütler & Teppa, Swiss 
Pension Funds] (finding that amongst Swiss retirees, a small capital stock is 
correlated with an increase in chance of taking retirement savings in the form of 
a lump sum).
92 See James Poterba et al., The Shift from Defined Benefit Pensions to 401(k)
Plans and the Pension Assets of the Baby Boom Cohort, 104 PROC. NATL.
ACAD. SCI. 13238 (2007).
93 Inkmann et al., supra note 15, at 291; Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 
10.
94 See id. at 13–14 (finding that people who demonstrated higher levels of 
financial knowledge indicated a greater willingness to annuitize). But see
Agnew, supra note 89, at 421–22 (finding that financial knowledge led to a 
lower preference to annuitize).
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the majority of people.95 Specifically, this modeling found that retirees 
were often better off maximizing their incomes by investing and 
consuming their savings despite having to personally bear some 
longevity risk.96 However, this modeling does not perfectly mirror real 
world observations. For example, according to this modeling, single 
women often want to annuitize, yet this is not usually reflected in actual 
annuitization rates.97
Overall, while there is some evidence regarding the causes of low 
annuitization rates, much remains to be studied. The next part of this 
paper will examine high annuitization markets and try to explain how 
some of the abovementioned causes of low annuitization are less 
applicable in these markets.
IV. THE POPULARITY OF LIFE ANNUITIES IN CERTAIN MARKETS
Despite the fact that most markets have low annuitization rates, in
some markets the opposite is seen. Ascertaining which characteristics 
have led to these high-annuity markets could be useful in formulating 
policies to increase annuitization rates in the United States.
A. MARKETS WHERE LIFE ANNUITIES ARE POPULAR
The Oregon Public Employees Retirement System is one fund that 
has high annuitization rates. Its workers are able to choose between 
belonging to a defined contribution, defined benefit, or hybrid defined 
contribution defined benefit fund, with most choosing the defined 
contribution fund.98 Irrespective of the type of fund members are in, 
upon retirement, they have a choice of receiving their benefits as a full 
annuity or a partial annuity with a lump sum.99 There was previously a
limited period where their choice also included an option to receive 
benefits in the form of a full lump sum with no annuity.100
Approximately 85% of members over the researched period chose a full 
annuity.101 During that period this fund had no default option,102 and 
according to some calculations, this fund’s annuities had a present value 
greater than their lump sum equivalent.103
95 Dushi & Webb, supra note 16, at 137–39.
96 Id. at 134–39.
97 Id. at 140.
98 Chalmers & Reuter, supra note 43, at 2608.
99 Id. at 2602.
100 Id. at 2603.
101 Id. at 2630. The period in question was 1990–2002. Id. at 2602.
102 Id. at 2604.
103 Id. at 2603.
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The market involving Swiss retirement fund members also exhibits 
very high annuitization rates. The Swiss retirement system is a 
mandatory scheme funded through contributions of which at least half 
are paid by the employer.104 A study that examined a number of Swiss 
retirement funds found that just over 61% of members, upon retirement, 
chose to fully receive their benefits in the form of an annuity.105 The 
funds examined in this study included both defined benefit funds and 
defined contribution funds.106 Most Swiss annuities represent excellent 
value for money on an actuarial basis.107 All but one of the studied funds 
had an annuity as their default option.108
Members of U.S. defined benefit plans are another group of people 
who typically have a high annuity uptake. Although different studies 
report varying annuitization rates for such plans (which is 
understandable given the large number of plans), it appears that they 
usually have annuitization rates of over 50%.109 Such plans historically 
104 Bütler & Teppa, Swiss Pension Funds, supra note 91, at 6.
105 Id. at 27.
106 Id. While the annuitization rates for the defined benefit funds were 
consistently very high, the average annuitization rates for the defined 
contribution funds were also high, although, on average, not as high as those of 
the defined benefit funds. Furthermore, the bundle of defined contribution funds 
had greater variation in annuitization rates compared to the bundle of defined 
benefit funds. Id.
107 Id. at 25 (calculating that for the period relevant to the study, in many cases 
the annuities were better than actuarially fair, though this was not the case for 
single men). However, this was partially accomplished by the running down of 
fund reserves. Monika Bütler & Federica Teppa, The Choice Between an
Annuity and a Lump Sum: Results from Swiss Pension Funds, 91 J. PUB ECON.
1944, 1957 (2007) [hereinafter Bütler & Teppa, Annuity and a Lump Sum].
108 Bütler & Teppa, Swiss Pension Funds, supra note 91, at 27. But see Benartzi 
et al., supra note 15, at 152 (stating that had the default been the lump sum for 
the funds where the opposite was the case, it would have led to lower 
annuitization rates). As only one of the funds studied had a lump sum as the 
default, it remains unclear to what extent the Swiss system’s annuitization rates
are due to many of its funds having the annuity as the default. 
109 Alessandro Previtero, Why Do People (Not) Annuitize?, ANDERSON SCHOOL 
OF MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 12 (Nov 2008), http://www.and
erson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/fac/finance/whyannV9.pdf. Previtero finds that
such funds, typically, have annuitization rates of 70%. But see Benartzi et al., 
supra note 15, at 151–53, for an examination of previous studies using their 
own evidence, finding that defined benefit plans had annuitization rates of 
between 27% and 88%. However, the authors did state that not all the data can 
be regarded as 100% accurate. Specifically, one of the studies relied upon used 
self-reported data rather than archival data. Furthermore, the authors’ own data 
excluded younger participants (under fifty), had smaller balances (less than 
$5,000), or had less than five years of job tenure. The authors point out that in 
the case of some plans, the $5,000 balance minimum made a substantial 
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tended to offer only an annuity option, but in the 1990s they began to 
add a lump sum option as well.110 However, the number of employers in 
the private sector offering defined benefit plans has been declining for a
number of years, meaning that a large percentage of current employees 
are unable to participate in such plans.111 There is some evidence that 
U.S. defined benefit plans offer better value annuities than most defined 
contribution funds.112
B. HOW THESE FACTORS LEAD TO HIGH ANNUITY DEMAND
Earlier in this paper, a description was given of factors that have 
contributed to low annuitization rates in most markets. The next section 
discusses how these factors have been minimized in markets with high 
annuitization rates.
1. Cheaper Annuities
Of the U.S. defined benefit, Swiss, and Oregon high-annuity 
markets, at least the latter two are characterized as having relatively 
cheap annuities.113 However, the evidence discussed below regarding the 
price elasticity of annuities suggests that any direct increase in demand 
due to cheap price is a relatively minor factor in annuity uptake rates.
Although the exact price elasticity of annuities is unclear,114
empirical research does give us some idea as to its approximate 
magnitude. One study examined the change in uptake of life annuities in 
Switzerland after an increase in price. The study found that a 23.5% 
increase in annuity prices led to a thirteen percentage point drop in 
annuitization.115 Another study, based on surveys taken in the United 
difference to what would have been the findings had such participants not been 
excluded.
110 Previtero, supra note 109, at 1.
111 John Beshears et al., Behavioral Economics Perspectives on Public Sector 
Pension Plans, 10 J. PENSION ECON. AND FIN. 315, 316 (2011).
112 Brown & Warshawsky, supra note 16, at 29–31. Contra Benartzi et al., supra
note 15, at 154.
113 See supra note 112 (discussing annuity value in the U.S. defined benefit 
market).
114 There has also been modeling concerning the sensitivity of annuity demand 
to price. See Babbel & Merrill, supra note 37, at 33 (finding that a loading of up 
to 30% has little effect on annuity demand for anything but the least risk-averse 
retirees). But see Inkmann et al., supra note 15, at 312–13 (indicating that the 
presence of actuarially fair annuities would lift stockholder life annuity 
participation to over 40%, but would leave their popularity with non-
stockholders at less than 10%).
115 Bütler et al., supra note 86, at 27. The subsequent 19% reduction of the 
expected present value of benefits led to a thirteen percentage point drop in 
annuitization. A 19% drop in the expected present value of an annuity is 
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States, found that when an annuity’s price was 25% more expensive than 
its actuarially fair equivalent, it led to an eleven percentage point drop in 
demand.116 Even assuming that most annuities are around 25% more 
expensive than those in the markets where annuities are popular, these 
figures suggest that annuity demand should be approximately eleven to 
fourteen percentage points lower in most markets than in high-annuity
markets. It should be noted that the 25% price difference appears to be 
an outer limit, and there is a good chance that the real life price variation 
is lower.117 However, in reality, annuitization rates in most markets are 
dramatically lower than those in high-annuity markets—much more than 
the eleven to fourteen percentage point difference that would be 
expected due to a 25% higher price (a generous pricing difference 
assumption).118 This strongly suggests that factors beyond price 
contribute to low annuitization rates.
However, an examination of the indirect consequences flowing from
the availability of cheap annuities helps explain why the availability of 
annuities at a good price possibly plays a wider role in increasing 
annuitization levels. For example, lower annuity prices mitigate the 
adverse selection effect. The adverse selection effect involves those 
equivalent to the annuity price rising by (1/0.81 = 1.2345), which is a price rise 
of 23.5%. Id., at 13.
116 Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 8. In this survey, people were asked 
whether they would give up their social security benefits in exchange for a lump 
sum; 59% answered in the affirmative when the trade-off was actuarially fair, 
compared to 70% answering in the affirmative when the lump sum option was 
increased by 25%. Id. at 6–7.
117 See generally Brown, Role of Real Annuities, supra note 4, at 58 (estimating 
based on 1998 data that the expected present value as a percentage of the life 
annuity price in the United States, for someone with an average life-expectancy, 
was 86% for males and 89% for females); Finkelstein & Poterba, Selection 
Effects, supra note 52, at 46 (using 1998 U.K. data found that the respective 
rates were 87% for males and 86% for females); Amandha Ganegoda,
Explaining the Demand for Life Annuities in the Australian Market 25–26
(Centre for Pensions and Superannuation, Discussion Paper No. 05/2007, 2007)
(showing that in Australia, another country that has low annuitization rates, in 
2006 the figure was 76% for males and 78% for females, and notes that these 
figures represented a sharp decline from a previous survey that had used year 
2000 data). Thus, if it is assumed that high annuitization rate markets have 
actuarially fair annuities, most markets are likely to have annuities that are no 
more than 25% more expensive than those of such markets. However, even if 
some of the high annuitization rate markets have annuities that are dramatically 
cheaper than actuarially fair annuities, and it is assumed that the price disparity 
between annuities of typical markets and high annuitization rate markets varies 
by more than 25%, the direct price impact still only goes a short way to 
explaining the lower annuity demand in most markets.
118 In most mainstream markets annuitization rates do not exceed single-digit 
percentages. See Section II, supra.
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viewing themselves as having below-average longevity being less likely 
to buy annuities. This leads to a spiral of higher annuity prices and a 
further skewing of annuity purchasers. It follows that the impact of this 
cycle is likely to be less extreme where annuities are cheaper in the first 
place.119 Thus, reducing the adverse selection effect may reduce annuity 
prices and indirectly benefit annuitization levels.
2. Minimized Loss-Aversion and Risk Perception
As previously discussed, the widespread lack of annuitization is 
likely due in part to the phenomenon that people tend to overweigh the 
potential for loss. Specifically, the risks of loss arising from premature 
death following annuitization and from provider default are generally
both overweighed and altogether avoided by individuals who choose not 
to annuitize.
However, the model by which annuities are offered in high-
annuitization markets could lessen the effects of loss aversion and risk 
perception. In high-annuitization markets, annuities are frequently
offered by a retirement plan in which the employee has been a member 
during their most recent employment—that is, the annuity is offered by 
an organization they have dealt with for many years. However, in other 
markets this is typically not the case. Usually, retirees have not had long-
term dealings with their life insurance company when they consider 
purchasing an annuity. Even when a defined contribution plan offers an 
annuity option, such a plan acts only as an intermediary between the 
retiree and the annuity provider rather than as a direct provider.120 It is 
also important to note that the vast majority of defined contribution plans 
do not offer their members an annuity option in the first place. 121
A few interrelated reasons explain why offering annuities directly 
through a retirement plan reduces fears of annuity-related losses. First,
potential annuitants are dealing with a party they are more likely to 
trust.122 Second, given the relationship among the potential annuitant, the
retirement plan, and other plan members, it is realistic to expect that
potential annuitants perceive annuitization as a collective arrangement 
that exists to benefit themselves and their coworkers rather than an
119 See GENTRY & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 83, at 43–44 (discussing the positive 
feedback loop involving lower annuity prices and higher annuitization rates).
120 Previtero, supra note 109, at 13.
121 In 2003, only 17% of 401(k) plans offered annuities. Brown, Rational and 
Behavioral Perspectives, supra note 9, at 8. In 2009, practically no 401(k) plans 
offered an annuity option. Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 149.
122 See Wouter Poortinga & Nick F. Pidgeon, Trust, the Asymmetry Principle, 
and the Role of Prior Beliefs, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1475, 1475 (2004) (discussing 
research that indicates that trust is built over time when dealings are positive, 
whereas it can be destroyed quickly and easily through negative dealings). 
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insurance executive.123 In other words, potential annuitants are more 
likely to view the possibility of a premature death following 
annuitization as the loss of a fair bet, with the winners being other 
retirees.124 In normal low-annuitization markets, however, annuitants are
more likely to view themselves as the financial victims in a premature 
death situation, with the provider’s shareholders and executives as the 
winners.125 The fact that annuity purchases in low-annuity markets are 
often worse bargains than purchases in high-annuity markets likely 
reinforces this perception.
This reasoning is consistent with psychological studies showing that 
people often prefer lose/lose outcomes over win/win outcomes if they 
feel the latter does not give them a sufficient portion of the gain.126
Applied to potential annuitants, this could mean that despite the benefits 
of annuitization, some will hesitate to annuitize if they see themselves 
receiving an unfair deal from annuity providers. This is more likely to be 
the case where the annuity has not been directly offered by a familiar 
body such as the provider of the retirement plan.
Similarly, a retirement plan that directly offers annuities could 
diminish fear of payment default. People are more likely to trust parties 
with whom they have had long-term positive dealings.127 Thus, those 
who buy annuities directly from the provider of their retirement plans 
may be more likely to believe the payments will be honored. Of course, 
having insurance against provider default (an arrangement that exists in 
some high-annuity markets) does not hurt either.128
123 See Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & Daniel John Zizzo, The Value of Groups,
99 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 295–96 (2009) (summarizing the literature that 
indicates that people generally act in a more cooperative and less self-interested 
manner towards other persons they consider as part of their group).
124 Indeed, the annuitant may perceive the loss as a bequest or gift to former 
friends and co-workers under that same plan.
125 See GENTRY & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 83, at 63 (raising the possibility of 
consumers perceiving annuities as unfair gambles).
126 The Ultimatum Game involves two players, where one player splits a fixed 
amount of money between themselves and the second player. However, if the 
second player is unhappy with the split then both parties end up with nil. Studies 
have generally shown that the second player rejects low offers. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Binmore et al., Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A 
Preliminary Study, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1178 (1985); Werner Güth et al., An 
Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG.
(1982).
127 Poortinga & Pidgeon, supra note 122, at 1475.
128 See Benjamin Avanzi, What is it that Makes the Swiss Annuitise? A 
Description of the Swiss Retirement System, 16 AUSTL. ACTUARIAL J. 135, 151 
(2011) (discussing the comprehensive Security Fund that protects Swiss annuity 
receipts); see also Jeffrey R. Brown, Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic Effects 
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3. Framing Effect
The popularity of annuities in certain markets may also be explained 
by the framing effect: the idea that marketing and customer perceptions 
influence individuals’ decisions to annuitize. The framing effect 
manifests itself in a number of ways. First, in high-annuity markets 
annuities are more likely to be viewed as a collective pooling of risk 
rather than an unfair gamble with an annuity provider. Thus, annuitants 
may perceive their purchase as more attractive than would otherwise be 
the case.
Another likely way that the framing effect leads to greater 
annuitization relates to the presentation of benefit statements sent to 
retirement plan members (who have generally yet to make annuitization 
decisions). For instance, the Swiss retirement plan statements, which are
regularly sent to individual members, devote substantially more space 
displaying annuity entitlements than lump sum entitlements.129 In 
defined benefit plans in the United States, statements usually show
entitlements in the form of an income stream.130 The framing of benefits 
as an income stream makes potential annuitants comparatively more 
likely to annuitize.131 This is possibly attributable to the endowment 
effect,132 which is the tendency for people to value items they perceive as
of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 1, 2008 at 
177, 183–87 (discussing the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation that insures 
payments from U.S. defined benefit fund, and noting that this scheme is subject 
to a maximum annual payout limit, and that it has had some financial 
troubles). Most annuities in the United States are only covered by a limited 
guarantee; in such cases the size of the guarantee depends on the state in 
question. See Babbel & Merrill, supra note 37, at 31 (listing the guarantee limit 
for each State).
129 Bütler et al., supra note 86, at 8.
130 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 155.
131 Id. at 155–56.
132 Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326–28 (1990). However, some research 
questions the endowment effect and argues that people only disproportionately 
value what they already own when it has no clear substitute (such as valuing the 
low risk of loss of health, meaning that how much money people are willing to 
accept to give up a lower risk of ill-health exceeds how much they would be 
willing to pay to purchase this lower risk if they do not already have it) and that 
this principle does not apply to goods that have clear substitutes and open 
market (such as coffee mugs). See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, 
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 635, 635–36 (1991); Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving 
Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
255, 266 (1994). Even if this is the case, given that in most cases an annuity 
stream cannot be substituted back to a lump sum, the endowment effect 
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already possessing more highly than items they lack. Due to the 
endowment effect, recipients of statements that frame benefits as a lump 
sum are more likely to view annuitization as the loss of a lump sum;
whereas those that receive benefit statements in the form of entitlement 
to an income stream are less likely to do so.133
4. Other Reasons
There are other reasons for the popularity of annuities in certain 
markets. For instance, many participants in high-annuitization markets 
have large balances in their retirement plans,134 and there is evidence 
that, up to a point, larger retirement plan balances are correlated with 
higher annuity demand.135 In the case of the Oregon Public Employees’
Retirement System, the fact that public sector workers may be inherently 
more likely to annuitize could explain part of the high demand.136
Furthermore, people may be influenced by their peers, which would
reinforce both the unpopularity and popularity of annuities in their 
respective markets.137
The next part of this paper will draw on the factors of success in 
high-annuity markets to propose policies aimed at increasing 
annuitization in mainstream annuity markets. Various other policies that 
potentially increase annuitization rates will also be discussed.
illustrated by the research of Kahneman et al. is applicable to annuitization 
decisions.
133 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 157.
134 See Bütler et al., supra note 86, at 31 (discussing Swiss retirement accounts);
Chalmers & Reuter, supra note 43, at 36–37 (discussing the Oregon Public 
Employees’ Retirement System).
135 Bütler & Teppa, Swiss Pension Funds, supra note 91, at 14.
136 Chalmers & Reuter, supra note 43, at 14.
137 See generally Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, Participation and Investment 
Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues' Choices, 85 J.
PUB. ECON., 121 (2002) (describing how the peer effect influences whether 
workers sign up for a retirement plan, as well as their choice of fund if they 
choose to sign up); John M.R. Chalmers et al., Who Determines When You 
Retire? Peer Effects and Retirement, 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. NB08-13, 2008) (describing how the peer effect influences 
retirement age). But see John Beshears et al., The Effect of Providing Peer 
Information on Retirement Savings Decisions, 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17345, 2011) (finding that a study examining the 
reaction of employees to positive peer information regarding retirement plan 
enrollment had an oppositional impact on their enrollment decisions as 
compared to a control group that was not given such information).
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V. POSSIBLE INITIATIVES FOR INCREASING THE POPULARITY OF LIFE 
ANNUITIES
The phenomenon of low annuitization rates despite the marked 
benefits of annuitization raises an issue as to whether there are grounds 
for introducing policies to encourage annuitization. Such policies could 
be justified on the basis that low annuitization rates are, at least partially,
caused by imperfect markets. Specifically, adverse selection, which is 
the result of asymmetric information, can lead to market malfunctions.138
Policies that encourage annuitization can help reverse the negative 
feedback loop that is the adverse selection effect.139
Other reasons for low annuitization rates are behavioral in nature 
and also justify the introduction of pro-annuitization policies.140 In 2004, 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) found that 41% of roughly 1,000 
retirement-age participants when offered the chance would not convert 
part of their Social Security entitlements to an actuarially equivalent 
lump sum.141 This finding supports the fact that in most markets, there is 
a material level of under-annuitization. This is because the 41% of 
members of the segment that would not give up their Social Security 
entitlements are theoretically either happy with their current level of 
annuitization (from receipts of Social Security and any defined benefit 
pension entitlements) or wish to have higher levels of annuitization. But 
they do not wish for less annuitization; otherwise, they would have given 
up at least a portion of their entitlements for a lump sum. However, it
would be a miraculous coincidence if ideal annuitization levels were 
equivalent to people’s receipts of social security and defined benefit 
pensions.142 Consequently, it follows that a material proportion of the 
ones who would choose the lump sum option desire to have higher levels 
of annuitization. Yet as discussed in this paper, in most voluntary annuity 
138 Akerlof, supra note 55.
139 As discussed below, certain policy initiatives can lessen the adverse selection 
effect by breaking its negative feedback cycle by making annuities more 
popular.
140 See Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for 
Implementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107, 107 (1979) (making the point 
that the existence of inadequate market outcomes is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for policy intervention). To determine the desirability of a policy 
aimed at correcting a market failure, the outcomes of its implementation need to 
be compared with the failure it is trying to alleviate. Id.
141 Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 7. Another possible interpretation is 
that due to market failures, people in some cases do not perceive annuitization 
as being as beneficial as it actually is. Id. The study is likely to be representative 
of the general population of older workers because the subsample of 1,000 
individuals used for this study was representative of the HRS cohort, and the 
HRS is a “nationally representative longitudinal study of older individuals.” Id. 
at 5–6. Of note, the median age of participants was nearly 58 years old. Id. at 24.
142 Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 71.
Spring 2013] Security in Uncertain Times 495
markets only a very small percentage of people annuitize their wealth.
However, given that 59% of people in the same study would trade part of 
their Social Security entitlements for an actuarially fair lump sum 
indicates that the majority of people might still prefer lump sums to 
actuarially fair annuities.143 Consequently, it is important that policies 
aimed at encouraging annuitization do not result in over-annuitization.144
Yet, on the whole, there is a case for increasing annuitization levels. 
The following subsections will examine specific policies that aim to do 
just that. Some policy suggestions are based on adopting important traits 
that have contributed to annuity popularity in high-annuity markets. 
Others are based on theory and independent research.
A. DIRECTLY OFFER LIFE ANNUITIES IN RETIREMENT PLANS
Since one of the common characteristics of high-annuity markets is 
that annuities are offered directly by retirement plans, replicating this 
feature is an important step to achieving higher annuitization. As noted, 
most U.S. defined contribution plans do not offer an annuity option, and 
those that do tend to act only as intermediaries. Consequently, policies 
could be enacted that encourage or mandate defined contribution plans to 
offer life annuities. Defined contribution plans could do so by reselling 
group annuities purchased from life insurance companies. However, 
policies geared in this direction would have to be formulated with the 
aim of inducing defined contribution plan sponsors to offer annuitization 
as a genuinely attractive option. One could envisage a situation where 
defined contribution plan providers grudgingly offer annuities. As a 
result, the annuity option would not be positively communicated and 
might be offered at an unattractive price. 
Instead, policies that encourage defined contribution plans to directly 
offer annuities should not be viewed in isolation. Ideally, they would 
operate alongside other policy initiatives suggested in this paper, such as 
framing annuities in an attractive manner and creating a comprehensive 
annuity guarantee system. Such policies would operate synergistically to 
143 See Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that the result might 
mean that compulsory annuitization does not enhance welfare to the extent 
suggested by standard life-cycle theory). Another explanation for the results is 
perception by consumers that annuitization is not welfare enhancing. Id.
144 A household is over-annuitized when its desired consumption path is either 
less than its annuity income (due to a bequest motive), or constrained by its 
annuity income (for instance, due to the household desiring liquidity so as to 
buffer against a potential unexpected economic shock). See Jeffrey R. Brown, 
Are the Elderly Really Over-Annuitized? New Evidence on Life Insurance and 
Bequests, in THEMES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 91, 94–95 (David A. Wise 
ed., 2001) (discussing over-annuitization in the context of Social Security 
recipients).
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increase annuitization through the availability of well-priced annuities,145
which are perceived by retirees as a fair way of pooling longevity risk 
with other retirees.
Certain regulatory changes would also be desirable to ensure that 
defined contribution plans effectively offer annuities. One of the legal 
changes relevant to the availability of deferred annuities146 would 
involve modifying the Required Minimum Distributions rules.147 These 
rules, which apply to some retirement accounts, mandate that retirees 
over a certain age withdraw a minimum annual percentage of their 
account balance.148 In their current form, such laws could, potentially,
result in a portion of the deferred annuity purchase price being taxed 
during the retirement deferral stage as if it were being distributed, even 
though distribution might not occur.149 To some limited extent, recently 
145 A large number of people annuitizing would, to some extent, lessen the 
adverse selection effect, as it would help reverse the negative feedback loop of 
adverse selection. GENTRY & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 83, at 43–44; see also 
Estelle James et al., The Payout Stage in Chile: Who Annuitizes and Why?, 5 J.
PENSION ECON. & FIN. 121, 135, 151–52 (2007) (finding that the Chilean 
annuity market, which has high annuitization rates but only permits retirement 
fund distributions to take the form of annuities or phased withdrawal products, 
has a limited adverse selection effect and offers annuities which have an 
expected return which is close to actuarially fair).
146 See generally Part V.H, infra.
147 See WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., AUTOMATIC: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA 
SAVES 123–50 (2009) (discussing modifying the rules in the context of defined 
contribution plans offering automatic trial income streams).
148 Retirees must annually withdraw a percentage of the balance of their 
retirement plans (for some types of funds): I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9)(A), 403(b)(10), 
408(a)(6), 408(b)(3), 457(d)(2) (2012); Treas. Reg §§ 1.401(a)(9)-1 (2009), 
1.403(b)-3 (2007), 1.408-8 (2004). The required percentage to be withdrawn 
increases with the age of the retiree. Treas. Reg §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A(4) 
(2004), 1.401(a)(9)-9, Q&A(2) (2002). In the case of many plans, the 
requirements commence the year after the later of when the retiree reaches 70.5 
or of when they retire, but in the case of some plans, they commence the year 
after the retiree has reached age 70.5: I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C). The aim of these 
laws is to make the retirement account funds used by the retiree (and possibly 
their spouse) rather than others, given that those funds have had the benefit of 
tax incentives. Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules 
and Their Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth,
2000 BYU L. REV. 587, 588–89 (2000). In general, immediate annuities from 
defined benefit plans (Treas. Reg § 1.401(a)(9)-6, Q&A (1) (2004)) and defined 
contribution plans (Treas. Reg §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A (1)(e) (2004) & 
1.401(a)(9)-6, Q&A (4) (2004)) are not regarded as part of the balance that is 
subject to annual minimum distributions However, deferred annuities for the 
period that payments have not commenced are not exempt from these 
provisions: Treas. Reg §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A (1)(e) (2004) & 1.401(a)(9)-6,
Q&A (4) (2004).
149 GALE ET AL., supra note 147, at 140.
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proposed regulations prevent the Required Minimum Distributions rules 
from applying to certain deferred annuities.150 Allowing defined 
contribution plans to offer deferred annuities without adverse tax
outcomes would in this respect give them an advantage over defined 
benefit plans, since defined benefit plan annuity payments typically start 
at age sixty-five.151 This is because some of the reasons for not 
purchasing immediate annuities are less applicable to deferred 
annuities.152
Another relevant issue concerns the simplification of fiduciary 
requirements that apply to fund sponsors as they choose annuity 
providers.153 Currently, fulfilling the requirements of safe harbor 
provisions allows the fiduciary that chooses an annuity provider to 
satisfy the duty of adequate care, skill, prudence, and diligence.154
However, these provisions have not proven popular due to their 
vagueness.155 A system that makes it clear which annuities would enable 
a plan sponsor to utilize the safe harbor provisions would decrease the 
cost of providing certain annuities. Information about qualifying 
sponsors could also be combined with an electronic quotation system 
that easily enables a comparison of annuity prices. A comparison tool of
this nature could facilitate competition among low-liability sponsors and 
help maximize the value of annuities.156
Although these suggested changes would enable defined 
contribution plans to offer annuities more easily, there is no guarantee 
they would actually offer annuities. Additional rules may be needed that 
150 See, e.g., Longevity Annuity Contracts, 77 Fed. Reg. 5443 (proposed Feb. 3, 
2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). One of the major limitations of these 
proposed regulations is that they only apply up to a limit of 25% of the 
retirement account balance, meaning that if the retiree wishes to purchase a 
deferred annuity with more than 25% of their retirement funds then they will not 
be fully protected by such provisions. See id.
151 See id. at 5449 (stating that these proposed regulations will not apply to 
defined benefit plans since such plans already give members the option of 
annuities that provide longevity protection). 
152 See infra Part V.H.
153 GALE ET AL., supra note 147, at 141.
154 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(a)(4) (2013).
155 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 160. The regulations include vague and 
broad requirements, such as requiring that the fiduciary consider and act on 
information regarding the ability of annuity providers to be financially able to 
make annuity payments and that the fiduciary consider the costs of the annuity 
and decide whether they are reasonable as compared to the benefits and services 
of the annuity contract. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(a)(4) (2013).
156 See Craig Thorburn et al., An Analysis of Money's Worth Ratios in Chile, 6 J.
PENSION ECON. & FIN. 287, 302 (2007) (discussing how the introduction of such 
a comparison tool in Chile appears to be associated with annuities having lower 
commissions).
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either require such plans to offer annuities or provide stronger incentives
for them to do so. The advantages of mandating an annuity option need 
to be balanced against the inherently coercive nature of such policies. If,
on balance, encouragement rather than coercion is the preferable policy 
stance, decision-makers could continue to reward employers for utilizing 
certain policies aimed at increasing retirement plan participation.157 They 
also might consider an incentive that not only rewards the offering of 
annuities but also the achievement of certain annuitization rates among 
plan retirees.
B. FRAME ANNUITIZATION OPTION AS AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION
Policies carefully utilizing the framing effect can also make 
annuities more attractive. Retirement plans that directly offer 
reasonably-priced annuities are likely to be bolstered if regular benefit 
statements sent to its members frame member entitlements as an 
estimated annuity equivalent. If incentives exist that reward defined 
contribution plans for achieving certain annuitization rates, it will be in 
the plans’ interests to frame annuities in an attractive manner. In this 
way, they may include the benefits as an estimated annuity equivalent in 
regular members’ statements. Additionally, framing annuities as 
consumption rather than investment vehicles, may be desirable given the 
aforementioned research indicating that annuitization is more likely with 
the former.158 Alternatively, if policies mandating or encouraging plans
to offer annuities are not based on attaining set annuitization levels, 
requiring benefit statements to include an estimated annuity equivalent 
could be considered a form of disclosure that would help to increase 
annuitization levels.159
C. OFFER GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE
Evidence exists that the risk of an annuity provider defaulting 
discourages annuitization, especially given the ordinary planholder’s 
aversion to losses and tendency to overweigh small risks.160 Older 
persons, who typically have limited ability to earn income, are even 
more hesitant at the prospect of provider default. A guarantee that 
enables retirees to feel secure about their annuity receipts would alleviate 
such fears and likely contribute to a rise in annuitization rates. 
157 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 160. Specifically, this reward exempts them 
from certain anti-discrimination regulations that limit the benefits available to 
the highest paid workers of the firm. Id.
158 However, there is no evidence that high annuitization rate markets actively 
do this.
159 See, e.g., Lifetime Income Disclosure Act, S. 2832, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(proposing that some regular statements include the annuity equivalent of 
entitlements).
160 Default risk may discourage annuitization. See Section III, supra.
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Although the United States has various state-level guarantees for 
annuity providers, these guarantees are often limited in coverage, and 
different states offer varying levels of coverage.161 Given these factors,
the current system might not withstand a broad economic shock that 
affects a large number of insurers.162
A comprehensive federal scheme to guarantee annuity payments 
would do much to give potential annuitants incentives to annuitize at 
least part of their retirement wealth. Such a scheme could follow the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation model of guaranteeing bank 
deposits. For instance, an agency could guarantee annuity payments up 
to a maximum of $500,000.163 Although such an insurance scheme 
would represent an increased cost to annuity providers and, like most 
increased costs, could be passed on to consumers, such guarantees would 
go a long way towards giving retirees the option of purchasing a secure 
income stream.164
D. PROVIDE TAX INCENTIVES
Just as the above three suggestions would promote annuitization in
the U.S. market, the addition of a tax concession or subsidy on life 
annuities would also encourage higher annuitization rates. This could be 
implemented by applying the capital gains tax rate to all or part of 
annuity distributions. Alternatively, part of the annuity payments could 
be exempt from income tax.165 However, taxing non-annuitized 
retirement plan distributions in a disproportionately high manner 
resembles an indirect form of coercion, not an incentive to annuitize.
Nevertheless, offering tax incentives on life annuities can be
justified on several grounds. For example, such incentives may be
necessary to spare society the cost of retirees who outlive their 
retirement savings and subsequently rely on government assistance.166
However, there is no evidence to suggest that such savings would recoup 
the fiscal costs of such incentives or subsidies.
Still, concessions or subsidies counteract psychological factors such 
as risk perception that often prevent people from annuitizing. Providing
preferential tax treatment for annuities would also offset the adverse 
selection effect.167 These incentives would enable cheaper annuities, 
161 Babbel & Merrill, supra note 37, at 31.
162 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 160–61.
163 GALE ET AL., supra note 147, at 142–43.
164 See Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 160–61 (noting that a guarantee system 
is an alternative to workable safe harbor provisions). 
165 Brown & Warshawsky, supra note 16, at 41.
166 GENTRY & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 83, at 16.
167 Id. at 17–20.
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which would then feed into a cycle of greater uptake by those with 
average longevity. This would reduce prices, leading to an even greater 
uptake.168 Additionally, the demonstrated ability of subsidies to alleviate 
adverse selection in health insurance markets suggests that subsidies
would likely have a similar impact on annuity markets.169
However, government subsidization raises equity issues. This is 
because comparatively wealthier people have a greater ability to 
annuitize, meaning that they would on average receive a greater subsidy 
than those less able to do so. Furthermore, if policymakers decide that 
enhancing retiree well-being is a desirable policy, there may be more 
useful ways to spend taxpayer money than subsidizing the annuity 
markets. Finally, such subsidies would likely be paid for by higher tax 
burdens on other parts of the economy,170 which, given the nature of 
taxes, could lead to other market distortions.171
Overall, it would appear that using government money to increase 
annuitization through concessions or subsidies is not an ideal policy 
stance. If emulating features of markets that have high annuitization 
rates could lead to markedly increased annuitization rates without 
government subsidies, tax concessions become very difficult to justify. 
If, on the other hand, such features would not result in a marked rise in 
annuitization levels, policymakers should consider an additional policy 
of tax concessions or subsidies on annuitized income.
E. MANDATE LIFE ANNUITIES
A number of countries already mandate that retirees annuitize a 
portion of their retirement savings.172 Such a policy has advantages and 
disadvantages.
First, one of the advantages is that mandatory annuitization would 
help reduce the adverse selection effect. This is because adverse 
168 Id. at 43–44.
169 See Bradley M. Gray & Thomas M. Selden, Adverse Selection and the 
Capped Premium Subsidy in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, 69
J. RISK INS. 209, 210 (2002) (listing studies which support their finding that 
subsidies in health insurance markets help counter the adverse selection effect).
170 Those higher taxes might be in the present or future. To the extent such 
incentives or subsidies are funded by a higher fiscal deficit, they will be paid for 
by higher taxes in the future. 
171 Brown & Warshawsky, supra note 16, at 42.
172 Orszag, supra note 39, at 13.
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selection is dependent upon those who perceive themselves as having 
comparatively shorter longevity choosing not to annuitize.173
Second, to the extent that behavioral explanations like loss aversion 
and risk perception result in under-annuitization, one could argue that the 
government has an interest in mandating behaviors that will maximize 
the long-term well-being of retirees and society. After all, the 
government already interferes to promote well-being in a number of 
areas. For instance, laws regarding the mandatory use of vehicle seat-
belts help prevent injuries and deaths to individuals, as well as reduce 
the costs that society pays for such events.174 Similarly, laws aimed at 
cutting tobacco consumption are not only beneficial to individuals whose 
consumption is prevented or reduced, 175 but they also reduce second-
hand smoke and are beneficial to society.176
However, strong counter-arguments discourage mandated 
annuitization. People’s freedom of choice, while not an absolute right, is 
of inherent value.177 Reducing people’s ability to spend and invest their 
retirement savings at will is an abrogation of such rights. Not 
surprisingly, the forced annuitization that occurs in certain jurisdictions 
has provoked anger among citizens who feel that life annuities provide 
poor returns while increasing the profitability of insurance companies.178
Furthermore, forced annuitization disproportionately harms those 
who can reasonably expect to have below-average longevity. The 
173 See Finkelstein & Poterba, Selection Effects, supra note 52, at 42–43 (finding
that the adverse selection effect is about twice as pronounced in the U.K.
compulsory annuity market compared to the U.K. voluntary annuity market).
174 Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on 
Driving Behavior and Traffic Fatalities, 86 REV. ECON. STAT. 828, 828 (2003),
found that mandatory seat belt laws do save lives and concluded that the 
evidence does not support past claims that such laws lead to significant negative 
changes in driving behavior. There is also evidence that motor vehicle accident 
related health care (which like all health costs, is partially borne by the public) 
is reduced through seat belt use. See Shane Allen et al., A Comprehensive 
Statewide Analysis of Seatbelt Non-use with Injury and Hospital Admissions: 
New Data, Old Problem, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 427, 432 (2006).
175 Jonathan Gruber & Botond KĘszegi, Is Addiction ‘Rational’? Theory and 
Evidence, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1261 (2001) (showing that the justification for excise 
on cigarettes is mainly due to their addictive nature and the resulting harm they 
cause the individual).
176 See id. (stating that the cost of externalities such as these, while real, are 
substantially smaller as compared to the cost of the harm that tobacco smoking 
directly causes smokers). 
177 Daniel B. Klein, Statist Quo Bias, 1 ECON. J. WATCH 260, 263–64 (2004),
discusses the main virtues of liberty as well as the major works describing these 
virtues.
178 Orszag, supra note 39, at 2.
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existence of adverse selection reflects the fact that persons can often 
judge their own mortality better than annuity providers.179 The injustice 
of forced annuitization could be abated by more comprehensive 
underwriting, resulting in fairer priced annuities to retirees.180 However, 
there are likely limits as to the extent underwriting could solve this 
problem.181
Another related issue is that although market imperfections cause 
under-annuitization, it does not necessarily follow that the majority of 
people would benefit from annuitization. Given that the ideal rate of 
annuitization is unknown and that some research suggests most people 
do not desire an actuarially fair annuity, mandating annuities could, in 
fact, not be in the majority’s interests.182 Also, while Social Security is a 
mandatory government scheme that results in some measure of forced 
annuitization, the aims of Social Security differ from private annuity 
markets.183 Therefore, the justifications for the mandatory nature of 
Social Security might not apply to the private compulsory annuitization 
of retirement wealth. 
179 Finkelstein & Poterba, Selection Effects, supra note 52, at 30, argue that the 
adverse selection effect is dependent on information asymmetry. Theoretically, 
if annuity providers knew as much as the annuitant did about the annuitant’s 
longevity, then they could price the annuity at a price catered for that particular 
annuitant. Id. This would then prevent the spiraling adverse selection effect 
which is dependent on those with below average longevity not annuitizing due 
to them perceiving annuities as poorly priced for them. Id.
180 Robert L. Brown & Patricia L. Scahill, Issues in the Issuance of Enhanced 
Annuities 11 (Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population
Research Paper No. 265, 2010).
181 See Id. at 9–11, for a discussion of some of the legal constraints regarding 
the use of some criteria for the underwriting of annuities in the United States 
and Canada. Furthermore, insurance underwriting is based on objectively 
measurable attributes being correlated with different measures of risk, meaning 
that factors that cannot be readily objectively measured cannot be properly 
taken account of. Id. For instance, it would be difficult to take into account the
number of friends one has for the purpose of predicting longevity, despite the 
fact that the number of friends one has in their social network is correlated with 
longevity. See Lynne C. Giles et al., Effect of Social Networks on 10 Year 
Survival in Very Old Australians: The Australian Longitudinal Study of Aging,
59 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 574, 577 (2005). 
182 See Brown, New Evidence, supra note 3 (finding in a survey that 59% of 
people would be willing to lose part of their Social Security benefits in 
exchange for an actuarially fair lump sum).
183 See John H. Langbein, Social Security and the Private Pension System, in IN
SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY 109, 109–13 (Teresa Ghilarducci et al. eds., 
2005) (arguing that the goals of Social Security differ from the private pension 
system in that Social Security is aimed at preventing elderly people from being 
destitute and also, unlike the private system, plays an important redistributive 
role).
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Overall, while the case for mandating annuitization has merit, forced 
annuitization might not be the ideal step in maximizing overall utility. 
This is especially so given the examples of high annuitization rates in 
some markets without compulsion. Allowing individuals to voluntarily 
annuitize is a much more elegant solution than mandating that everyone
do so “for their own good.”
F. USE SOFT COMPULSION
But perhaps there is a middle ground. “Soft compulsion” is one way 
of encouraging people to purchase life annuities that, while falling short 
of mandatory annuitization, relies on people’s inertia and can be 
considered a mild form of coercion. Specifically, there is evidence that 
the use of a default option is a powerful tool in influencing people’s 
choices regarding retirement savings.184 Policies could be implemented 
that result in defined contribution plans offering annuitization as the 
default choice for distributions. Clearly, such a policy could only be 
feasible if combined with regulatory and other policies, such as those 
discussed above, which aim to dramatically increase the number of 
defined contribution plans that offer a life annuity option. Another 
method of utilizing the default bias could be to give those entering 
retirement the default choice of a trial annuity, which would
automatically convert to a life annuity after two years.185 Under this idea,
the retiree could opt out of ever receiving the trial annuity in the first 
place or out of receiving a life annuity within the two-year trial period.186
Yet another method for utilizing the default effect would be to allocate a 
portion of retirement plan contributions (during the accumulation phase) 
for the purchase of deferred life annuities.187
184 Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 
401k Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1150 (2001) 
(giving evidence of the power of a default option in increasing 401(k) fund 
participation rates, as well as in setting people’s contribution rate and fund 
allocations); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for 
Retirement Saving Outcomes: Evidence from the United States (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12009, 2006) (summarizing the evidence 
regarding the power that a default option has in influencing choices made at 
various stages of the retirement life-cycle). It has also been shown that 
participation rates in 401(k) plans were substantially higher when new 
employees were asked to make a decision as to whether they wanted to 
participate, as opposed to a standard opt-in regime. Gabriel Carroll et al.,
Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1639, 1639 (2009) 
(stating that though being presented with making an active decision that does 
not involve a default option is very different from being presented with an 
annuitization default and having to opt-out to avoid annuitization).
185 GALE, supra note 147, at 132–39.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 154–58.
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The justifications for using the default option, like those for 
mandating annuitization, are to alleviate adverse selection and
behavioral biases.188 But unlike a mandatory purchase requirement, the 
use of default options for influencing retirement savings outcomes is a
form of “libertarian paternalism” and does not directly infringe on 
people’s personal liberty.189 Such techniques encourage annuitization 
while preserving people’s freedom of choice. On the other hand, the 
reality is that people’s freedom in many contexts is a matter of degree, 
and the use of the default effect utilizes people’s behavioral biases190 to 
make certain outcomes more likely.191 Therefore, it does have some 
impact on people’s freedom. Consequently, while use of the default 
effect might be justified, the issue is whether, keeping in mind the 
inherent importance of freedom,192 a strong enough case can be made for 
its use in influencing annuitization decisions.193 In deciding this, it is 
important to consider that the ideal amount of annuitization is relatively 
unknown, as is the precise quantitative impact of many market 
imperfections that cause under-annuitization. Thus, it is difficult to make 
a compelling argument for mandating that annuitization be the default 
option for retirement plan savings. Further, while it might be argued that 
not having annuitization as a default limits freedom by discouraging 
people from annuitizing, there is a marked difference between biasing 
people towards the irrevocable decision of annuitizing and biasing them 
towards not immediately doing so (which allows them to make future 
financial decisions).
G. ISSUE GOVERNMENT LONGEVITY BONDS
One of the risks annuity providers face is an unexpected increase in 
the average life expectancy of annuitants. The difficulty of hedging 
against such systematic longevity risk leads to higher-priced annuities.194
188 Id. at 124.
189 Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 122 J. POL. ECON. S164, 
S185–86 (2004) (citing Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian 
Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 175 (2003)).
190 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1548–50 (1998) (summarizing many of the major 
behavioral biases).
191 See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 178–79 (discussing a variety of 
policies that incorporate different degrees of paternalism but still, at a literal 
level, allow people a freedom of choice).
192 Klein, supra note 177, at 263–64.
193 Clearly very few would argue that every decision that involves behavioral 
biases should be subject to some form of government paternalism.
194 See Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, Life Is Cheap: Using Mortality Bonds 
to Hedge Aggregate Mortality Risk 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11984, 2006); Andrew Ngai & Michael Sherris, Longevity 
Risk Management for Life and Variable Annuities: Effectiveness of Static 
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One way to counter this is for the government to issue longevity bonds,
which assist annuity providers in hedging against systematic longevity 
risk.195 While the private sector could issue similar financial 
instruments,196 a previous attempt was unsuccessful.197 However, more 
recent developments have raised hope of a future private sector 
solution.198
The advantage of the government issuing longevity bonds is that it
should lead to cheaper annuities.199 Through direct and indirect means,
cheaper annuities would likely lead to higher annuitization rates. 200
Longevity bonds could also contribute to higher annuitization levels 
through lessening the risk of annuity provider default.201
On the other hand, issuing such bonds would subject the government 
to systematic longevity risk.202 This is on top of the longevity risk that 
the government already experiences to due to age-related spending, such 
as Social Security and subsidized health care. However, one justification 
for the government taking on such risk (which would be borne by later 
generations)203 is that any unexpected increase in community longevity 
would have a comparatively greater benefit on later generations.204 This 
is because such an advancement would likely have a greater impact on 
Hedging using Longevity Bonds and Derivatives (Austl. Sch. of Bus. Research 
Paper No. 2010ACTL03, 2010).
195 See David Blake & William Burrows, Survivor Bonds: Helping to Hedge 
Mortality Risk 68 J. RISK INS. 339, 344–46 (2001) (referring to such bonds as 
survivor bonds, where such bonds have a payout that corresponds to the 
longevity of a pre-determined cohort of the population).
196 See Friedberg & Webb, supra note 194, at 2.
197 David Blake et al., Living with Mortality: Longevity Bonds and other 
Mortality-Linked Securities, 12 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 153, 162 (2006).
198 David Blake et al., The Birth of the Life Market (The Pension Inst., City 
Univ., London, Discussion Paper No. PI-0807, 2008); Enrico Biffis & David 
Blake, Mortality-Linked Securities and Derivatives (The Pension Inst., City 
Univ., London, Discussion Paper No. PI-0901, 2009); Blake & Burrows, supra
note 195, at 345 (arguing that even if the private sector were able to issue such 
instruments, the government issue of longevity bonds would still provide a
relative advantage in that government instruments require lower yields).
199 Compare Jeffrey R. Brown & Peter R. Orszag, The Political Economy of 
Government-Issued Longevity Bonds, 73 J. RISK INS. 611, 621 (2006)
(maintaining that the lack of the ability to hedge against systematic longevity 
risk raises annuity prices by less than five percentage points), with Blake & 
Burrows, supra note 195, at 347 (describing the possible price reductions from 
being able to hedge against such risk as “substantial”).
200 See supra Part IV.B.2–3.
201 Friedberg & Webb, supra note 194.
202 Blake & Burrows, supra note 195, at 345.
203 Id.
204 Id.
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the working lives (and possibly lifespans) of those belonging to younger 
generations when the advancement was made, as compared to its impact 
on the working lives of those who would already be at or approaching 
retirement.205 In other words, as younger generations have more to gain 
financially from higher longevity, it follows that they should also 
shoulder the financial downside of such an event. The counter-argument 
is that government might shift the risks too much and over-burden future 
generations.206
On balance, given that the government is already highly subject to 
longevity risk and a pre-existing deficit, the issuing of government 
longevity bonds might not be the ideal solution. Rather, the private 
sector should be left to find a solution through the utilization of financial 
instruments, even though it is uncertain when it will satisfactorily be able 
to do so. The government might try to do its part in assisting the private 
sector, though, by setting up a longevity index, which would predict the 
probability of and degree to which actual life expectancy deviates from
the official forecast.207 However, because the systematic longevity risk is 
unknown and difficult to model,208 such an index is likely to be of 
limited assistance. In the meantime, annuity providers should consider 
relying heavily on life annuities that allow lower payouts if widespread 
longevity increases more than expected.209
H. OFFER DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANNUITIES
So far this paper has argued that offering annuities through familiar 
retirement plans, together with other policies, could lead to materially 
higher annuitization rates. But those involved in issuing annuities could 
also spur annuitization by offering existing subtypes of life annuities 
more cheaply or in a more targeted manner. Issuers could also innovate 
new types of life annuities. However, this needs to be balanced against 
the fact that too much choice can overwhelm people and result in 
inaction.210
205 Id.
206 Id. at 627.
207 Pablo Antolin & Hans Blommestein, Governments and the Market for 
Longevity-Indexed Bonds 10–11 (OECD, Working Papers on Ins. and Private 
Pensions, No. 4, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/3797
7290.pdf.
208 See Sherris & Evans, supra note 53, at 17–24.
209 Brown & Orszag, supra note 199, at 619.
210 Sheena Sethi Iyengar et al., How Much Choice is Too Much?: Determinants of 
Individual Contributions in 401K Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND 
STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 88–91 (Olivia. S. 
Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004) (finding that 401(k) plans offering a 
large choice of funds led to lower participation rates).
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Deferred life annuities that commence payment only once the holder 
reaches a relatively old age are already available. However, annuity 
providers may want to consider why such annuities are potentially 
attractive for some retirees who might otherwise shun immediate life 
annuities. This is because some factors that deter annuitization generally 
are less applicable to deferred annuities. Specifically, deferred annuities 
that commence at a later age increase annuitant welfare more than
immediate life annuities.211 Such deferred annuities target the portion of 
retirement where the annuitant’s remaining life expectancy is uncertain;
whereas, immediate annuities tend to cover the annuitant’s full 
retirement period. Consequently, a deferred annuity requires less wealth,
minimizing the amount of money lost when purchasing an annuity at an 
actuarially unfair price.212 For instance, a sixty-five-year-old would need 
to spend less money on a deferred annuity than on an immediate annuity, 
meaning that less money would be lost to the costs (and possibly profit) 
of the annuity provider. 
Another advantage of deferred annuities relates to the behavioral 
bias in which individuals underweigh large risks and overweigh small 
risks. This bias, which makes an immediate annuity taken at age sixty-
five comparatively unattractive,213 can operate in the opposite manner 
for deferred annuities making them relatively attractive. This is because
underestimating the chance of premature death leads to an 
overestimation of the payments one will receive from such an annuity.214
This behavioral bias will also make an immediate annuity with a 
guaranteed minimum payment period comparatively attractive to the 
younger buyer, since such an annuity is essentially the bundling of a 
term annuity and a deferred annuity.215
The widespread availability of variable life annuities at a reasonable 
price might also increase annuitization rates. Variable annuities offer an 
opportunity for the annuitant to obtain returns based on a variety of 
211 Jason S. Scott et al., What Makes a Better Annuity?, 78 J. RISK INS. 213,
228–38 (2011).
212 Benartzi et al., supra note 15, at 157.
213 This is due to the overweighing of the small risk of an early death.
214 See Hu & Scott, supra note 68, at 76. Specifically, if the deferred annuity is 
set to commence at a late enough age, then the “underweighing of large risk” 
bias leads to the annuity being comparatively attractive. In cases where the 
deferral age is not late enough for this to be the case, there is still some 
lessening of the “overweighing of small risk” bias that makes an immediate 
annuity comparatively unattractive. Id.
215 John Ameriks, Recent Trends in the Selection of Retirement Income Streams 
Among TIAA-CREF Participants, 74 RES. DIALOGUE 1, 1 (2002) (stating that 
most annuitizing TIAA-CREF retirees choose an annuity with a minimum 
guarantee period).
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investment options.216 Modeling has shown that the availability of 
variable annuities should increase annuitization in the earlier part of 
retirement.217 However, there is also evidence that in the real world 
variable life annuities are plagued by high fees.218 Thus, an important 
step in increasing the popularity of variable annuities is to offer them at a 
reduced price. While it is likely that more people would annuitize if 
well-priced variable annuities were widely available,219 it is unclear to 
what extent this would be the case, given that the availability of equity 
investment does not appear to be a major reason for low annuitization.220
The availability of annuities that include liquidity features might also
play a role in increasing annuitization rates. Despite being speculative, 
the proposal to increase or even mimic liquidity in annuities is 
intriguing. It has been suggested that offering annuities bundled with 
long-term health insurance might encourage annuitization, as one of the 
reasons people desire liquidity is to self-insure against health shocks.221
It has also been proposed that refundable annuities could partly rectify 
liquidity concerns.222
VI. CONCLUSION
Life annuities give retirees an opportunity to enjoy an income stream 
that is free from investment and longevity risk. Furthermore, they 
216 Colin Ledlie et al., Variable Annuities, 14 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 327, 329 
(2008).
217 Moshe A. Milevsky & Virginia R. Young, Annuitization and Asset 
Allocation, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 3138, 3167 (2007). However, to
what extent this modeling reflects reality can be called into question because it 
predicts that people should purchase fixed life annuities in late retirement, 
whereas, empirically speaking, delayed annuitization is uncommon. Davidoff et 
al., supra note 13, at 1582.
218 FISHER, supra note 38, at 60–64.
219Ameriks, supra note 215, at 5–6, discusses data that indicates that a 
substantial proportion of TIAA-CREF members choose a variable life annuity 
upon retiring. However, the data only examines TIAA-CREF retirees that 
choose some type of non-lump-sum distribution option. Furthermore, TIAA-
CREF does not offer fixed life annuities as a distribution option.
220 See supra Part III.A.4.
221 Zvi Bodie, Thoughts on the Future: Life-Cycle Investing in Theory and 
Practice, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 24, 27 (2003); Mark J. Warshawsky, Recent 
Developments in Life Annuity Markets and Products, BENEFITS Q., Second 
Quarter 2007, at 46, 55–56.
222 See Eytan Sheshinski, Refundable Annuities (Annuity Options), 12 J. PUB.
ECON. THEORY 7, (2010). Warshawsky, supra note 223, at 52–53 discusses a 
product that offers limited liquidity, in that it allows a one-time withdrawal of 
30% of the expected present value of the annuity on its fifth, tenth, or fifteenth
anniversary, though notes that such products have the potential of adverse 
selection.
Spring 2013] Security in Uncertain Times 509
typically offer a higher retirement income as compared to other 
investment techniques that avoid such risks. The opportunity for retirees 
to purchase a life annuity at a reasonable price enables many of them to 
enjoy income security at a time of their lives when it is most needed. 
And while full annuitization of retirement wealth might be unsuitable for 
most retirees, many of them would benefit from partially annuitizing 
their savings. Despite this, the vast majority of retirees choose not to 
annuitize their retirement funds. Because low annuitization is due in part
to market imperfections, policies that increase the attractiveness of 
annuities should be enacted to give retirees a greater chance of 
experiencing a secure income stream in retirement.
Specifically, policies should promote (1) the opportunity for retirees 
to directly purchase annuities from their retirement plans, (2) the 
presence of a comprehensive guarantee for life annuity payments, and 
(3) the inclusion of entitlements displayed as income streams in plan 
benefit statements. Such measures would help create a positive feedback 
loop of higher annuitization rates and lower annuity prices. Additional 
policies, such as implementing a system that easily allows consumers to 
compare annuity prices would encourage competition and contribute to 
this goal. It is also possible that a tax incentive on annuity income might 
be an important and unavoidable ingredient in this positive feedback 
loop. However, the most elegant set of pro-annuitization policies would 
be as non-coercive as possible. 
* * *
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Australia’s retirement policy impacts on the lives of many. Specifically, when making 
retirement policy decisions, it is vital to recognise the relevant stakeholders, who are: 
• Current retirees, who are directly impacted by their ability to meet day-to-day living 
costs and make other consumptions choices. Closely related issues are their feeling 
of security and their anxiety about finances in retirement. Given that most people 
will become retirees in the future, nearly everyone can be considered a stakeholder 
in this regard. 
• Those of working age in the work force, who are impacted in terms of how much of 
their take-home pay is reduced by taxation which is expended by governments on 
retirees, and how much it is reduced by contributions to their own retirement 
savings. They are also impacted, both in terms of perception and action, by the 
financial measures they need to undertake in anticipation of their future 
retirement, including voluntary savings and investments. Clearly, such decisions 
are influenced by individuals’ perceptions about the extent to which 
superannuation and the pension will provide for their retirement. Revenue-raising 
for publicly funding retirement transfers also has an impact on non-workers to 
some extent, given that government revenue-raising encompasses means other 
than the taxation of labour. 
• Society in general has an interest to the extent to which its members can feel that ‘the 
system’ has improved the well-being of its citizens in a fair manner. 
As in most areas of law, given the different trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages that 
different policy combinations present to decision makers, there is no one perfect 
combination of settings. However, by increasing the pool of knowledge in this area, two 
broad goals become more easily attainable. First, policies that are clearly suboptimal can 
be avoided. Second, where policy decisions do involve viable alternatives, a better 
understanding of the goals and consequences of such policies is likely to result in an 
outcome that properly balances the needs and detriments of various parties. 
The pieces of research forming this dissertation all contribute to the sum of knowledge 
regarding different aspects of Australia’s retirement policy. Collectively, they help us 
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better understand what retirement policy is specifically trying to achieve, and what kinds 
of general and specific policies best achieve it. Unfortunately, there are and always will be 
constraints, including political will, disproportional influence of various lobby groups, 
misinformation due to the media, and public apathy. 
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Australia’s combination of superannuation and a means-tested age pension certainly has 
advantages, but as discussed in Article 1 and Chapter 2, other policy combinations are 
worthy of consideration. Specifically, a comparatively larger reliance on the age pension 
and less on superannuation is affordable, would aid income inequality and possibly offer 
poverty alleviation, but would have a cost as far as work incentives are concerned. 
Complementing superannuation with a public investment fund has advantages such as 
lessening the deadweight loss of superannuation fees and reduction of investment risk, 
but would instead introduce political risk and would require tight, effective governance 
standards. 
Ideally, Australians would be willing to enter into informed debate at the most 
fundamental level regarding these and related issues. Specifically, this would include 
discussing the existence of superannuation, the extent of its importance as part of the 
overall retirement regime, the possible use of default options rather than compulsory 
contributions, and the use of a public investment fund to complement or replace 
superannuation. This would involve a large measure of broad-mindedness, as well as a 
generous amount of determination not to allow self-interested interest groups and 
preconceived ideas to disproportionally influence the outcome. 
In the absence of such a discussion, policy debate should be aimed at perfecting the 
current system. Such debate should ideally include the issues raised in Article 2 and 
Chapter 3. One of these important issues is improving the taxation of superannuation by 
making it better targeted and less costly. Specifically, limiting the taxation concessions 
available to high-income earners would result in the system being less expensive to the 
government, given that such taxpayers are still likely, in the absence of superannuation, to 
end up being self-funded retirees. There also needs to be open and frank discussion 
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about whether there is a need to raise the compulsory superannuation levy above the 
current 9.5 per cent. As argued in Article 2, the trade-offs between higher retirement 
income and lower working life income, as well as the fiscal cost, means that such an 
increase is unlikely to be a worthwhile exercise. 
As also discussed in Article 2 and Chapter 3, policy makers are faced with a deficiency in 
the research on whether retirees are responsibly spending their superannuation savings, 
and this needs to be addressed. Once such research is undertaken, if the finding is that 
retirees are not responsibly using their superannuation, the findings can be used as a basis 
for implementation of policy to prevent or abate behaviour by retirees that is 
irresponsible. In the alternative, if the findings confirm the current research that retirees 
are in the aggregate acting in financially responsible ways, they can be used to prevent 
self-interested lobby groups persuading governments to unnecessarily constrain the 
freedom of retirees. Until a more fully articulated research base is available, the current 
limited research should be taken as a starting point, which means that as things stand, 
there should not be any restrictions on the availability of superannuation lump sums. 
Another relevant issue regarding improving the current system, discussed in Article 3 and 
Chapter 4, involves limiting the availability of the superannuation TTR provisions. 
Specifically, legislation should be enacted to ensure that these provisions are 
predominantly used in a manner consistent with their original goal, which was to allow 
workers to transition to retirement by cutting their work hours to supplement their 
reduced incomes. The current situation, where the provisions are predominantly used by 
full-time workers as a tax minimisation tactic, and such use is encouraged by a 
government website, is not justifiable on an objective policy analysis. Laws aimed at 
restoring original policy goals would go some way at least towards reducing the net cost 
of the superannuation system. 
One of the major aims of retirement policy is to give retirees a measure of financial 
security at a time in their life when their ability to produce income from their labour can 
be severely limited. As discussed in Article 4 and Chapter 5, for some retirees, life 
annuities can play an important role in obtaining financial security. Despite the ability of 
life annuities to provide a secure, lifelong income stream, they are unpopular in Australia, 
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as they are in most countries that do not mandate their use. As discussed in Article 4 and 
Chapter 5, there are policies which, if implemented, would be likely to boost their 
popularity. Specifically, such policies include superannuation funds being encouraged or 
mandated to directly offer either life annuities or similar instruments, a government 
guarantee similar in nature to that which currently exists on bank deposits, and 
superannuation balance statements expressing entitlements in annuity form. Article 4 and 
Chapter 5 also discussed utilising strict compulsion or making annuities the default 
option, but concluded that these are not good policy options, as they would lead to 
suboptimal results for a material number of retirees as well as potentially sparking 
widespread community anger. Even if future research does find that retirees are not 
spending their retirement savings responsibly, that would not justify mandatory 
annuitisation. Rather, in such an instance, retirees should be given a choice between 
annuities and phased withdrawal products. As discussed in Article 2, phased withdrawal 
products with both minimum and maximum withdrawal limits are another vehicle 
through which retirees can be made to spend their savings responsibly. 
Given the importance of retirement policy, it is surprising that there has not been more 
extensive public debate and consultation on many of its important issues. While there are 
many difficulties in arriving at a world-class retirement system, a combination of political 
courage, further research and balanced debate can get us closer to that point. The 
potential rewards clearly make that effort worthwhile. 
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